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FOREWORD
If Alexis de Tocqueville is to be believed, Americans of the Jacksonian era
were pragmatists well before there were philosophers of pragmatism. In Democracy in America he observed that in the United States, "the purely
practical side of science" was energetically developed but that "hardly anyone" was concerned with "the essentially theoretical and abstract side"
of knowledge (Democracy in America, ed. J. P. Mayer and trans. George
Lawrence [Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor edition, Doubleday, 1969], 460).
Tocqueville was suggesting what many later commentators would echo,
that pragmatism, with its emphasis upon an experimental approach to virtually everything, from morals and religion to politics and economy, presupposed a setting sufficiently spacious, richly endowed, and sparsely populated to support a general culture of trial and error and to dismiss as
abstruse any speculation that seemed unpromising in immediate payoff. To
invoke Tocqueville once more, America was the land where one could always correct one's mistakes.
Arguably, during much of the twentieth century pragmatism was
widely viewed by American philosophers and political theorists as the
modern, even the postmodern, version of democratic theory. John Dewey,
in particular, popularized the notion that pragmatism or, in his formulation, "instrumentalism," stood for the application of scientific method to
social problems. Understood pragmatically, democracy was the political
equivalent of, or at least the analogue to, scientific method. Its politics was
said to be characteristically experimental since a free political life meant
not being bound by the dogmas of the past or deference to wealth and
privilege. In the manner of a scientist the democrat depended upon the
free and open exchange of ideas-to identify problems, to deliberate over
the proper solutions, and to compare their relative consequences. And if
one approach failed, try another.
Today, the United States no longer seems quite as 'capacious as the
ix

x
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founders of pragmatism assumed. Our borders are tightly policed, and immigrants are widely regarded as a public burden. And the skeletal remains
of old forests and of vacant high-rise, low-cost housing developments suggest that, contra Tocqueville, the margin for corrigible mistakes has narrowed. There are also other causes at work that make the flexible politics
presupposed by the theory of pragmatism questionable and tend to render
that theory more of an acquired taste than a national instinct.
Ironically, those causes are related to the deliberate cultivation-or
perhaps overcultivation-of two basic principles of pragmatism: the supreme importance of encouraging the growth of the natural sciences,
and especially their practical applications, and of applying a rational
method ( analogous to the experimental methods employed by scientists)
to the solution of social problems. Contemporary science is, in the popular
phrase, "big science," requiring considerable financial resources-public
and corporate-as well as huge research installations and a large and
steady supply of highly trained scientists. Science is integrated into both
the corporate economy and the structure of government. Which is to say,
to a large extent, big science is bureaucratized rather than autonomous. At
the same time, the sciences, whether big or not, have ceased to be viewed
as the unambiguous ideal they had been for the founders of pragmatism.
Significantly, today's neopragmatists, for the most part, have simply
dropped science.
A comparable disillusionment has emerged out of the efforts to define
and solve social problems by means of government action. Rapidly changing, highly integrated societies appear to have an infinite capacity for generating social problems. For more than a half century the main political
response has been the attempt to resolve problems by the actions of federal
and state governments, which meant enlarging the size and power of governments and, largely unnoticed, conceiving of political action as engagement in problem-solving by means of "policy." Once action was equated
with problem solving through policy formulation, the next development
seemed to follow naturally. Ever since the New Deal the idea of action-aspolicy has been touted as the governmental version of scientific method.
The fields of application have been virtually endless, from economic policy
to immigration policy, from defense policy to environmental policy. A policy requires that a problem, say, toxic waste disposal, be defined and delimited so it is analyzable by formal methods that typically claim to be follow-

Foreword

xi

ing "rigorous," i.e., scientific, ways of thinking. The methods may take a
variety of forms: rational choice and cost-benefit analysis are among the
more familiar ones. But the abstract character of the methods of analysis
has also proved congenial to big government because they are readily
adaptable to bureaucratic modes of action such as regulation or rule-making. Typically, bureaucracies attempt to set a uniform rule for a large number of circumstances or cases that, in fact, display widely varying local differences.
As of this moment, the principal critics of bureaucratic action are and
have been business spokesmen, opponents of welfare programs, leaders of
the so-called militia movement, and defenders of property rights. What
may be among the stakes in this challenge is the privatization of action.
The response to the controversy on the part of political leaders, federal
and state, has been to treat it as a problem of administration that calls for
"reinventing government" by reducing its size, scope, and costs. Unfortunately, action itself remains firmly bureaucratized.
To the dilemma of the bureaucratization of political action versus the
privatization of action, Joshua Miller's Democratic Temperament offers a
fresh and important alternative. He has undertaken to retrieve the notion
of political action and restate it within the context of a radical democratic
conception of politics. He rejects the antipolitical direction and hyper-individualism of the privatizers in favor of seeking common and shared values through democratic forms of action based on respect, trust, and equality. But he also defends the idea of smaller scales of action than those
represented even by reinvented government. His arguments are developed
by using William James's pragmatic conception of action as a starting
point. Although Miller is careful to state fairly, though not uncritically,
various Jamesian positions, his main concern is to address some hard contemporary questions about democracy and the meaning of citizen action.
He has retained the openness, verve, and directness of James as well as
James's delight in human differences and impatience with pretense. A
reader who enjoys watching theory at work on questions that are both
serious and immediate will greatly profit from these pages.
Sheldon Wolin
Whale Gulch, Mendocino

KANSAS OPEN BOOKS PREFACE
I see now that in writing Democratic Temperament: The Legacy of William
James I tried to create a role model. In William James I found an advocate for political action based on conviction, doubt, and mutual respect. Political actors assume that their causes are based on truth, but,
according to James, they should also understand that they cannot be
sure. However unlikely, committed political actors should leaven their
convictions with a seed of doubt. No one possesses all of the truth, so
you should not demonize your opponents because they might be right
to some degree. This attitude allows for disagreement without demolishing the community.
In the paragraphs that follow I will trace my intellectual path to
William James, but then question the relevance of James’s democratic
temperament in the post–Trump era. In the Jamesian spirit I will try
to articulate some of the political stances of both the Right and Left,
and then ask if he is a good guide for political action in our day.
I thought that by writing this book I was achieving independence
from my mentors who had such deeply held convictions, including my
father, Jay Miller, and political theorists John Schaar, Sheldon Wolin,
and Wilson Carey McWilliams; I wanted to be my own man. I realize
now that each of them possessed aspects of the Jamesian ideal.
From the ages of twelve to forty-two, I was an absolutist. I grew up
in Chicago during the 1960s as the child of prominent left-wing activists. Like them, I wanted to ban the bomb, stop the Vietnam War,
and support labor, civil rights, and civil liberties. In college, I traded
individualism for community, called myself a conservative radical (see
Henry Adams), and hoped to preserve the environment. I revised my
ideals but advocated them with equal fervor.
But Jamesian seeds had been planted. My father, an ACLU executive, was a free speech absolutist; you challenged the existence of natxiii
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ural rights at your peril. And yet, the ACLU fought to preserve the
free speech rights of those who might later become Trump supporters: Nazis, racists, misogynists, and homophobes. Dad insisted that
the government must never interfere with speech, only with violence.
(James said something similar in “On a Certain Blindness in Human
Beings.”)
At the University of California, Santa Cruz, I was introduced to political theory by John Schaar, who advocated community rather than
individual rights. In his essay, “The Case for Patriotism,” in Legitimacy
in the Modern State (1981), Schaar sought to create common ground
between leftists and conservatives. He urged young people not to see
the United States as only a violent, imperialist, racist country. Instead
they should appreciate the noblest democratic facets of the American
tradition; the Left could find patriotism appealing if only they would
separate it from nationalism. Schaar claimed that Abraham Lincoln
offered a democratic aspiration for ideological opponents. At the end
of his first inaugural address, Lincoln said,
I am loath to close. We are not enemies, but friends. We must not be enemies. Though passion may have strained it must not break our bonds of
affection. The mystic chords of memory, stretching from every battlefield
and patriot grave to every living heart and hearthstone all over this broad
land, will yet swell the chorus of the Union, when again touched, as surely
they will be, by the better angels of our nature.

Perhaps to a fault, Lincoln said that Southern enslavers were as
much human beings as Northern whites. Northerners would be no
more likely to oppose their economic interests than were Southerners.
Likely a role model for James, Lincoln taught that people should hold
tightly to moral principles while respecting others or at least doing
them no harm.
The author of Politics and Vision and Democracy Incorporated, Sheldon Wolin was my thesis advisor at Princeton. He wrote the foreword
for this book, and his reflections on the manuscript are interpolated
in it. In his essay “Archaism, Modernity, and Democracy in America,”
Wolin posited that, while he opposed these movements, there was a
democratic element in the fights for mandated school prayer, censor-
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ship of public libraries, and the teaching of creationism. I wrote about
this dimension of Wolin’s theory in “Conservative Democracy in Politics and Vision,” in Theory and Event (2007). Wolin did not advance an
abstract theory of mutual respect but rather asserted that there was a
point of connection between these movements and his own advocacy
of radical democracy.
Rutgers professor Wilson Carey McWilliams, a student of Schaar
and Wolin, solicited this book for the American Political Thought
series published by the University Press of Kansas. Carey contained
multitudes and saw the value of almost every political position except
liberalism, and when he encountered actual liberals, he found common ground. (See The Democratic Soul, 2011.)
In short, my teachers’ political ideas made a place for people with
whom they disagreed. In contrast to founders of certain utopian communities, they did not want to populate a city with the like-minded.
My point is that the components of William James’s democratic temperament were not completely new to me, as I had thought when I
began working on the manuscript.
* * *
I lost my democratic temperament when Donald Trump was elected
president in 2016. Who could respect fellow citizens who voted for
a fascistic, vulgar, and misogynist bigot? Must I be friends with them?
I have come to wonder if populist democracy, the foundation of my
political value system, is a good thing.
I assumed that the election of Barack Obama signaled that the
country had moved toward mutual respect among races, religions,
classes, genders, and sexualities. Apparently not. I have come to understand that Trump voters feel threatened by cultural and political
change, especially the election of a black president. To be fair, they also
are afraid for their jobs and social status.
In my last vestiges of Jamesian democratic temperament I will try
to identify the political attitudes of Donald Trump’s supporters and
many conservatives. I must first clarify the term liberal. Conservatives
often use the word liberal to mean “left,” lumping together everyone
from moderate Democrats to Socialists. When I was coming of age,
“liberal” meant “vacillating.” Phil Ochs sang, “Love me; I’m a liberal.”
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In Santa Cruz we distinguished “liberal” political theory that emphasized individual rights—including Hobbes, Locke, Jefferson, and Mill—
from that of radical democratic communitarians such as Rousseau,
early Marx, and the People’s Party or American Populists. Just as those
on the Right lump together centrists with socialists, I will link Trump
supporters with the vague term “reactionaries.” I realize that there are
a variety of opinions among reactionaries. Reactionaries are a subset
of conservatives and not all conservatives support Trump.
Overall, as reactionaries see it, liberals are willing to sanction mass
murder in the name of women’s right to choose abortion. Liberals accept homosexuality and trans identity; they welcome to America dangerous Muslims and “illegal” immigrants, who include gang members,
murderers, and rapists. The liberals would put “illegals” on welfare at
the taxpayers’ expense. If “illegals” do not want their families to be
separated, do not bring them into the country. Liberals would be as
happy to have Sharia law as the Constitution. They would eliminate
the Second Amendment and take away guns from the very people who
would protect the country’s safety and the American way of life. Elitist
liberals care more about blacks, Latinos, Muslims, “illegals,” prisoners,
and the spotted owl than they do about working-class white people.
Immigrants and the liberal elite have taken away white jobs. Liberals
do not acknowledge black racism against white people and ignore violence directed at police and ICE officers. Blue lives matter.
Reactionaries and conservatives often state that the liberal point of
view is promoted by liberal professors who teach students to be politically correct, undermining both patriotism and common sense. They
know that liberals claim that their critics are guilty of “white privilege.”
Many points of view are censored at the institutions where debate
should be encouraged. Students are not permitted to even suggest that
women should be mothers first or that those accused of rape have the
right to defend themselves. Innocent jokes are called sexist and racist.
Boys are put on trial for being boys, and girls take no responsibility for
getting themselves into situations in which things can get out of hand.
College students who live in a liberal bubble are in for a rude awakening when they enter the real world. Whatever sins Donald Trump may
have committed in his personal life, and no matter how obnoxious he
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is, his actions support the best American values. You might not know
the good things that Donald Trump does because the lying media will
not give him a break.
Opponents of these views are also divided, but many of them believe that Trump supporters are racist, homophobic, violent, and
cruel. Gun rights advocates enable horrific almost daily mass killings.
Unrecognized or unacknowledged racism has been a fundamental
part of America since 1619, and slavery continued after the Emancipation Proclamation as peonage, mass incarceration, and Jim Crow.
Police murder black people with impunity. Genders are fluid and nonbinary; call people the pronouns they desire. Climate change is real
and public lands should be protected from developers. The treatment
of prisoners and undocumented people, especially family separation,
is shockingly cruel. There is a desperate need for housing and food
among poor and even middle-income people. Universal health care,
education, abortion, and contraception are human rights and should
be free. Trump supporters are comfortable with their views because
they have white privilege. Social analyst Ta-Nehisi Coates says that you
cannot be a nonracist Trump supporter.
How can people who hold such opposing views live together in a
democracy? If he were alive today, would James still advocate mutual
respect? In the essay, “On a Certain Blindness in Human Beings,”
James called for the reconciliation of workers and owners. At this
point in time, however, mutual respect feels like the wrong goal. How
can you respect cruel people who do not see themselves as cruel? Some
liberals, in the Jamesian spirit, are trying to heal the rift, which they
blame on media-consumption habits. One group watches Fox News
and the other CNN. On Twitter and Facebook you choose who you
want to follow and therefore are not exposed to positions other than
your own, so you should add your ideological opponents to your Twitter feed and watch Fox News. Yet a friend said, “Why do we have to
reach out to them? Let them reach out to us.”
I opened by remembering that in this book I constructed James as
a role model for a democratic temperament that includes mutual respect. In the wake of Trump’s election, I am losing the Jamesian spirit.
I do not want Trump supporters in my Twitter feed or as Facebook
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friends, and I will not watch Fox News. I hear the Trump point of
view in the New York Times, NPR, and from many of my students and
colleagues. See above.
Should William James serve as an intellectual and political role
model for our time? Maybe not. He was a white Harvard professor
from one of America’s wealthiest families—the epitome of white privilege. If we listen to James at all, what part of his ideas should we
accept or reject? In the name of mutual respect, should we debate the
existence of racism, the science of climate change, the rights of trans
people, and the supposed threat of Muslims to the West?
It cannot hurt to realize that the other side feels as right about
their views as we do ours. Although Americans are deeply divided we
cannot be divorced, so we might as well try to understand the other
as much as possible. I do not know what will ameliorate America’s
intense conflict. I do not know if James can or should be heard today,
but if the intense friction in American politics were reduced, William
James should again be our guide to create a democratic temperament.
Joshua I. Miller
Easton, PA
February 2020

PREFACE
It is no small burden to try to bring someone new into theory's conversation about politics. "No room! No room!" Epic theorists-Plato, Aristotle, Machiavelli, Rousseau, Hobbes, Locke, Mill, and Marx-take up
a lot of space at the table, and other European giants-Kant, Hegel,
Nietzsche, Heidegger, Benjamin, Foucault, Habermas-also command positions. Some Americans occupy seats, despite the supercilious glances
of the Europeans: Winthrop, Jefferson, John Adams, Paine, Madison,
Hamilton, Calhoun, Lincoln, Henry Adams, John Dewey, Randolph
Bourne, Jane Addams, Martin Luther King, Jr., and Hannah Arendt.
Should James have a place at theory's table?
Convincing theorists that William James was a significant political
thinker will certainly take work. One night at a political science convention, I was hoping to impress a theorist over a drink. She was jazzed about
a new study group on postmodernism at her university. "What are you
working on?," she asked.
"I study American political thought, and I'm doing a book on William
James."
"William James? Didn't he write The Turn of the Screw?"
"No, that was his brother, Henry. William was a psychologist and philosopher who lived from 1842 to 1910. He was the author of Pragmatism;
his Principles of Psychology used to be the standard textbook in psychology
courses throughout the country; he was America's preeminent philosopher
at the end of the nineteenth century. The New York Times once published
a front page interview with him about his ideas. I'm trying to draw out the
implications of his thinking for political theory."
"That's interesting," she sighed. After a few minutes of conversation
on other topics, she asked me again what I was working on.
"William James." I realized that romance was a dimming possibility.
"Yes, you said that. That's not very postmodern, is it?"
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I could have replied that James actually was postmodern in crucial
ways. Although not denying the existence of truth or God, he rejected the
idea that they can be known with any certainty. He believed that convictions and causes are risky choices whose veracity cannot be guaranteed by
reference to an external standard. The link between James and postmodernism has been made explicit by Richard Rorty, a liberal postmodernist
philosopher who has invoked James and pragmatism as a direct antecedent
of his argument for the benefits of antifoundationalism, which is the recognition that one's truths do not rest on objective grounding. And there
are close similarities between James and political theorist William Connolly's case for ambiguity and "agonistic democracy." The postmodernists'
preoccupations with contingency, truth, belief, difference, and action were
at the heart of James's concerns.
I could have told her that the perverse nature of contemporary political
life makes listening to James particularly urgent. Public conversation about
politics has become strikingly uncivil. Campaigns are built on attack ads,
which everyone deplores while the ads remain effective. Generosity toward
opponents is defined as weakness. Every scrap of personal failing, mistaken
utterance, or controversial vote is used as a weapon to destroy one's adversary. Moderates on abortion are denounced as baby killers, opponents of
the death penalty are said to be soft on crime, and to suggest that taxes
need to be raised or that the poor need more help is political suicide. Advocates of every position claim the moral high ground and denounce those
who disagree as enemies of the people. In the aftermath of the Civil War,
James asked how proponents of various causes could act without trying to
demolish, conquer, or demonize the other side.
I should have told my friend that if she shared with many postmodernists a faith in radical democracy, she should study James's theories of
action and mutual respect, because if she happened to wonder why people
take part in politics and asked if the "typical" motivation for action is compatible with regard for opponents, she could find in James illumination of
the complexities of democratic political consciousness. I might have
summed up by saying that James's great contribution to political theory
is his comprehension of the political actor's psychology. But that night in
the bar, having abandoned hope, I mentioned none of this. I could not
yet quickly convey what mattered in James's thought.
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I began to study James without knowing what I was looking for in
his work. Wilson Carey McWilliams proposed to me that the contributions to American political thought of a number of philosophers, including
Royce, James, and Santayana, might be more fully articulated. I offered to
write on James because I knew him to be a localist and a great writer, even
though I distrusted pragmatism as the potential enemy of visionary, i.e.,
radical politics.
In this record of my engagement with James, I have attempted to create
a work of political theory rather than an intellectual history. As I understand theory's task, it is to address contemporary political problems by examining how previous theorists have grappled with similar issues. I have
tried here to bring James into the political dialogue of the present by articulating his ideas concerning democratic action. By explicating, criticizing, and meditating on James, I develop my own ideas about issues facing
democracy and democrats today. Although taking James as my focal point,
I am attending to contemporary problems that preoccupy theorists. Therefore, I am quite selective in the themes that I treat in James's thought,
focusing on the themes that concern significant issues in democratic theory and practice.
At the heart of the book is James's description of the democratic temperament, which I take to be a healthy corrective to the distemper that
characterizes so much of politics today. The democratic temperament
includes a willingness to act, placing the public good ahead of private comfort, generosity toward one's opponents, and a nearly universal respectwhich, for James, included women, African Americans, workers, inhabitants of the Third World, and even white members of the middle and
upper classes.
I could have written a more empirical book in which I used primarily
historical and contemporary examples of democratic politics to illustrate
James's theory of democratic temperament, describing the members and
leaders of unions, parties, cause organizations, and experiments in egalitarian or consensual decision making. I might have studied the biographies of politicians and activists, perhaps even interviewing them about
their worldviews and self-understandings to see if they corresponded to
James's categories. Instead of following either of those approaches, in writing about James on political consciousness I have drawn on my own po-
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litical experiences, those I have witnessed, and those about which I have
read.
My political education began at home. My father was a trade union
organizer and business agent before assuming a leadership role in the peace
and civil rights movements. Later he became a career official of the American Civil Liberties Union. My mother studied labor education in graduate
school at the University of Chicago before becoming an education director
and a social services director, first in the Midwest and then nationally, for
the Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union. She was one of
the founders of the Coalition of Labor Union Women, serving for many
years as its president, and was the first woman to sit on the executive board
of the AFL-CIO. Through my parents, I met many people whose lives are
devoted to social change. I have had some political experiences of my own,
as a participant in the antiwar movement as a high school student and,
after college, as a community organizer for two years in the South. My
sister, Rebecca, is the political director of 1199, the National Health and
Human Service Employees Union.
Perhaps because of this family background, when I write about politics
I usually am thinking about visionaries and activists of movements and
organizations, and sometimes public officials, who work to bring about major changes in the political order. Abraham Lincoln, Ida B. Wells, Jane
Addams, Tom Hayden, Martin Luther King, Jr., and John Lewis are
often on my mind. These men and women are the political equivalents of
James's "saints" described in his Varieties of Religious Experience. My preoccupation with transformative politics is consonant with James's religious, moral, and political concerns. Although he sometimes emphasized
the preservation of American institutions, he was equally interested in
how societies are radically altered and in the mental outlook of the people
who lead society through those changes.

My first debt of gratitude in writing this book is to Carey McWilliams,
one of the most prominent political theorists in the United States. We had
many helpful conversations about James, and the book is much stronger
because of his skill and insight in reviewing the manuscript. I incorporated
many of his ideas into the final version, and I am grateful to Carey and to
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Fred Woodward, director of the University Press of Kansas, for their
warmth and enthusiasm for this project.
I began by being a bit unnerved about discussing James's thought without knowing my mentors' estimation of him; they never lectured on James.
Then I took some pride in my intellectual independence. As Flannery
O'Connor wrote in a letter, "I keep clear of Faulkner so my own little boat
won't get swamped." Without commenting on the draft chapters of the
manuscript I sent them, they still offered crucial advice. John Schaar, professor of political theory at the University of California, Santa Cruz, advised me not to jump on the bandwagon of the pragmatism revival by
arguing primarily with contemporary commentators but to instead face
James directly. In our several conversations about the book, Sheldon
Wolin, my former graduate adviser in Princeton's political philosophy program, urged me to look at the historical forces that led James to theoretical
paradoxes and insisted that a conventional book about James would not
be worth writing.
After nearly six years of work, I had completed what I assumed was the
final substantive draft of this book. At that point, Wolin offered me his
suggestions for revising the manuscript. This act of remarkable generosity
took Wolin away from his own writing projects to dictate several hours of
comments on microcassettes, which I transcribed to nearly twenty singlespaced pages of invaluable ideas for revision and numerous insights into
the theoretical issues with which I was wrestling. He reminded me of the
history of those issues in the tradition of political theory and proffered
alternative interpretations of James. Fred Woodward wisely allowed me just
three months to make revisions. How to incorporate and properly credit
Wolin's work became a dilemma. I have included many of his remarks in
the text and notes and cited them as his; in other places, I have silently
( and more traditionally) integrated his editorial recommendations into
the text. I wished to share his insights with the reader, and I believe this
unusual inclusion of commentary into the text will make for interesting
reading. It was a pleasure to work with Wolin on the book, and I am grateful for his efforts.
I have also benefited from the intelligent critiques of various chapters by Charles Hersch, Brian Weiner, Elaine Thomas, Janet Ewald, Laurie
Maffly-Kipp, Ernst Manasse, Casey Blake, Romand Coles, Ingrid Creppell, and Richard Rorty. I had no intention of writing a chapter on James
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and gender until I fell under the influence of a seminar on race and gender
at the National Humanities Center in 1993-1994. At the last meeting of
the seminar I presented my chapter and received extraordinarily helpful
comments from Paula Giddings, Evelyn Brooks Higginbotham, Claudia
Koonz, Luise White, Judith Bennett, John Thompson, Gary Shapiro, and
Mark Mazower.
My teacher, the late Maurice Natanson, and my friends Nicholas Xenos
and Wendy Brown provided important counsel on the writing and publication of this book. I delivered an early version of the chapter on education as a Jones Lecture, "Democratic Pedagogy," at Lafayette College in
spring 1993 and presented another to the Political Science Club at North
Carolina State University in fall 1994. I also profited from discussions with
students and faculty at the University of Texas, Austin, and Tulane University as well as from panels of the American Political Science Association and the Western Political Science Association. Students in my spring
1995 graduate seminar on pragmatism and politics in the Political Science
Department at Rutgers University helped me to clarify my ideas, as did the
members of my senior seminar on democratic action at Lafayette College
in fall 1994.
Completion of this book depended upon public funding for the humanities, and I am very grateful to the National Endowment for Humanities for supporting a revivifying year at the National Humanities Center in
Research Triangle Park, North Carolina, during which most of this book
was written. Every member of the center's administration and staff, from
the director to the engineer, believes in the cause of scholarship and does
everything possible to make a Fellow's stay productive and pleasurable.
Also, Lafayette College generously granted me a sabbatical, a summer research fellowship, and student research assistance. Nicole Piccione proved
to be an excellent copyeditor, and Terese Heidenwolf and Vaswati Sinha
of Skillman Library's Reference Department solved many bibliographic
problems for me. I did my own typing and printing, but Lafayette's Computing Services Department-including its former director Les Lloyd,
Tracy Logan, Lori Young, and students Diane Lorenzo and Bridget Solimeno-provided me with the equipment I needed and patiently solved
many mysteries of its use. A gift from my grandmother allowed me to acquire the other tools I needed to complete the book.
I gratefully acknowledge permission from Kluwer Academic Publishers

Preface

xxv

to reprint "Truth in the Experience of Political Actors," an early version
of Chapters 1 and 4, that appears in The Prism of the Self: Philosophical
Essays in Honor of Maurice Natanson, ed. Steven Galt Crowell ( 1995).

At the conclusion of the race and gender seminar, Judith Bennett declared, "I'm sure that we all like William James more than we did before
we read Josh's paper." I was pleased by her remark, but persuading readers
to like James is not my goal; my primary aim is to stimulate the reader's
thinking about the issues concerning democratic action raised in the various chapters. Nevertheless, it would be good if more people read James. I
can attest to the fact that a serious engagement with James is an intellectually pleasurable and transformative experience.
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I
Before turning to James's explicit ideas about democratic action, I must
establish the fact that he had political interests, because treating James as
a theorist, or even as a thinker with serious political concerns, may seem
strange to people familiar with his traditional identities as a philosopher,
psychologist, and interpreter of religious experience. It has been frequently
asserted that he was a radical individualist, with no interest in politics, 1
and discussions of pragmatism's political implications usually turn quickly
from James to Dewey. 2 At the same time, critics characterize James as a
democrat, an egalitarian, and a localist before passing on to other themes
in his work. More recent commentators, however, especially George Catkin and Deborah J. Coon, have shown that James's lack of interest and
insight into politics has been exaggerated. 3
Admittedly, his attention to the tradition of political theory was not
comparable to his devotion to philosophy, psychology, and the supernatural, but James was not ignorant of that tradition. He knew and criticized
Plato, Hegel, and Nietzsche. His Principles of Psychology frequently cites
Hobbes's Leviathan, and he acknowledged the influences of John Stuart
Mill, Nation editor E. L. Godkin, and Tolstoy on his political thinking. 4 It
is thus no surprise that James often called himself a "liberal." One can
presume that as a well-educated Harvard professor and a godson of Ralph
Waldo Emerson, James was steeped in the classic texts of American political thought. His student Santayana thought that James's devotion to the
principles of the Declaration of Independence was at the heart of his "naive" anti-imperialism. 5
Much of James's writing is implicitly related to politics. He had a Puritan commitment to moral action, i.e., to combating evil in order to
reshape the world according to a vision of justice. James believed that God
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exists and is on the side of good, but he also believed that God offers no
salvation if people do not struggle to save themselves. To depoliticize this
theme in James's work reflects an overly narrow definition of politics rather
than its true place in James's thought. There is no reason to restrict James's
reflections on action to private life since he made clear that he did not
sharply distinguish between public and private action. In The Will to Believe, James was concerned with the philosophical and psychological bases
for acting when faith in absolute truth has been shaken. The essays "Great
Men and Their Environment" and "The Moral Philosopher and the Moral
Life" can be read as descriptions of the psychological and ethical dilemmas
of a person who wants to transform institutions and ideas. 6 In Varieties of
Religious Experience, James identified radical political actors with the religious activists he studies in the book: "The Utopian dreams of social justice in which many contemporary socialists and anarchi~ts indulge are, in
spite of their impracticability and non-adaptation to present environmental conditions, analogous to the saints' belief in an existent kingdom
of heaven." 7
James expressly discussed such political themes as action, equality, citizenship, obstacles to respect among individuals and communities, materialism, and war in his essays ''A Certain Blindness in Human Beings,"
"What Makes a Life Significant," and "The Moral Equivalent of War" and
in his speeches "Robert Gould Shaw" and "Remarks at the Peace Banquet." Although he did not pay sufficient attention, from the standpoint
of political theory, to institutions, economics, or power, his insights into
psychology and religion can be applied to political experience. I do not
claim that his primary concern was politics, but the political dimension of
his work has been insufficiently acknowledged and studied.
In this book, I do not attempt to address all aspects of James's political
thinking but instead focus on the theme of democracy. By "democracy," I
usually mean radical or participatory democracy and thus distinguish democracy from two terms with which it is commonly associated, "liberalism" and "representation." Many readers distrust radical democracy with
its stress upon citizen power, action, equality, and community. They prefer
liberalism that, in its ideal form, is embodied in a benign and limited centralized authority which protects individual rights and represents the people's true interests. Radical democrats do not repudiate the ideals of indi-
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vidual rights and a government that rules in the public interest, but they
emphasize equality of power; direct participation of citizens in decision
making, both in politics and in civil society; and mutual respect for the
diverse members of the community. As one who believes in participatory
democracy, my political ideas differ from James's: he was not consistently a
radical democrat, although much of his thought is compatible with radical
democracy. In this book, I translate James's thinking into the language of ·
democratic politics, not only interpreting him to be a theorist of action
but also exploring the complexities of that theory.
Students of politics should be interested in James because he speaks to
the paradoxical condition of modern political existence: widespread withdrawal from public life combined with fanatic action. James lived through
the Civil War and wrote his major works during the era of massive immigration from Europe, the building of the railroads, the escalation of
American imperialism, the Populist movement, the campaign for women's
suffrage, the Haymarket riot, and violent struggles between labor and management. Reconstruction was dismantled while lynching became common, the Ku Klux Klan was formed, Jim Crow laws were passed, and, in
response, a nascent civil rights movement took shape. 8 Nonviolent resolution of domestic and international conflicts seemed a remote possibility.
Yet, even in this period of change, James and other intellectuals were anxious about a lack of reasonable political action. 9 The national government
had become corrupt after the Civil War, and after the defeat of the Populist party in 1898, citizens began to withdraw from national politics. 10 Political scientist W. Y. P. Elliott wrote that
the twentieth century began with a fear of the monstrous complexity
with which it was faced hanging in the air like a heavy pall. Life
had lost forever, men seemed to think, the poetic simplicity and untroubled confidence with which the youth of Western civilization had
faced its problems. Eucken said of this time ... : "paralyzing doubt saps
the vitality of our age. We see a clear proof of this in the fact that
with all our achievements and unremitting progress we are not really
happy.... " The prophet of this period is old Henry Adams. 11
James believed resignation to be a danger to democracy, and even to-
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day passivity remains a formidable obstacle to the recovery of democratic
politics. In The Prince, Machiavelli depicted a popular attitude like the one
James saw in the United States in the late 1800s and one that remains
widespread:

It is not unknown to me that many have held, and still hold, the opinion that the things of this world are, in a manner, controlled by Fortune and by God, that men with their wisdom cannot control them,
and that, on the contrary, men can have no remedy whatsoever for
them; and for this reason they might judge that they need not sweat
much over such matters but let them be governed by fate . This opinion
has been more strongly held in our own times because of the great
variation of affairs that has been observed and that is being observed
every day which is beyond all human conjecture. 12
From the standpoint of the people who are acquiescent, God, the government, late capitalism, or any power except themselves and their neighbors
shapes reality and controls events; human beings are helpless to do more
than accommodate to the direction of force. Seeing no hope for political
change, many citizens focus on themselves ( the private life of self, friends,
family, work, body, spirit, psyche, pleasures) or turn their attention from
this world to the next.
James challenged those elements of American political culture that encourage compliance, particularly education and the rise of large-scale institutions. 13 Even today most conflicts are not resolved democratically;
usually one person or a small group decides and then gives orders to subordinates. Despite our nation's professed commitment to democracy, the
bureaucratic, hierarchical model is assumed to be natural, efficient, just,
and conducive to productivity, and this model has been adopted by most
corporations, families, colleges and universities, and even social change
organizations. Because challenging authority is risky, most citizens obey
the people who have power over them, even when they strongly disagree
with their actions or beliefs, both because they fear the penalties of resistance and because they have come to accept inequality as natural. From
the perspective of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, continuous obedience without
consent is a system of coercion akin to slavery. One function of leaders and
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teachers, according to James, is to overcome resignation and initiate action.14
As in James's time, the popular alternative to passivity is still moral
absolutism. For James, this concept was embodied in the imperialism of
Teddy Roosevelt, in American chauvinism, and in the inability of the
bourgeoisie and working classes to understand the other's point of view.
Today, moral absolutism can be seen in the anti-abortion movement, the
religious right, parts of the left, the Nation of Islam, and the campaign to
censor books, television, music, art, and film. One fears that acts of political terrorism, such as the bombings of the World Trade Center and the
Oklahoma Federal Building and the shootings of doctors and staff members at abortion clinics, will increase. Many groups and individuals act as
if they have a direct line to God, condemning their opponents as deluded
or deviant; their demands are nonnegotiable. Absolutism is antidemocratic because politics requires recognition of, and negotiation with, opponents; democratic politics implies that people are at least allowed to state
their claims and, ideally, to take part in making a decision. 15 Neither passivity in the face of increasing governmental and corporate power nor violence, terrorism, and hatred are harmonious with democracy.
As I explain in Chapter 3, James sought to balance action based on a
self-critical faith with tolerance for the causes of others. His concept of
"the will to believe" spoke to intellectuals who feared that they could not
act legitimately if they could not discover solid external ground ( e.g., God's
will) or scientific certitude for their causes. According to James, motives
for human action are never completely rational, and therefore people
should abandon the quest for certainty; if they do so they will be less likely
to censure the causes of others.
Democrats today wish to promote, as did James, both principled action
and mutual respect among citizens of different viewpoints, races, genders,
classes, and religions. James offers, if not a path leading out of resignation
and violence, an analysis of the antecedents of those reactions and the
difficulties of overcoming them. One finds James to be a critic of imperialism and absolutism and an advocate for esteeming and tolerating diverse
cultures. It might not be too strong to say that in this advocacy, James laid
the groundwork for the cultural pluralism developed by Randolph Bourne
and James's student Horace Kallen. 16
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II
I will say something now of James's life, but only a little, for I have no
wish to contribute to the tradition of subsuming his ideas to his admittedly
compelling biography. 17 In his person, James was short, charismatic, and
a sharp dresser. In personality, he was humane, lively, and generous, and
those qualities are reflected in much of his political thinking. Born in
New York City, William was the oldest son of Henry James, Sr., one of the
wealthiest men in America and an eccentric writer on literature and religion. Ralph Waldo Emerson was a friend of the elder James and visited
his home on Washington Square a few days after William was born. At
Emerson's suggestion, Henry David Thoreau also called on Henry James.
William's younger brother, Henry, Jr., wrote The Turn of the Screw, The
Bostonians, Portrait of a Lady, and What Maisie Knew, and his invalid sister,
Alice, has received attention from feminist scholars for her insightful diary.18 Two other brothers fought in the Civil War. Wilkinson James, who
served under Robert Gould Shaw in the 54th Massachusetts Infantry, a
black regiment, was wounded at Fort Wagner. After the war, "Wilky" and
Robertson James started a racially integrated farm in Florida, but it failed,
largely because of attacks by local racists after they discovered Wilky's connection with Shaw.
In 1860-1861, William James studied painting in Newport, Rhode Island. Abandoning that career at the insistence of his father, he entered
Harvard where he studied chemistry and anatomy. In 1863, he began
medical school, graduating in 1869; the M.D. was his only degree. He
interrupted his training to join a scientific expedition to Brazil and then
studied psychology in Germany.
Although William James was a man of prodigious energy and accomplishment, he was afflicted throughout his life with feelings of depression
and lethargy. He had a nervous breakdown at twenty-eight, which concluded with the adoption of a new philosophy that posited a pluralistic
universe in which convictions are chosen rather than supplied by God.
James went on to teach psychology and physiology at Harvard and later
became a professor of philosophy at the same institution. His students included Gertrude Stein, W. E. B. Du Bois, Walter Lippmann, Horace Kallen, and Theodore Roosevelt, each of whom had a significant impact on
American politics, political theory, or culture. James sought an audience
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for his ideas that was broader than professional philosophers. 19 After his
classic works, the two-volume Principles of Psychology and his essays Will
to Believe, his most prominent books are collections of public lectures: Talks
to Teachers, Varieties of Religious Experience, and Pragmatism.
In the 1890s, James took an increasing interest in politics. 20 In 1895,
he protested the United States' role in the crisis connected with the Venezuela boundary dispute and "was henceforth keenly concerned about colonialism, imperialism, international relations, militarism, and America's
role in the world scene." 21 He supported the nineteenth-century movement to establish and protect African Americans' civil rights and publicly
denounced lynching. He vigorously protested U.S. involvement in the
Philippines and in the Spanish-American War. 22 James had a strong interest in defining the public role of the intellectual, and he distinguished theory from action. In a letter to Wincenty Lutoslawski, a Polish Plato scholar
and political reformer whom James highly respected, he wrote: "Division
of labor is the great thing. You belong to the theoretic sphere as few men
do, and you do not belong to the practical sphere. Work out the abstract
theory of freedom, and let the close-lipped, iron-willed, hard-hearted men
of affairs who exist for that purpose translate it into action. Thus it shall
best succeed."23 In his letters, James defined his vocation variously as philosopher, academic, teacher, and intellectual, yet he believed all of those
activities had a public dimension. 24

III
In the chapters that follow, I attempt to articulate a coherent democratic
theory in James's writings, yet I must also acknowledge his contradictions.
He was a pacifist who called for a warlike spirit. He was egalitarian and
open to points of view dismissed by most others, but he was also an elitist
who called the college-educated an aristocracy and the many "a herd of
nullities." The individual was perhaps his central value, but he insisted
that people had strong obligations to serve the community. He has been
labeled an anarchist because he hated institutions that might restrain
creativity and energy and recognized that geniuses were innovators who
transgressed existing laws and customs. Yet he also supported the consti-
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tutional order and said that punishing lawbreakers was essential to its preservation. He seemed to believe in God but doubted that God could be
comprehended. Although asserting that we can never be sure that our values are ultimately true, he often assumed that the liberal reformist values
of his circle were true and was convinced that history would eventually
remake reality according to those values. The philosophy of pragmatism
emphasizes the practical and successful, but James also celebrated idealists,
visionaries, and lost causes. He believed in and practiced the scholarly and
intellectual life, but he praised action so much-hating ideals that were
not acted upon-that he has sometimes been depicted as anti-intellectual.
What method of interpretation is appropriate for a thinker with so many
contradictions?
It has been said that James's ideas embody that part of Nietzsche that
Americans can accept. 25 James's figure of the genius, which I will discuss
in Chapters 1 and 5, is reminiscent of Nietzsche's overman. Yet, there is
no strain nihilism or misogyny in James, and James wrote, "The sallies of
the two German authors [Schopenhauer and Nietzsche] remind one, half
the time, of the sick shriekings of two dying rats. " 26 James's contradictions,
at least, may be comparable to those of Nietzsche, and Karl Jaspers provides a model for interpreting James in his reading of Nietzsche:
The interpretative study of Nietzsche's thinking thus always requires
the gathering together of all utterances that relate to a given topic....
All statements seem to be annulled by other statements. Selfcontradiction is the fundamental ingredient in Nietzsche's thought. For nearly
every single one of Nietzsche's judgments, one can also find an opposite. He gives the impression of having two opinions about everything.
Consequently it is possible to quote Nietzsche at will in support of anything one happens to have in inind. 27
The method of this book is inspired by Jaspers's recommendation to bring
together statements that appear to be contradictory. Virtually every chapter focuses on a paradox in James's thinking. In struggling with each paradox I attempt both to interpret James's "real" intention and to draw out of
the paradox something illuminating for politics today, particularly the
possibility and problems of reviving democracy.
What are the ambiguities of democratic revival? Leadership is needed
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if efforts at social change are to succeed, yet leadership itself can overwhelm initiatives on the part of the many. Public opinion can be terribly
wrong-supporting demagogues, punishment, sexism, and violence-yet
the people must be respected in order to accomplish democratic transformations. Politics should be conducted with gentleness and courtesy, but
struggles over power are intensely fought and one seems to need a strong
stomach and sufficient aggression to play hardball. Democracy implies mutual respect among people who hold contrary opinions and who battle for
conflicting gains, yet the very faith or self-interest that motivates political
action makes it difficult to tolerate the opposition. Tolerance probably requires a feeling of commonality, a sense that even though we disagree we
are bound by common values or a country. The question then arises, Is
all commonality coercive? If education is necessary to develop a "democratic temperament," can that temperament be fostered by an education
that contains significant elements of elitism, hierarchy, and discipline?
These questions are at the heart of democratic politics and at the center
of James's political thought.

Chapter 1

Models of Action
William James broke with the liberal tradition in which political action
has held a secondary place. In Hobbes's Leviathan and Locke's Second Treatise on Government individuals turn their power over to the sovereign, even
if they retain the right to revolution, to be used only in extraordinary circumstances. Neither Hobbes nor Locke had much good to say about ordinary citizen action. 1 The Federalists pejoratively linked nongovernmental
initiatives with selfish and frenzied factions. The Constitution sanctions
peaceable assembly and petition of the government for redress of grievances but does not institutionalize participation other than voting. In
the late nineteenth century, the English theorist Herbert Spencer ( 18201903) developed a social Darwinism that disavowed the need for government in favor of individualism and "voluntary social cooperation." The
only legitimate purposes for cooperation, Spencer avowed, were war and
the protection of persons and property. He made virtually no mention of
direct action or public decision making in communities, organizations, or
the nation. 2 In the United States, conservative sociologist and social Darwinist William Graham Sumner rejected the idea that classes have obligations toward one another and derided political reform as "the absurd
attempt to make the world over. "3
Before elaborating James's alternative assessment of action, I offer this
summary of his theory: he celebrated action, including political action; his
advocacy of popular action is a democratic element of his thought that
undermines its elitist elements; and he envisioned several models of action,
some more democratic than others. Despite his professed individualism,
James believed that people are connected to their communities and have
obligations both to their fellow citizens and to past and future generations.
The historical context for James's writings included the intensely bitter
public clashes of the Civil War, the Spanish-American War, and racial and
class struggles, so that for James to commend conflict took no small
amount of courage.

10

Models of Action

11

I
In his most democratic thinking, James identified action with personal and
political health; it suggested freedom and vitality. 4 For James, action implied more than mere voting behavior, the expression of preferences, and
the pursuit of self-interest. Action is the development of one's potential in
the service of a cause greater than oneself; it is thus simultaneously selffulfillment and self-sacrifice. Respect for action makes James an ally of democracy, which is defined by citizen action rather than constitutions and
institutions. 5
In designing the United States Constitution, the Federalists tried to
rein in popular participation and separate it from public power.6 They understood passion to have a dynamic character that, if stirred, makes citizens difficult to control. In Federalist 6, Hamilton put the rhetorical question, ''Are not popular assemblies frequently subject to the impulses of rage,
resentment, jealousy, avarice, and of other irregular and violent propensities?" and Madison disparagingly connected democracy and passion in
Federalist 10:
A pure Democracy, by which I mean, a Society, consisting of a small
number of citizens, who assemble and administer the Government in
person, can admit of no cure for the mischiefs of faction. A common
passion or interest will, in almost every case, be felt by a majority of
the whole .... Hence it is that such Democracies have ever been spectacles of turbulence and contention; have ever been found incompatible with personal security or the rights of property; and have in general been as short in their lives as they have been violent in their
deaths. 7
Whereas the Federalists thought that participation was dangerous because it resulted in passion and partisanship, James encouraged participation precisely because it elicited passion from the citizens. James averred,
in oddly archaic language, that there will be change
even in this shrunken and enfeebled generation . . . . Battles and defeats will occur, the victors will be glorified and the vanquished dishonored just as in the brave days of yore, the human heart still with-
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drawing itself from the much it has in safe possession, and concentrating all its passion upon those evanescent possibilities of fact which still
quiver in fate's scale. 8
For James, moral action required personal commitment. "We find such
persons in every age, passionately flinging themselves upon their sense of
the goodness of life, in spite of the hardships of their own condition. "9 In
his Talks to Teachers, James endorsed the "popular belief" that "estimate[s]
the worth of a man's mental processes by their effects upon his practical
life." In this view,
the man of contemplation would be treated as only half a human being, passion and practical resource would become once more glories of
our race, a concrete victory over this earth's outward powers of darkness would appear an equivalent for any amount of passive spiritual
culture, and conduct would remain as the test of every education worthy of the name. 10
In "The Moral Equivalent of War," James called for the peaceful use of
"civic passion" for which people would "lay down their persons and their
wealth" to create a community of which citizens could be proud rather
than one in which many are subject to unrelieved "toil and pain and hardness and inferiority" while others lead lives of ease. 11 This civic passion
would include heroism, endurance, and discipline, not, as it might have
for Teddy Roosevelt, military conquest or domination.
James recognized the problematic dimension of passion: people have
an instinct for war that demagogic politicians and the press can manipulate for destructive ends. 12 When the public supported war with Spain,
James blamed Congress and the press-James hated Hearst's yellow journalism-for stirring up popular emotions, and he perceived the esteeming
of fervor for its own sake to be an upper-class characteristic. 13 Unlike the
Federalists, James did not see passion as the peculiar problem of the masses.
Whatever happens, in any event, will happen not as the result of any
particular reason, but as the result of passion, and of certain watchwords that nations have learned habitually to obey. We have some
pretty good ones of the latter sort, which will make for reason. But the
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great passion undeniably now is the passion for adventure . ... And, after all, has n't the spirit of the life of all the great generals and rulers
and aristocracies always been the spirit of sport carried to its supreme
expression? Civilization, properly so-called, might well be termed the
organization of all those functions that resist the mere excitement of
sport. 14
Especially in the face of enthusiasm for war and imperialism, James
endorsed the representative institutions of the Constitution, the principle
of checks and balances, and the cooler thinking of intellectuals as restraints on popular rages. Passion is, however, an inexorable force in politics, according to James, and therefore he did not seek to eliminate it but
to channel it into public-spirited activity of the type described in "The
Moral Equivalent of War." 15 For James, political conflict, ideally legal and
nonviolent, connotes not anarchy but moral courage, resistance to large,
centralized institutions, and the necessary, if painful, path to progress. 16
Conflict expresses vitality, catharsis, and concern for the common good. 17
For James, action is good in itself, not only as a means to an end; psychological, moral, and even material benefits come as much from striving
to realize an ideal as from attaining it. 18 Open struggle is better for a body
politic than resignation or suppression of discontent, which, if stifled, can
lead to violent eruptions. James put a positive spin on the fierce presidential election of 1896: "Our political crisis is over, but the hard times still
endure.... I doubt, notwithstanding certain appearances, whether the
country was ever morally in as sound a state as it is now, after all this
discussion." 19 He had expressed the same sentiment ten years earlier in a
letter to his brother Henry: the confrontation between capital and labor
in the United States (not including the Haymarket riot "which has nothing to do with knights of labor") was "a most healthy phase of evolution,
a little costly, but normal, and sure to do lots of good to all hands in the
end. "20 His praise for contention even pertained to the academic world.
When he and Hugo Munsterberg were attacked in a scholarly paper, Munsterberg urged that they write a letter of protest. James disagreed, saying:
"Since those temperamental antipathies exist-why isn't it healthy that
they should express themselves? For my part, I feel rather glad than otherwise that psychology is so live a subject that the psychologists should 'go
for' each other in this way.... We ought to cultivate tough hides." 21
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To further elucidate what James valued in political action, it might be
useful to contrast briefly his conception with those of Hannah Arendt and
Max Weber. 22 All three respected, even celebrated, action; each thought
of it at least partly in heroic terms. Arendt described the Greek polis as a
community of citizens publicly engaged in deliberation, speech, and deeds.
For Arendt, action reveals the nature of the self and its potentials, which
is one reason why speech is crucial to it. James did not invoke the polis or
even the New England town meeting, but he shared with Arendt the belief that individuals develop their potentialities through self-sacrifice for
the common good. 23 Action, in other words, is a way to combine the development and expression of the highest human capacities with the welfare of the community.
Like Arendt (and Tocqueville), James did not trust power located in
large institutions, including the nation-state, and concluded that the way
to resist oppressive institutional power was for individuals and groups to
act. 24 In an oft-cited passage, James announced:
I am against bigness and greatness in all their forms .... The bigger
the unit you deal with, the hollower, the more brutal, the more mendacious is the life displayed. So I am against all big organizations as
such, national ones first and foremost; against all big successes and big
results; and in favor of the eternal forces of truth which always work
in the individual ... under-dogs always, till history comes, after they
are long dead, and puts them on the top. 25
He declared that the political deterioration of America in the second half
of the nineteenth century was "the direct outcome of the added power of
government, the corruptions and inflations of the war.... Every war
leaves such miserable legacies, fatal seeds of future war and revolution, unless the civic virtues of the people save the State in time." This condition
of political degradation, brought on by a bloated post-Civil War state and
by the war itself, could be cured only by "the civic virtues of the people."
He continued:
Democracy is still upon its trial. The civic genius of our people is its
only bulwark, and neither laws nor monuments, neither battleships nor
public libraries, nor great newspapers nor booming stocks; neither me-
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chanical invention nor political adroitness, nor churches nor universities nor civil-service examinations can save us from degeneration if the
inner mystery be lost. 26
·
The greatest threat to the democratic spirit is overwhelming institutions.
James criticized "civilization, with its herding and branding, licensing and
degree-giving, authorizing and appointing, and in general regulating and
administering by system the lives of human beings." 27
Like James, in "Politics as a Vocation" Max Weber tried to establish
the place of creative action in a world in which bureaucracies are the characteristic political form. According to Weber, instead of thinking imaginatively, each person in a bureaucratic organization must carry out the orders of the person or committee above. Expertly trained administrators set
the limits on action, and creative thought becomes a threat to established
procedures. Because political knowledge comes to be identified as rules,
regulations, procedures, and budgets, the archetypal political leader becomes the lawyer, i.e., the one who can master the rules of law, while political knowledge based on experience and custom is denigrated. James
could have endorsed Weber's description of the ideal politician who serves
as an alternative to the bureaucrat. Weber defined politics as "independent
leadership in action," saying that the politician must have three qualities:
a feeling of responsibility; passion, i.e., devotion to a cause rather than
excessive feeling or romanticism; and a sense of proportion, distance from
things and men that allows control of the passions. 28 The desire to preserve passion, responsibility, and proportion-three characteristics of an
effective and a humane political actor-was shared by Weber and James.
James's fear of such institutions, and his desire to increase the space for
public action, was shared by Tocqueville, Weber, and Arendt.

II
R. B. Perry claimed that James's contribution to social and political
thought is the "exaltation of direct action, and hence of both revolution
and of dictatorship." 29 James believed that in order to have "depth," people
"must multiply their [ideals'] sentimental surface by the dimension of the

16

Chapter One

active will. "30 In other words, people should not just hold ideals but act
upon them. 31 One phrase he used for healthy existence is "the strenuous
life," which Browning asserted is James's "normative vision of the human."
The strenuous mood leads people to confront life's difficulties whereas the
easygoing mood seeks to escape them and accept present conditions. 32
The use of the term "strenuous life" reveals a powerful tension in James
between a democratic appreciation for the quotidian efforts of ordinary
citizens and an elitist appeal for heroes, geniuses, and saints to embody
the strenuous life, allowing the rest of us, who are less vigorous, to follow.
Sometimes his call for acting upon ideals is addressed to all citizens and
at other times to the few. I will present the evidence for this tension in
James by continuing to compare his views on action with those of Arendt
and then with the views of social Darwinists Herbert Spencer and Grant
Allen. Before addressing the theme of individualism, I will try to make
some sense of the tension by suggesting that James embodies the conflict
between liberalism and democracy on the issue of political action.
James's own life exemplified both the heroic and the ordinary models
of action that he advocated. In his efforts to provide leadership, he joined
committees for public causes; wrote open letters about education, imperialism, and lynching; and directly participated in protests against U.S. involvement in the Philippines. He endorsed Jane Addams's settlement
house projects, and she cited him in her autobiography as an inspiration
for Hull-House. As a philosopher, he endeavored to instruct and lead the
nation. 33 Not only did he teach at a prominent university, but he attempted
to reach broader audiences through public lectures that formed the basis
for most of his books. In these lectures, James did not exclusively address
the elite. His appeal to posit and fulfill their ideals went out to everyone:
working people and the wealthy, educated and uneducated.
In addition to broadly defining his audience, James expressed his democratic intention in his immediate, vivacious writing to reach that audience, ·
writing that was in marked contrast to the prose of most textbooks and
philosophical treatises. He maintained that academics needed to change
their style of communication with the public if they were going to shape
the democratic temperament, and he made this point explicit in a lecture
directed specifically at college students and faculty. Whereas many people
see in the university "a kind of sterilized conceit and incapacity for being
pleased," colleges need to become more engaging because "if a college,
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through the inferior human influences that have grown regnant there,
fails to catch the robuster tone, its failure is colossal, for its social function
stops: democracy gives it a wide berth, turns toward it a deaf ear. "34 James
did not think that intellectuals should rule the nation, but he did believe
they have a specific contribution to make to a democracy ( a point I elaborate upon in Chapter 5). If they do not connect with their audience, they
cannot make that contribution.
James championed two types of action as a way to express creative energy, to reduce the possibility of violence, to preserve and improve America's representative system of government, and to contribute to the common good. The first type of action might today be called "public service"
in politics, medicine, education, the arts, technological invention and
manual labor that serve public needs, and social work; in fact, James
praised any activity that helps others. He even thought that most people
are heroic in the sense of meeting the challenges of everyday life. The second type of action is more heroic, unusual, or unique. He recognized that
the values and institutions of societies are periodically transformed and
posited that these transformations are led by visionaries or geniuses who
are able to envision alternative social arrangements and draw people to
support them in making change. This type of action is close to what
Arendt meant by beginning something new. 35
In defining a public contribution, James was highly democratic. He did
not sharply distinguish the public from the private sphere, as Arendt was
to do. 36 Whereas Arendt located action in the public realm, James saw the
achievement of a personal goal, such as giving up drinking, as a form of
action. James said, "To keep out of the gutter is for us here no part of consciousness at all, yet for many of our brethren it is the most legitimately
engrossing of ideals."37 Historian George Fredrickson says that James defined action as belief and "internal effort," but that formulation is correct
only if one remembers how important it was to James that people strive to
realize their visions. 38 It is not enough, he said, merely to hold an ideal;
one must act on it. "Mere ideals are the cheapest things in life .... The
more ideals a man has, the more contemptible, on the whole, do you continue to deem him, if the matter ends there for him, and if none of the
laboring man's virtues are called into action on his part-no courage
shown, no privations undergone, no dirt or scars contracted in the attempt
to get them realized." 39 In general, a good, worthwhile, or, to use James's
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word, "significant" life means striving to fulfill an ideal that will contribute
to the public good. 40 His formula seemed to be, "from each according to
his ability."
Individuals can add to the welfare of the [human] race in a variety of
ways. You may delight its senses or "taste" by some production of luxury
or art, comfort it by discovering some moral truth, relieve its pain by
concocting a new patent medicine, save its labor by a bit of machinery,
or by some application of a natural product. You may open a road, help
start some social or business institution, contribute your mite in any
way to the mass of the work which each generation subtracts from the
task of the next; and you will come into real relations with your brothers-with some of them at least. 41
The democratic character of James's description of action is plain. These
actions have to do with everyday life; they are demanding, but not heroic
in the sense that either Arendt or James himself sometimes demanded.
James deconstructed elitism in his essay "What Makes a Life Significant," beginning with the proposition that "morally exceptional individuals . . . worked and endured in obedience to some inner ideal, whilst their
comrades were not actuated by anything worthy of that name." The narrowness and elitism of this formulation are then decimated. His definition
of ideals expands to include self-challenge, the effort "to enlarge ... sympathetic insight into fellow-lives," learning to love and forgive others
through religion, voluntary labor, voluntary poverty, and "class-loyalty."
Although at first appearing blind to the ideals of others, James then made
the possibility of blindness an explicit theme, identifying as an important
ideal the overcoming of blindness to the struggles, achievements, and inner meaning of others' lives.
The barrenness and ignobleness of the more usual laborer's life consist
in the fact that it is moved by no such inner springs. The backache,
the long hours, the danger, are patiently endured-for what? To gain
a quid of tobacco, a glass of beer, a cup of coffee, a meal, a bed, and to
begin again the next day and shirk as much as one can. [This is why
soldiers are honored, not laborers. But] the plot now thickens. . . . We
have seen the blindness and deadness to each other which are our
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natural inheritance; and in spite of them, we have been led to acknowledge an inner meaning which passeth show, and which may be
present in the lives of others where we least descry it. 42
Significant action has been redefined as the struggle to fulfill an ideal, to
overcome the difficulties put in one's way, and to appreciate the ideals and
struggles of others.

III
James not only espoused action but portrayed to his readers a world in
which action is meaningful. Individuals can collectively alter the currents
of history, at least to some degree, according to their plans and ideals.
"What are the causes that make communities change from generation to
generation?" he asked in Will to Believe, answering that citizens and their
leaders make change; history is not determined by God, evolution, technology, or the economy. 43
The scientific theories of Charles Darwin powerfully influenced
American thought after the Civil War and were taken to have a variety
of political implications. James indicted the social Darwinism of Spencer
and Allen as a philosophical buttress of resignation because it implied, in
the authoritative language of science, that individuals cannot deliberately
shape history. 44 Most details of the debate between James and these social
Darwinists are not worth recounting because that specific version of social
Darwinism is no longer current. Today, determinism takes different forms
as many people continue to believe that change cannot be made thoughtfully and creatively.45 Therefore, I describe only enough of the social Darwinist position, as described by one of its critics, to get a flavor of it in
order to elucidate James's models of political action.
According to intellectual historian Richard Hofstadter, James endeavored "to redeem spontaneity and indeterminacy from the oppressive causal
network of Spencerian social evolution." 46 In several essays, James indicted
Spencer and Allen for believing that social change was not created by
human beings. "Mr. Spencer ... and his disciple, Mr. Grant Allen ...
hold that no individual initiative has any effect in determining the course
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of human destiny."47 Allen said that great leaders are produced by their
countries, not by accident; the masses of citizens are more important than
the great individual; it is the common characteristics of a particular people
that are crucial, not the exceptional personalities; history creates important figures while leaders do not create history and barely affect it; leaders
are available when needed and are replaceable, i.e., history occurs without
the conscious choice of individuals. Finally, Allen and Spencer saw the
mind as passive, merely reflecting the environment. 48
The Spencerian school [believed that historical] changes are irrespective of persons and independent of individual control. They are due to
the environment, to the circumstances ... the increasing experience
of outer relations; to everything, in fact, except the Grants and the
Bismarcks, the Joneses and the Smiths.... [Determinism] professes
that those parts of the universe already laid down absolutely appoint
and decree what the other parts shall be. 49
Even though at the end of nineteenth century the Knights of Labor, the
Populists, anarchists, suffragettes, and African-American activists tried to
overcome determinism in practice, James refuted it at the level of theory
by emphasizing the importance of individual initiatives.
James's conception of science as applied to politics was different from
that of the ·social Darwinists. Underlying the conflict over science was a
dispute over the possibilities of political action. Believing that change resulted from large social forces, the Darwinists sought to develop a social
science to map the direction of mass behavior whereas James's model of
science and social change was more experimental: visionaries proffered
new paths for society, and with the people's support, those paths might
be successfully walked. Obviously, far more paths were advocated than
taken.
James called his outlook "meliorism" in contrast to pessimism and optimism. He described the pessimist as one who believes that the salvation
of the world is impossible whereas the optimist thinks it inevitable. Since
readers today might not call social change "salvation," one could substitute
such terms as "justice," "equality," or "democracy." Between pessimism
and optimism, James posited, stands "meliorism," which means that sal-
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vation is possible but not guaranteed. What is the meliorist model of
change?
Take, for example, any one of us in this room with the ideals which he
cherishes, and is willing to live and work for. Every such ideal realized
will be one moment in the world's salvation. But these particular ideals
are not bare abstract possibilities. They are grounded, they are live possibilities, for we are their live champions and pledges, and if the complementary conditions come and add themselves, our ideals will
become actual things .... [The conditions are something not predetermined but] a chance, a gap that we can spring into, and, finally, our

act.
Does our act then create the world's salvation so far as it makes room
for itself, so far as it leaps into the gap? Does it create, not the whole
world's salvation of course, but just so much of this as itself covers of
the world's extent?50
By the last sentence, James implied that change will not be universal, interconnected. He imagined that a critic will respond, "Irrational! ... How
can new being come in local spots and patches which add themselves or
stay away at random, independently of the rest?" James replied: "The only
real reason I can think of why anything should ever come is that someone
wishes it to be here. It is demanded, demanded, it may be, to give relief to
no matter how small a fraction of the world's mass. This is the living reason, and compared with it material causes and logical necessities are spectral things." Creating change requires that "each several agent does its
own 'level best.' " The implication of this model of change is that the
world becomes open to possibilities both of greatness and of horror. The
world is a "real adventure, with real danger ... a social scheme of co-operative work genuinely to be done." 51
As an alternative to the social Darwinists, who minimized agency in
shaping history, James's two models of change are both based on combining ideals and action. Sometimes James stressed the leadership of an elite
that would, with the support of the people, reshape politics, society, and
culture according to new ideals. A variant model of change adhered to the
boundaries on action set by the Constitution; accepting national institu-
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tions, James called on ordinary people to preserve popular government by
their active, informed participation in a government whose principles they
understand and embrace.
James is at his most elitist in his essay "Great Men and Their Environment," in which he advanced an alternative interpretation to that of
Spencer and Allen of the implications of Darwin's evolutionary theory for
political change. Darwin identified two central factors in the process of
evolution: free variation, i.e., the new capacities of a species brought about
by mutation, and natural selection, which maintains or destroys the variations. James compared natural selection with the historical factors that
affect the success or failure of individual initiatives. Without discounting
the importance of historical context for political action, James took free
variation to be the more important factor in social change. The mind of
the "genius" or "great man" is like Darwin's spontaneous variation. Such
minds do not reproduce existing ideas, customs, and institutions; they develop new visions, values, and laws-not unlike Nietzsche's supermen. 52
Not all geniuses are successful; many are so out of sync with their times
and the popular mood that they are ignored. And most people living
in stable conditions accept the ideas and institutions under which they
live and are not open to revolutionary leadership. 53 But other leaders do
gain the support of the people, and these are the founders of new parties and nations, religions and institutions, movements and organizations.
History evolves, said James, by the popular support of great leaders' initiatives.
In Will to Believe, James wrote in a Nietzschean vein, saying that existing conditions, unbearably soft and dull, must be overcome by great
leaders. In other moods, James's notion of change is more modest and respectful of what exists. Both strains of thought can be seen clearly in
"What Makes a Life Significant." He there relates a visit to an assembly,
something like a summer school for the wealthy intelligentsia, at Chautauqua in upstate New York:
Sobriety and industry, intelligence and goodness, orderliness and ideality, prosperity and cheerfulness, pervade the air.... You have the
best of company, and yet no effort. You have no zymotic diseases, no
poverty, no drunkenness, no crime, no police . . . . You have, in short,
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a foretaste of what human society might be, were it all in the light,
with no suffering and no dark comers.... And yet what was my own
astonishment, on emerging into the dark and wicked world again, to
catch myself quite unexpectedly and involuntarily saying: "Ouf! what
a relief! Now for something primordial and savage, even though it were
as bad as an Armenian massacre, to set the balance straight again.
This order is too tame, this culture too second-rate, this goodness too
uninspiring." 54
I quote this passage as an accurate description of a certain Jamesian mood,
but his final judgment on Chautauqua is different: "Grant that at Chautauqua there was little moral effort, little sweat or muscular strain in view.
Still, deep down in the souls of the participants we may be sure that something of the sort was hid, some inner stress, some vital virtue not found
wanting when required." 55 In this democratic humor, James realized that
when we tend to think any group is worth writing off we are probably
wrong.
James recognized and criticized his aristocratic moments as "ancestral
blindness," but he did have them. With uncharacteristic harshness, James
spoke of "human intelligences of a simple order" that are literal, governed
by habit, and take things for granted. Their "faithfulness and honesty" is
"the single gift by which they are sometimes able to warm us into admiration .... [But this simple intelligence is really more like] a piece of inanimate matter than ... the steadfastness of a human will capable of alternative choice." James also referred to "the herd of nullities whose votes count
for zero in the march of events," and he contrasted this "herd" with "examples and leaders of opinion or potentates, and in general those to whose
actions, position or genius gives a far-reaching human import" and with
a third group, "the rest of us." 56 James may have harshly criticized the
masses, not only because of ancestral class prejudice, but as an overreaction to the social Darwinist dismissal of individual effort and their claim
that aggregates of human beings are the sole historical force. Or he could
have been influenced by Emerson's essay "Representative Men," by Thomas
Carlyle's On Heroes and Hero-Worship, or by Nietzsche himself. 57
Even while acknowledging the aristocratic cruelty of his words, one
might hope to rescue James as a democrat by saying that his views represent
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an early position. Both Coon and Cotkin write of James's radicalization
in the 1890s, but in James's essay "The Social Value of the College-Bred,"
written in 1907 just three years before his death, a similar elitist model of
change appears, albeit with less vituperation.58
The notion that a people can run itself and its affairs anonymously is
now well known to be the silliest of absurdities. Mankind does nothing
save through initiatives on the part of inventors, great or small, and
imitation by the rest of us-these are the sole factors active in human
progress. Individuals of genius show the way, and set the patterns,
which common people then adopt and follow.... In our democracy,
where everything else is so shifting, we alumni and alumnae of the
colleges are the only permanent presence that corresponds to the aristocracy in older countries.
James contended that colleges should teach "the sense for human superiority." Confusingly, James claimed that the purpose of accepting "superiority" is to save democracy from those who would reject it on the grounds
that the people inevitably choose inferior leaders and spurn "higher"
human qualities. Without good leaders, democracy "may undergo self-poisoning." This line of thought did not induce James to echo Henry and
Brooks Adams in their rejection of democracy; James called democracy "a
kind of religion, and we are bound not to admit its failure." 59
In summary, James's emphasis on great men and his moments of contempt for the many are certainly elitist, but his second model of political action, in which average citizens are active, is consonant with democracy. James seems torn between democratic and elitist sentiments. At his
most snobbish he saw geniuses and leaders as the only people who matter
in history. Educated leaders and great individuals guide the "ordinary"
people, who need only recognize, respect, and follow these qualified leaders. At other times he implied that the average person can make a more
active contribution to public life. He indicated that representative government requires vigilance and participation on the part of the people, and
he discerned in everyone, no matter what their social position, the capacity for free action and the possession of ideas and positions that must be
recognized in making political decisions.
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IV
James's democratic side was revealed in an 1897 speech at the unveiling of
a statue of Robert Gould Shaw when James urged Americans to learn patriotic self-sacrifice from Shaw: "In such an emergency Americans of all
complexions and conditions can go forth like brothers, and meet death
cheerfully if need be, in order that this religion of our native land shall
not become a failure on the earth."60 In seeming contradiction to some of
his comments in "The Social Value of the College-Bred," James again
called democracy America's religion and defined it as self-rule by the citizens. "Our nation had been founded in what we may call our American
religion, baptized and reared in the faith that a man requires no master to
take care of him, and that common people can work out their salvation
well enough together if left free to try." Here a condition of political health
is depicted as citizens' attending to politics, choosing their leaders wisely,
and acting generously toward one another. Not only leaders but citizens
must act. Because people possess an instinct for war, Shaw's extraordinary
bravery in battle need not be emulated as much as his "lonely courage
(civic courage as we call it in peace-times) ." Civic courage enabled Shaw
to lead an African-American regiment in the face of calumny by many
fellow soldiers and citizens. This form of courage is admirable, but not epic;
to put it another way, heroic impulses must be channeled into seemingly
modest activities.
The nation blest above all nations is she in whom the civic genius of
the people does the saving day by day, by acts without external picturesqueness; by speaking, writing, voting reasonably; by smiting corruption swiftly; by good temper between parties; by the people knowing true men when they see them, and preferring them as leaders to
rabid partisans or empty quacks. 61

It is difficult to know how to assess James's politics here. Does he ask for
anything more than loyalty to the state? A generous reading of James's
image of popular activity may concede that he did not envision the Paris
Commune but called for something closer to radical democracy than our
present condition of widespread disillusioned withdrawal from public life.
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His vision of civic courage may seem inadequate, but it is not negligible
if one thinks of the alternative: popular support for extremists such as
George Wallace, Ross Perot, David Duke, and Russian nationalist Vladimir Zhirinovsky. Not demanding that most people accomplish extraordinary deeds may even be a form of political respect. Although everyone has
civic duties to perform, which are necessary for the health of the country
and community, we should not hate ourselves if we are not activists. 62
There is heroism, James declared, in just getting on with our lives: fulfilling
our obligations while confronting the setbacks, losses, and pain inherent
in existence. 63 James's Darwinian model of politics is democratic in that it
calls on everyone to participate and recognizes that the few geniuses cannot alter history solely by their own wills and activities. The tension between James's political models might be further illuminated if they are
compared to the civil rights and feminist movements, two of the most
important radical democratic mass campaigns of recent times.

V
James's theory of leadership seems to be one of his most undemocratic
stances, but the matter is more complicated than it at first appears. In
comparing his theory of leadership to ideas articulated by the theorists of
recent democratic movements, I am not suggesting that James is in a oneto-one relationship with, or a direct antecedent of, these theorists; instead,
I suggest that some of the positions they articulate concerning leadership
resonate with propositions of James while others go beyond him. For example, James said that one leader is insufficient to initiate change: "Sporadic great men come everywhere. But for a community to ·get vibrating
through and through with intensely active life, many geniuses coming together and in rapid succession are required. This is why great epochs are
so rare. "64 This image seems to fit the civil rights movement in which numerous leaders have emerged, including Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., James
Bevel, Andrew Young, Stokely Carmichael, Diane Nash, Rosa Parks, Fannie Lou Hamer, Robert Moses, Ella Baker, Jesse Jackson, and James Farmer.
To suggest that such leaders, whom I see as examples ofJames's "geniuses,"
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have played essential roles in the movement is not an inherently elitist
proposition.
Even the most egalitarian theorists of change acknowledge a role for
authorities within a movement, if only as teachers. Democratic activists
Ella Baker, Robert Moses, and Starhawk might accept James's assertion
that change is sparked by individuals who possess creative vision and conceive of strategies for achieving their visions, but they would not see, as
James sometimes did, a large gulf in talent between the leaders and the
many. Civil rights organizer Baker conceded the need for visionaries when
she said:
From a practical standpoint, anyone who looked at the Harlem area
knew that the potential for integration per se was basically impossible
unless there were some radically innovative things done. And those
innovative things would not be acceptable to those who ran the school
system, nor to communities, nor even to the people who call them·
· 65
se1ves supporters of mtegrat1on.
In this situation, leadership is necessary to see the possibility of change,
to create a plan to achieve it, and to move in an unfamiliar direction.
Baker differed from James in seeing the group as the innovators, not individuals. Furthermore, she rejected the tendency within the civil rights
movement to identify leaders as the primary agents of change. "I have always thought," she said, "what is needed is the development of people who
are interested not in being leaders as much as in developing leadership
among other people. "66 Feminist theorist Starhawk is closer to James when
she acknowledges the need for leadership in asserting: •~ group ... needs
a brain. It needs some people who are willing to look ahead, anticipate
problems, suggest new directions, try out new solutions, keep track of information and decisions, who lead in the sense of stepping out in front and
going first. Such leadership is a service to the group."67 The danger, she
says, comes from hidden leaders, unaccountable to the others who use
power for self-interest.
To claim that there are no leaders, as radical democrats have at times
claimed, does not eliminate them or their legitimate function. The leader
is in essence a teacher, and James had faith that leaders will bring out the
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creative potential of average citizens. He proclaimed, "In picking out from
history our heroes, and communing with their kindred spirits ... each
one of us may best fortify and inspire what creative energy may be in his
own soul."68 He thought that heroes, geniuses, and saints inspire creativity
on the part of the many rather than squelch it. 69 To the same end, civil
rights organizer Robert Moses wanted to identify and develop local leadership and create mass participation. 70 Although he "recognized how easily
the creative potential of people can be crushed by leaders and institutions,"
Moses did not dismiss their necessity. He insisted that once a movement
is started, if people are allowed to develop they will become leaders. Like
Moses, James feared the stultifying effect of institutions on the citizenry,
and both James and Moses believed that leaders would develop spontaneously. James called the process "free variation" while Moses said: "Leadership is there in the people.... You don't have to worry about that. You
don't have to worry about where your leaders are, how are we going to get
some leaders. The leadership is there. If you go out and work with your
people, then the leadership will emerge.... We don't know who they are
now; we don't need to know. But the leadership will emerge from the
movement that emerges." 71 Inspiration is precisely the effect that James,
Baker, Starhawk, and Moses want leaders to have, although the contemporary activists see more clearly than did James the danger that leaders
might substitute their initiatives for those of the people and thereby foster
either passivity or blind obedience.

VI
The tension between James's elitist and democratic tendencies has gone
largely unremarked by commentators, but he has frequently been called an
"individualist," a word that covers a multitude of sins, including political
impotence, lack of interest in politics, naive idealism, relativism, and an
underestimation of the importance of institutions. 72 According to political
theorist Richard Flathman, James, despite his intentions, "promoted an
individuality so radical that it threatened solipsism and even denial of the
desirability of mutual intelligibility." 73 Comel West describes James as "a
libertarian, with circumscribed democratic sentiments, an international
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outlook, and deep moral sensitivity. This perspective is one of political impotence, yet it buttresses moral integrity and promotes the exercise of individual conscience."74
"Unlike Dewey, his successor in the pragmatic tradition," wrote historian Richard Hofstadter, "James was guilty of only the remotest interest in
systematic or collective social reform. One expression of his fundamental
individualism is the fact that ... he had no sustained interest in social
theory as such. He always dealt with philosophical problems in individual
terms." 75 Santayana criticized his former teacher for believing that people
could shape events according to their ideals. 76 According to Santayana,
James
held a false moralistic view of history, attributing events to the conscious motives and free will of individuals; whereas individuals, especially in governments, are creatures of circumstance and slaves to
vested interests. These interests may be more or less noble, romantic,
or sordid, but they inevitably entangle and subjugate men of action. 77
Political scientist Gary Jacobsohn writes that pragmatism promotes individualism by encouraging each person to make up his or her own mind
about the truth, and George Fredrickson argues that James's anti-institutionalism opposed the spirit of his time which called for larger, more active
government. 78 Even James called himself an individualist: "We 'intellectuals' in America must all work to keep our precious birthright of individualism, and freedom from these institutions. Every great institution is perforce a means of corruption-whatever good it may also do. Only in the
free personal relation is full ideality to be found." 79 Elsewhere he said, "The
practical consequence of [pluralism] is the well-known democratic respect
r1or t h e sacred ness of m
· d·1v1·duat·1ty. "80
This formulation indicates that James linked democracy with individualism, and I would argue that James's conception of individualism is compatible with democracy but that he used the term "individualism" in a way
that might be misleading to political theorists. James's conception of individualism is not necessarily corrosive of politics or community, and his understanding of that term was quite different from that of Tocqueville in
Democracy in America, in which Tocqueville said: "Individualism is a calm
and considered feeling which disposes each citizen to isolate himself from
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the mass of his fellows and withdraw into the circle of family and friends;
with this little society formed to his taste, he gladly leaves the greater society to look after itself."81 James's individuals are not at all isolated: they
have powerful obligations to their society, including that of becoming active and alert citizens. Our common duty is to improve the world. 82 James
insisted in "The Moral Equivalent of War," ''All the qualities of a man
acquire dignity when he knows that the service of the collectivity that
owns him needs them." 83 At the age of twenty-six, James pronounced:
Our predecessors, even apart from the physical link of generation, have
made us what we are. Every thought you now have and every act and
intention owes its complexion to the acts of your dead and living
brothers. Everything we know and are is through men. . . . [A] sympathy with men as such, and a desire to contribute to the weal of a species, which .. . contains All that we acknowledge as good, may very
well form an external interest sufficient to keep one's moral pot boiling
in a very lively manner to a good old age. 84
James saw citizens as being connected by ties of friendship, tradition, and
shared ideals, and judging by his comments on the philosophy of Thomas
Davidson, individualism meant to James something like independence,
originality, and eccentricity.85
The question is not, Was James an individualist? but, rather, What did
he mean by individualism and did it undermine his democratic commitments? He did not uphold private rights against the public good, although
he thought the individual should be protected from a large, invasive state.
If he believed that the individual is in some sense "sacred," he also assumed that each person has ties and obligations to others. This ambiguity
is reflected, but not noted, in commentaries on James, even though commentators who label him an individualist also note strong communitarian
elements in his thinking. "Overall he made good his claim that one who
upholds an ethic of democratic individualism is obligated to take part in
social or political change," stated Gerald Myers. Hofstadter conceded that
James "in his later years ... viewed the rise of collectivism with satisfaction
and found a means of reconciling it with his characteristic emphasis on
individual activity." McDermott explained that "for James, it is precisely
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the ability of man to enter into the relational fabric of the world, in a
participative and liberating way, which enables him to become human. "86
For James, individualism is compatible with socialism. By socialism,
James surely did not mean state-owned property or means of production
but something like democracy, justice, community, and equality. Although
Davidson rejected the label "socialist," "no one felt more deeply than he
the evils of rapacious individual competition.... Spontaneously and flexibly organized social settlements or communities, with individual leaders
as their centers seem to have been his ideal, each with its own religious or
ethical elements of discipline."87 In "The Moral Equivalent of War," James
embraced a vaguely defined socialism: "I will now confess my own utopia.
I devoutly believe in the ultimate reign of peace and in the gradual advent
of some sort of a socialistic equilibrium."88
James's democratic socialist individualism seems to be another instance
in which he confounds the categories employed to understand him. What
type of individualist calls for socialism? How could he reconcile these
seemingly opposite values? The answer might lie in what James intended
by the terms. Although James used the word "individualism," he consistently separated individualism from self-interest. James's individualism was
quite close to communitarian anarchism and the doctrine that each individual should make a unique contribution to the common good, and that
each should be allowed to define that contribution in his or her own way.
James was an individualist who did not put economic freedom or personal
rights ahead of the common good. He did not see public obligations or
communal hegemony as dangerous to individuals, but, in the spirit of
Tocqueville's fear of "democratic despotism," James dreaded a powerful
state that leaves no place for eccentricity or human initiatives on behalf of
the community. His view of the potential contribution of each individual
to the common good may be utopian, but his utopia is democratic. 89
I have shown that James advanced two models of action: the first challenges people to make that contribution to the public good of which they
were capable; the second is revolutionary and creates a new body politic,
described as founding, by Machiavelli in The Prince. Examples of such founders include Moses, George Washington, and Lenin. What is the relationship between the two models of action? James did not make it clear. The
heroic is extraordinary, and he hoped that citizens will become more pub-
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lie spirited in everyday life before institutions are radically transformed. He
explicitly asserted in "The Moral Equivalent of War" that the impulse to
do great deeds for the common good is healthy but needs to be transmuted
from war to public service. He was not afraid of direct action, such as
strikes, but opposed violence and the denigration of one's opponents.
James believed that American institutions would be strengthened if
the citizenry embraced as civic duties attending carefully to politics, debating issues publicly, and choosing their leaders carefully. He did not seem
to realize, however, that the American institutions and liberal political
values he embraced fostered the centralization, selfishness, and passivity
that he deplored. 90 He did not appear to grasp, as Rousseau did in The
Social Contract, that representation can be taken as a substitute for direct
action. James's celebration of action may have been democratic, but his
liberalism undermined that contribution. There may be a component of
privatism in James's individualism that undermined the realization of his
desire for people to make a contribution to the public good and to adopt
the obligations to others required by political participation. Nevertheless,
James stretched the confines of liberalism; the liberal elements of his
thought strive with the radical democratic elements. And even James's liberalism is worthy of respect. One comes away from reading James reflecting
that if his advice to the American body politic were heeded, citizens would
be more active than they are today and less inclined to define a full human
life as one devoted to the accumulation of luxuries by working and trading
for profit while enjoying the pleasures of private life.

Chapter 2

James and Gender
For a pacifist and socialist, James found a lot to praise in war and warriors.
He believed war brought out virtues that could be tapped for the public
good and advocated sublimating the aggressive instinct into public service.
Admittedly, James's model of politics resembles the one criticized by feminist theorists as he invited his fellow citizens to be "manly."
A life is manly, stoical, moral, or philosophical, we say, in proportion
as it is less swayed by paltry personal considerations and more by objective ends that call for energy, even though that energy bring personal loss and pain. This is the good side of war, in so far as it calls for
"volunteers." And for morality life is a war, and the service of the highest is a sort of cosmic patriotism which also calls for volunteers. 1
We must make new energies and hardihoods continue the manliness
to which the military mind so faithfully clings. Martial virtues must
be the enduring cement; intrepidity, contempt of softness, surrender of
private interest, obedience to command, must still remain the rock
upon which states are built. 2
Obviously, James's language here is gender-laden as he calls on his fellowcitizens to adopt "manliness" rather than effeminacy. Women have often
been associated with nature, so James's call for "an army enlisted against
nature" in "The Moral Equivalent of War" has an ominous ring. 3 One
feminist critic of James indicts him: "In a nation in which one out of four
women can expect to be raped in her lifetime, a child is sexually abused
every two minutes, and wife beating is rampant, it is downright immoral
to join [James] in his praise of the rack of contempt of softness." 4
Understanding that feminist theory is not monolithic, in this chapter
I look at aspects of James's theory of action that might be ignored had
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feminist theorists not made them prominent-specifically, his genderbased language and his ideas about women, war, human nature, and asceticism.5 My central question is the effect of such language on James's
conception of action. Does the fact that he desired people to behave
"manfully" indicate that his models of action were misogynist, instigated
violence, or subverted his professed commitment to the common good? I
do not dismiss the possibility that they were and did, and do not intend
to say that James was only employing the vocabulary current in his day. I
will argue, however, that except when it came to the family, James so
mixed gender stereotypes, and had so much goodwill toward women who
broke through the Victorian constrictions on them, that his language is,
for the most part, not harmful. It is outmoded and unnecessary, and he
excessively employed military metaphors for public service, but James was
. in most ways a liberal feminist and came close to postmodern feminism by
confounding the gender categories of his age. James's military vocabulary is
easily misinterpreted. Although he invoked heroism, sacrifice, and battlefields, his goal was to claim that language for everyday nonviolent contributions to the common good, a claim that places his work much closer to
the values held by some feminist theorists than his vocabulary might lead
us to believe.
I write here with two audiences in mind, both of which I count as
friends: one is composed of feminists who are skeptical of James, especially
when they hear how he discusses action and women. I want to persuade
them that James was not only an ally but a useful one. The other audience
thinks that some feminist scholarship makes too much fuss about language
and that vocabulary should be set aside in order to get to the real issues.
In James's case these people are partly right, but a study of his vocabulary
nonetheless raises substantive questions.
In purporting to depict a "feminist" theory of political action and its
associated critique of the masculine ideal, I fear that my subject has vanished or at least metamorphosed. In the 1960s and 1970s, as women were
fighting to enter both mainstream and alternative politics, the issue of
whether or not to play the political game according to rules written by men
was quite lively. Today, despite the persistence of the glass ceiling, which
blocks women from occupying top positions in government and industry,
women have entered political life, and new, often quite subtle, theoretical concerns have emerged. 6 Nevertheless, my primary concentration is on
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political action, and therefore the previous wave of feminist theory, which
was preoccupied with the nature of action, remains of great interest to me.
I contend that James supported an expanded role for women similar to the
one called for by feminists since Charlotte Bronte and that he broke down
gender definitions in a way reminiscent of postmodern feminists. There
remain, however, elements of James's conception of women that are essentialist and reactionary.

I
It might be asked, What is so terrible about masculine politics? According
to some feminist theorists, masculine politics was defined by the ancient
Greeks and by later theorists such as Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Hannah
Arendt. Wendy Brown lists as "manly" political values: "devotion to personal power, heroism, violence, domination and 'the extraordinary,' antipathy to everyday existence, and the instrumental rationality with which
all of these things are infused." 7 Christine Di Stefano sees masculine ideology as a "combative brand of dualistic thinking," one that strives for a
secure, fixed identity, radical individualism, and fear of and hostility toward anything feminine. 8 In her view, masculine politics relies excessively
on self-discipline and conquering one's emotions-or at least suppressing
fear, pity, and compassion while expressing rage and competitiveness.9
Masculine politics is also criticized for being abstract. In the masculine
ideal, men sacrifice their lives for valor or to uphold a principle whereas
the actions and sacrifices of women are tied to other people; typically, they
would die not for "the cause," but they would die for friends, lovers, and
family. 10 One reason for the abstract nature of masculine politics is that
male theorists since the ancient Greeks have sharply distinguished public
from private life. 11 The Greeks excluded women from participation in politics and separated the domain of the household from the public realm. To
be confined to the home, as women and slaves were, was to be chained to
necessity, to activities required for mere life; in contrast, the political arena
was the site of freedom. Politics became abstract by turning its back on the
common, private, and everyday.
Once women are excluded, politic~l life reflects an aggressive mascu-
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line personality. Another explanation of this personality is provided by the
psychoanalytic theory of object-relations. Men become pugnacious in order to attain their autonomy: to become men they must distinguish and
separate themselves from women, beginning with their mothers. 12 "The
principle of masculinity," Di Stefano writes, "rests on the repression of
what is deemed feminine." 13 Women, on the other hand, develop by imitating their mothers and therefore have connection rather than distance
at the heart of their identity formation. 14
Whether masculine politics originates in child development, ideology,
the split between public and private, or ancient customs, its greatest dangers include war and the suppression of women's potentialities, which is a
type of violence. 15 Peace is rejected as being feminine and therefore contemptuous. 16 The citizen is modeled on the warrior, but a participatory
democracy composed of citizen warriors may self-destruct. 17 Nancy Hartsock asks: "ls the masculine political actor, the citizen warrior, capable of
inhabiting a real democracy, that is, a world of equals who engage in rational consideration of the right actions for the community as a whole? Or
is he more at home in agonistic and competitive settings where he can
pursue the attainment of glory and honor ?18 From this critical standpoint,
the warlike spirit of James's ideal citizens would eventually destroy democracy, community, and peace. 19 James has been accused of advocating action for its own sake and of praising the "will to power" while pragmatism
is frequently criticized for lacking a test or standard by which success in
action or "good consequences" can be measured. The danger is that power
and efficacy become goals in themselves.
If masculine politics is to be jettisoned, what should take its place ?20
Some feminist theorists have posited that women-through biology, psychology, experience, or tradition-bring different values and viewpoints to
public life. 21 If men have sought to prove their masculinity with guns and
brawls, resulting in a politics of competition and violence, women have not
relied on physical force to accomplish their ends. 22 And although they
have been frequently controlled, women have not always lacked influence.
They therefore can teach men how to achieve power without autonomy
and domination.
Other conceptions of feminist politics separate it from actual women.
Feminist politics need not be practiced exclusively by and for women, just
as masculine politics has not been practiced only by men or by all men.
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Martin Luther King, Jr., because of his advocacy of nonviolence and community, may be considered a feminist political actor, and conversely, many
women have shown great capability for playing the political game in
its masculine configuration. Defining feminist politics by its values rather
than its practitioners, one could start with the proposition that such politics would not sharply divide the personal from the political. Desire, relationships, and feelings would not be dismissed as trivial or impediments to
valor but respected as proper topics for public discussion. Feminist politics would be concrete: citizens would not strive for efficiency, mastery, or
power but for specific ends. Women's politics would thus be based upon
tangible aims, connections with others, nonviolence, and relationships
other than command and obedience. 23
At this point Wolin suggests, as an expansion of the theoretical inquiry: "There remains a question of the conception of politics in feminist theory. Can politics be transformed so that the truly beneficial values
it promotes-nurture, connection, nonviolence-are the only necessary
and effective weapons and so that the type of characteristics James promotes can be dismissed? Different interests and ideals inevitably come into
conflict, in this world and any imaginable world, without anything sinister
about that conflict. And then one has to confront power, which is necessary to achieve one's ends and to confront the opposition's power. Can one
participate in that system of power without developing some of the characteristics to which James points? To take part in any game-whether it's
tennis, baseball, or skating-or in politics requires that one play by the
rules. Some feminists might want to change the nature of the game, becoming radical in the sense of rejecting current understandings or conventions about the game's nature. But what happens to those things that feminists claim make it objectionable, such as the quest for power, heroism, and
courage? Do war, violence, and class conflict disappear ?" 24
Feminist theory would put us on guard against James's vocabulary of
action, as he seems to employ precisely the dangerous language of action
that would lead to violence, if not war, and the dissolution of community
by fostering agonistic competition. I do not accept the various elements of
this proposition, however. Why would a pacifist resort to metaphors of war
and armies? During the time James was writing, advocates of war were
drawing on the heroic imagery of the Civil War in order to justify imperialist conquest. Teddy Roosevelt was using the language of "the strenuous
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life" to glorify war and denounce as sissies anyone who opposed imperialism. James felt it necessary to use the same language for radically different ends. James also assumed that heroic language tapped into popular instincts for aggression, self-sacrifice, and public service; he argued that any
case for pacifism that did not speak to those instincts would fail. Nevertheless, understanding the reasons why James used the language does not
resolve the issue of whether or not it has had a detrimental effect: has it
produced more violence and buttressed traditional gender roles? I have no
empirical _evidence to answer that question, but it would certainly be unfortunate if Roosevelt's call to live "the strenuous life" through actual conquest were conflated by the public with James's call to live that life through
nonviolent contributions to the public good.

II
In order to determine if James is guilty of perpetuating the worst aspects
of masculine politics as described by feminist theorists, we must examine
his explicit views about women. In his writings on psychology, he attempted to distinguish male and female psyches, and he took up the theme
of gender roles, inside and outside the family. Even if James espoused the
value of "manliness," and along with most other men in his day linked
"femininity" with weakness, he encouraged women to transgress their inherited roles; he criticized the Victorian stereotype for encouraging women
to be weak and passive; and he judged that the pain of childbirth, the
courage and self-sacrifice of motherhood, and the undertaking of physical
challenges made women appropriately "manly. "25
Here is one biographical clue to his outlook on women: James respected his women students, including Gertrude Stein and Mary Whiton
Calkins. He argued vigorously, against the objections of Harvard president
Charles W. Eliot, that Calkins should be accepted as a student in James's
graduate psychology seminar. When all the male students registered in the
seminar mysteriously withdrew, James taught Calkins in a seminar of one. 26
In The Principles of Psychology James described men and women as being different in significant ways. Women are more optimistic, innocent,
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and intuitive; women become as angry as men but are more afraid to express their anger through fighting; empathy and parental love are stronger
in women than in men. 27 All in all, James's notions about gender in that
work are neither vicious nor visionary. 28
In criticizing the repressive situation of women in Victorian America,
at least the situation of women of his race and class, James showed that he
did not accept the reigning stereotypes for them. Above all, he held that
women had been coddled and rendered frivolous; indeed, he could have
endorsed the narrator's proclamation in Jane Eyre:

It is in vain to say human beings ought to be satisfied with tranquility:
they must have action; and they will make it if they cannot find it.
Millions are condemned to a stiller doom than mine, and millions are
in silent revolt against their lot .... Women are supposed to be very
calm generally: but women feel just as men feel; they need exercise for
their faculties, and a field for their efforts as much as their brothers do;
they suffer from too rigid a constraint, too absolute a stagnation, precisely as men would suffer; and it is narrow-minded in their more privileged fellow-creatures to say that they ought to confine themselves to
making puddings and knitting stockings, to playing on the piano and
embroidering bags. It is thoughtless to condemn them, or laugh at
them, if they seek to do more or learn more than custom has pronounced necessary for their sex. 29
Although James praised "manly" action and criticized passivity as being
"effeminate," he believed that women should be encouraged to be manly
in the sense of being courageous, self-disciplined, and even heroic. 30 He
wrote to his depressed daughter Margaret:
You have evidently been in a bad state of spirits again, and dissatisfied
with your environment; and I judge that you have been still more dissatisfied with the inner state of trying to consume your own smoke,
and grin and bear it .... I believe you have been trying to do the
manly thing under difficult circumstances, but one learns only gradually
to do the best thing ... [which is to express one's unhappiness to loved
ones, but in a controlled manner]. 31
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Note that James points to a better way of behaving than doing the "manly
thing."
Women could become admirably manly by undertaking strenuous
physical labor, participating in sports and outdoor activities, and by becoming mothers. 32 lnterpreting motherhood as an expression of civic virtue is a feminist tradition dating from the American Revolution, 33 and
James emphasized the character transformation engendered by raising
children:
A woman will run among strangers in her nightgown if it be a question
of saving her baby's life or her own. Take a self-indulgent woman's life
in general. She will yield to every inhibition set by her disagreeable
sensations, lie late in bed, live upon tea or bromides, keep indoors from
the cold. Every difficulty finds her obedient to its "no." But make a
mother of her, and what have you? Possessed by maternal excitement,
she now confronts wakefulness, weariness, and toil without an instant
of hesitation or a word of complaint. The inhibitive power of pain over
her is extinguished wherever the baby's interests are at stake. 34
Since James's word for civic virtue is "manliness," he paradoxically implies
that women are being manly when they are being "true mothers." While
traveling in Europe, James admired German peasant women and suggested
that their physical exertion set a good example for American women, particularly for his tormented sister Alice.
The sight of the women here has strengthened me more than ever in
my belief that they ought to be made to do the hard labor of the community-they are far happier and better for it. I only wish I had that
pampered Alice here to see these little runts of peasant women stumping about with their immense burdens on their backs.... Seriously
there is a great deal of good in it-and the ideal German woman of
poetry (see Goethe, for instance), is a working woman. 35
James did not believe that women were incapable of possessing the "martial virtues" he admired, even if he labeled the passive life he feared
as "feminine." Because James used "feminine" to designate characteristics
typical of (childless) women of his era-not inherent or universal qualities
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of women per se-he showed that he was conscious of the distinction between stereotypes and actual women. 36 He feared that the pampered condition of Victorian upper-class women would become general throughout
the United States, brought on partly by the socialist and feminist values
he embraced. People flee pain and would create a government to alleviate
it, but a world with no challenges would leave no room for action.37 In
such a world the inertness of the stereotypical Victorian woman would be
appropriate.
James preferred that women become "manly" through taking part in
public action, sports, and camping. Gerald Myers invokes as evidence of a
feminist streak in James his support for Jane Addams and consumer advocate Pauline Goldmark and the fact that when hiking in the Adirondacks
with a group that included Bryn Mawr students, on the day he fatally
strained his heart, James complimented them for wearing knickerbockers.
Edith Franklin Wyatt wrote: "I remember especially that he made us all
feel in the van of progress ... by saying of the convenience of our clothes
for climbing-'l'm glad it's come. I'm glad I've lived to see it'-and how
grateful to him I was. "38
In an 1869 book review of John Stuart Mill's The Subjection of Women
and Horace Bushnell's antifeminist tract, Women's Suffrage : The Reform
Against Nature, James, then twenty-seven, took the issue of women's
equality seriously. 39 Although he dismissed Bushnell's volume as foolish,
he recommended that Mill's book be read by "every one who cares in the
least degree for social questions,-and who does not?-in its original
form."
James refuted Bushnell's argument that women must stay out of politics
if they are to retain their femininity. If femininity is as deeply ingrained as
the sexists contend it is, James stated, women will not easily lose it; if they
lack it, there is no excuse to prevent them from entering public life. Although generally an advocate of asceticism, he repudiated the view that
women are somehow ennobled by suffering the pain of discrimination and
exclusion from public life. He rejected Bushnell's examples of women's disastrous meddling with politics; the examples truly serve as arguments in
favor of educating women politically and giving them the feeling of responsibility. "The strongest of all 'women's-rights' arguments is, that
women are frivolous because they are irresponsible."
James's criticisms of Mill in the review reveal that James's impulses to
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gender-bending either emerged in his mature thinking or were unconscious. Since this section of the review is James's fullest explicit statement
on gender roles, and anticipates contemporary debates about "essentialism," i.e., the attribution of fixed traits either to all human beings or to
particular races, genders, or ethnicities, I will quote it at length. James accused Mill of becoming so passionate that "in one or two places" he
pressed
his arguments beyond the point at which, in a subject that he looked
at more coolly, he would probably have stopped: as when, for example,
he maintains that we are at present all but absolutely ignorant of the
true mental characteristics of woman. It even makes him guilty of
something like special pleading, as where he attempts to show that we
have no good ground for thinking women to be naturally less fitted for
original production in music than men. In fact there runs through the
whole book a sort of quibble on the expression "nature of women." The
main-stay of his thesis is, that there is nothing fixed in character, but
that it may, through the education of a sufficient number of generations, be produced of any quality to meet the demand; yet nevertheless
he keeps speaking of woman's present condition as a distorted and "unnatural" one. "Undesirable" is the only word he can consistently use.
[Mill should be able to concede, without threatening his larger point,
that men and women have significantly different capacities today, even
if these result from custom rather than nature.] As it is, his somewhat
nervous anxiety to efface even the present distinction leads him into
extremes where numbers-even of those who fully sympathize with his
practical aims-will not care to follow.
The "woman question" has hitherto been in the main a practical one.
The etiolated and stunted condition of single women on the one hand,
and the interests of order in the family on the other, have been the
chief points of attack by the reformers, and retort by the conservatives.
[The most "noteworthy feature" of Mill's book] is its thorough hostility
to the accepted sentimental ideal of the personal intercourse of man
and wife. [The conditions of women are not as bad in the United
States as they are in England.] Much of what he attacks exists here but
in feeble form. The legal abuses are in large measure obsolete; the ele-
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ment of brutality which he makes so prominent in the masculine feeling of superiority is foreign; American husbands are as a rule less sensitive about their wives occupying a position of independent publicity
than those of whom Mr. Mill writes .... [Mill's lack of support for the
sentimental ideal] furnishes that intense contempt for our actual arrangements which gives such a headlong character to his work.
At the heart of those arrangements is the nuclear family with a male
breadwinner. A man's illusions of security, repose, respect, and authority
require a family that needs him, James postulated, especially a dependent
wife. In other words, the independence and public activity that he recognized as good for women conflicts with men's emotional needs.
However he might shrink from expressing it in naked words, the wife
his heart more or less subtly craves is at bottom a dependent being. In
the outer world he can only hold good his position by dint of reconquering it afresh every day: life is a struggle where success is only relative, and all sanctity is torn off of him; where failure and humiliation,
the exposure of weaknesses, and the unmasking of pretence, are assured incidents; and he accordingly longs for one tranquil spot where
he shall be valid absolutely and once for all; where, having been accepted, he is secure from further criticism, and where his good aspirations may be respected no less than if they were accomplished realities.
In a word, the elements of security and repose are essential to his ideal;
and the question is, Are they easily attainable without some feeling of
dependence on the woman's side,-without her relying on him to be
her mediator with the external world,-without his activity overlapping hers and surrounding it on almost every side, so that he makes as
it were the atmosphere in which she lives?
Many men will answer No, peremptorily; for instance, Dr. Bushnell.40
James did not endorse the cultural demand that he described, for
women to sacrifice their autonomy and critical capacity in order for men
to feel strong, accomplished, and protective, although he neglected to assess the price women pay in loss of self-confidence and strength because
of dependence on their husbands. 41 He depicted alienation from the work-
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place, a world of "failure and humiliation," of powerlessness and failed aspirations, in which the family is supposed to compensate for a man's impotence in the world by being dependent upon him in the home. On the
other hand, James implicitly criticized the value of autonomy that is at the
heart of the traditional male ideal by revealing the sacrifice necessary to
preserve male independence, which he acknowledged was a crafted illusion.
James's views on women might be clarified further by contrasting him
briefly with two of his contemporaries: Theodore Roosevelt and Henry
Adams. Roosevelt perfectly fits the model of macho politics targeted by
feminist theorists. He tied together "the strenuous life" advocated by
James, with war, imperialism, and traditional gender stereotypes. While
calling for U.S. control of Hawaii, Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines,
he wrote that "the man must be glad to do a man's work.... The woman
must be the housewife, the helpmeet of the homemaker, the wide and fearless mother of many healthy children."42 James insisted that both men and
women could live the strenuous life, and he tried to break the link between it and imperialism.
Henry Adams may be seen either as a radical feminist with an essentialist view of women or as merely a different variety of sexist than the
bellicose Roosevelt. Unlike Roosevelt and James, Adams believed that the
United States needed, not more manliness, but more femininity. He characterized the politicians, industrialists, and adventurers who dominated
the country as hyper-masculine. Indicting the United States for its suppression of feminine power, which he associated with love, beauty, family,
and sex, Adams identified with women and hoped that the country would
eventually become a place "that sensitive and timid natures could regard
without a shudder."43 Whereas Adams conceived of America as being insufficiently feminine, James believed it to be insufficiently masculine.
Adams admired traditional femininity more than James did and asserted
that America should change, not women. Adams feared that women
would become masculine, but James welcomed that prospect. They both
agreed that the United States had weakened women and gave them too
small a role in post-Civil War political culture.
What has been revealed so far about James's attitudes toward women?
Although retaining the idea that there might be differences between men
and women, even if those differences are not permanent and implanted by
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nature, James criticized the constrictions of gender roles and endorsed
women's public action, work, and physical activity. Although he linked his
ideal of heroism with the word "manliness" and rejected passivity as "feminine," he encouraged women to be "manly." With regard to the sociological function of the family, it fulfilled the need to have others depend on
men and served as a refuge from a world of work in which most people
are disposable. Having outlined James's explicit attitudes about gender, the
question remains, How did his attitudes affect his theory of action?

III
James's model of heroic action could be labeled "ascetic," a term used disparagingly by some feminist theorists. In order to feel a sense of accomplishment, James believed that people must encounter danger and resistance, but he also asserted that those situations need to be balanced by
repose, relaxation, and security. 44 Opposing the post-Industrial Revolution cultural norm of the driven capitalist, James's ideal encompasses a
combination of hard work and vacations. The appalling aspect of poverty,
according to James, is not its difficulty but the fact that no opportunity
exists for relief; this aspect is galling because at the same time many people
enjoy soft, easy lives and never experience the challenges faced by the
poor. 45
The ascetic character of James's model of action is found in his description of human instincts, and the main source for determining James's view
of instinct is The Principles of Psychology. He described so many contradictory human proclivities that it is difficult to label him as an essentialist. 46 He identified as instincts hunting, fighting, envy, ambition, acquisitiveness, privacy, shyness or reserve, and modesty. He posited that human
beings innately desire certainty, creativity, excitement, risk, power, development of talents, leadership, mastery, personal isolation, and sociability.47
People have a sexual instinct, but they also have an antisex instinct, which
is revealed when they recoil from being touched or by their reaction when
they sit on a chair that is still warm after being occupied by someone else. 48
James's account of human instincts is ambiguous, i.e., it does not conform
to traditional stereotypes of male and female.
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To the extent that people are by nature aggressive, James implied, our
instincts must be suppressed and channeled by institutions and reason;
otherwise, society will be destroyed through war. 49 Such instincts can only
be regulated, never completely repressed, which is not all bad because some
elements of aggression should be preserved for the good of society. 50
Although sharing many of the same ideals, James repudiated those socialists, pacifists, and feminists who strove to eliminate manly or warlike instincts; not only was that task impossible, but accomplishing it would deprive the community of the energy necessary for public action. 51 "Martial
virtues," James insisted, "are absolute and permanent human goods."52 Although himself a pacifist, James believed that war's expression of the aggressive instinct had a healthy psychological effect that nonviolence could
imitate and use for constructive purposes. 53 War brings out heroism, endurance, self-discipline, and energy; James asked how these characteristics
could be developed without war. 54
Asceticism in James's theory takes the form of self-discipline, control
over emotions, resistance to pain, the acceptance without bitterness of
failure and material simplicity, and a willingness to sacrifice one's interests
and even one's life for the public good. Cowardice, laziness, withdrawal,
and aggression have to be overcome. "Be systematically ascetic or heroic
in little unnecessary points, do every day or two something for no other
reason than that you would rather not do it."55 For James, emotions must
be controlled by reason, because feelings, emotions, and instincts have no
inherently moral content and cannot be trusted to guide action reliably. 56
James would be wrong, and emotions would not require policing,
if there were some "natural" morality in our emotional makeup. Perhaps
people instinctively hate to see their fellow creatures suffer pain, as most
people are moved by stories of murder, torture, starvation, rape, and even
mistreatment of animals. But if sympathy is "natural," people who hurt
others would have to repress something in themselves through ideology or
psychological diso~der. And what can explain the widespread popularity
of boxing, football, and hockey; graphically violent films; and cock fights,
bull fights, and pit bull fights? Does their popularity manifest a "natural"
sadistic pleasure in witnessing pain-showing that many people are deaf
to the cries of others and even take pleasure in hearing those cries-or
does their popularity represent cultural conditioning ?57 Are controlled
sports in any sense related to larger instances of sadistic evil such as death
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camps, the slaughter and rape of Muslims in Bosnia, the hacking of opponents by the Tanton Macoutes in Haiti? I am not suggesting that the people who enjoy violent sports and movies are responsible for or connected
with social violence, but I am endeavoring to make sense of James's assertion that the "free play" of human instincts would not create a generous,
loving society. Cruelty and pleasure in the pain of others seems so prevalent that James appears to be correct in viewing instincts as being multiple
and thus in need of shaping and control by society. 58
Impulses toward violence, cruelty, and revenge have profound political
implications. In a cycle of revenge, one person stabs another to compensate
for past wrongs of the enemy group. The friends of the new victim react
with rage. That rage should be suppressed by the individual's reason and
conscience if possible but by external force if necessary. Once the violent
acts are halted, the emotions may eventually be calmed so that a peace
process can begin. James hoped that reason-thinking things out, cooling down, considering the consequences of one's action-would produce
moral action. In short, his ideal of action rejects aggressive action while
demanding control over emotions. Wolin comments on this point: "What
is James presupposing in the way of conditions so that weighing things out
would produce moral action? It seems to me that fresh from nearly a half
century of debate over slavery there is a limit to what one can expect from
this kind of counsel. And one would also want to ask if there are no circumstances under which rage is not only natural but even commendable."
I would reply that democratic debate becomes difficult when one or both
parties are enraged.
James's asceticism includes the belief that people need to accept failure
and modest levels of material comfort. "The more one thinks about the
demands of participatory life," muses Wolin, "the more one sees that they
are at odds with the things that James is pointing to: the success ethic,
materialism, and the comfort ethic." Unlike Machiavelli, James does not
insist that fate must always be dominated, and this willingness to relinquish control over fate could be seen as an implicit critique of mastery as
a male ideal. 59 James counseled that while the American worship of "the
bitch-goddess SUCCESS ••• is our national disease," failure in most human
enterprises is inevitable, and we need to learn to fail gracefully. 60 "It seems
almost as if it were necessary to become worthless as a practical being ...
[like] your mystic, your dreamer, or your insolvent tramp or loafer" in order
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to gain perspective on a nation's values. People who win at the game rarely
question its validity.61 Poverty is taken to be a dishonorable badge of failure, but James proposed that if it comes, poverty should be accepted without a feeling of humiliation. In fact, living modestly offers political actors
freedom because they need not dread loss of possessions.
Think of the strength which personal indifference to poverty would
give us if we were devoted to unpopular causes. We need no longer hold
our tongues or fear to vote the revolutionary or reformatory ticket. Our
stocks might fall, our hopes of promotion vanish, our salaries stop, our
club doors close in our faces; yet, while we lived, we would imperturbably bear witness to the spirit, and our example would help to set
free our generation. 62
Simple living makes freely chosen action more likely.63 At the other end
of the financial spectrum, some people with great wealth seek legislation
that benefits the poor without facing the danger of joining their ranks.
Such noblesse oblige is, of course, exceptional.
James's ascetic ideal was not only offered for a few heroes. Indeed, he
advised that no one should seek only material luxury; all should pursue
deeds that demand risk. 64 But to do so does not always mean extraordinary
accomplishments. In a world frequently subjected to war, genocide, violent
crime, and famine, achieving a modest level of security is often a heroic
act. James would go further and insist that considerable courage and
strength are required to remain sane, moral, and engaged with the world
while enduring the typical boredom and indignities of the workplace, frustrations of traffic jams and bureaucratic foul-ups, the distress and pain of
illness, the sickness and death of a loved one, and witnessing, even via the
media, the suffering of others.65 James made this point most clearly in a
response to a speech by his friend Oliver Wendell Holmes, in which
Holmes had suggested that everyone should strive to be heroic.66 In a private letter, James bemoaned the fact that Holmes
celebrate(s) mere vital excitement, la joie de vivre, as a protest against
humdrum solemnity. But to make it systematic, and oppose it, as an
ideal and a duty, to the ordinarily recognized duties, is to pervert it
altogether. . . . It is curiously childish to me, and Wendell always forgets
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that on his own terms the dutiful people also fulfil his law. Even they
live hard, and enjoy the struggle with their opposing devils! So let
them alone! . . . Mere excitement is an immature ideal. 67
James might appear to be contradictory here: if heroism is pervasive, why
did he elsewhere condemn American softness and appeal for a moral
equivalent of war ?68 James found heroic strength in everyday life, which is
the opposite of softness. His objection was to the rise of large government,
created in response to utopian visions, that would supplant the initiatives
of communities and individuals.
James invited citizens to become more energetic in the face of increasingly powerful institutions in the late nineteenth century, but he also demanded respect for the lives of ordinary citizens. That respect led James
to proportional demands from the citizenry, a version of "from each according to their ability." For some people, attaining the bare necessities of
life or holding onto a job requires a heroic struggle, and they are not obligated to undertake extraordinary public action beyond fulfilling the minimal civic duties. But the elite, who possess economic or emotional security,
including the Victorian single woman of the middle class, should push
themselves to accomplish more and give more to the community. Not everyone has the same task; the economic and intellectual elites are held to
a higher standard. James believed that "there must be novelty in an idealnovelty at least for him whom the ideal grasps. Sodden routine is incompatible with ideality, although what is sodden routine for one person may
be ideal novelty for another. "69
James condemned Teddy Roosevelt for being too abstract, saying of his
imperialist rhetoric:
Although in middle life, as the years age, and in a situation of responsibility concrete enough, he is still mentally in the Sturm and Orang
period of early adolescence, treats human affairs .. . from the sole
point of view of the organic excitement and difficulty they may bring,
gushes over war as the ideal condition of human society, for the manly
strenuousness which it involves, and treats peace as a condition of
blubberlike and swollen ignobility, fit only for huckstering weaklings,
dwelling in gray twilight and heedless of the higher life. Not a word of
the cause-one foe is as good as another. 70
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James censured Roosevelt for his abstract call to action, blaming him for
blindness to the fact that action takes its moral content from its cause.
Similarly, he reproached Roosevelt with the same criticism he leveled at
Holmes: the constant call for struggle and risk as the essence of courage.
"In both cases," Wolin comments, "he is trying to deal with a certain kind
of immaturity on their part, a juvenile quality, in which excitement appears to be a substitute for thought." James may have at certain points
appeared guilty of the very things for which he chided Roosevelt and
Holmes, but those criticisms reveal that he recognized the problem of endorsing action as a universal good.
Wendy Brown attempts, unsuccessfully I think, to clarify the difference between masculine and "postmasculinist" courage when she states
that courage has been narrowly defined by men as establishing one's humanness by overcoming the instinctual fear of death. She wishes to keep
courage but remove its macho elements. ''A post-masculinist politics must
[not] refuse a place to bold, impetuous, forceful or daring actions." 71 Feminist courage, according to Brown, would sustain life, risk one's identity,
and engage with others in relationships of trust. 72 Although James might
not have understood the concept of risking one's identity, he probably
would not otherwise have objected to Brown's formulation, other than to
ask if feminist theorists need to recognize, and do something other than
repress, the widespread impulses of aggression and competition ("universal
and competitive passion") that James hoped to transmute into "civic passion."73
Courage is a central element in political action. Radical action usually
demands the strength to think independently of prevailing ideas and then
the fortitude to accept suffering and even death in resisting power.74 Whatever the joys and material benefits of political action, if people act on their
ideals, they might be disappointed, condemned by family and friends, fired
from their jobs, physically attacked, incarcerated, and .even killed. Bravery
is required to resist the prevailing views and customs of one's family, community, or country, and until one finds friends and comrades it can be a
lonely effort. 75
The vocabulary of gender in relationship to courage now seems outmoded. Feminist theorists correctly teach that one should not enter politics to test one's power and endurance; such testing seems more appropri-
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ate to physical training, solo sports, and wilderness adventure. Even
though some feminist theorists have argued that masculine courage overvalues autonomy, the actual concept and experience of courage have been
more complex. Politics has never overvalued autonomy because action has
always required trust; although unions have frequently been dominated by
men, union leaders preach solidarity. And trust, particularly in war, is a
traditional component of courage: "Be there for your buddy." Feminists
have rightly indicted those people who say that only men can be brave.
Some men may have mistakenly postulated that only they have the capacity for true courage, and James did associate courage with "manliness," but
he never claimed that only men could possess it. He quite appropriately
muddied the waters.
Thinking about gender, courage, and muddied water reminds me of a
rafting trip I took in Utah in the summer of 1995 through the perilous Cataract Canyon of the Colorado River. The woman who guided our
eighteen-foot oar boat, which carried three passengers and lots of gear, had
long thick brown hair and powerful legs and arms. There was nothing
masculine about her. As we went through the rapids at Big Drop Two, she
missed an intended cut, and the raft flipped . All four of us were dumped
into the freezing water. The guide got caught by the ropes under the boat
and wounded her hand, finally cutting herself loose just in time to breathe
again. Coming up, she told me to push her onto the overturned raft and
then helped me climb onto it before handing me over to a rescue boat,
telling them to make sure I got warm. She stayed on top of the raft
through the rest of the rapids. When we talked later, she was careful to
admit that something frightening and dangerous had happened. Although
she had flipped before, she had never done so while carrying passengers
and had never been in such personal difficulty. She quietly vowed that if
she could not get people safely through the rapids-all of us made it-she
would quit. (She wrote me later that she went back through Cataract Canyon several more times that summer, flipping again but "more cleanly.") I
was impressed with her bravery, skill, and strength (no match for the river
that day), as well as her honesty and concern for others. This is a long
way of saying that I admired her courage, and James would have admired
her, and that admiration has little to do with gender. It was neither masculine nor feminine, just courage itself. 76
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IV
James's model of action should not be dismissed because there is much
good in it. Politics still requires bravery. In an age when many people believe that capitalism has triumphed over all possible alternatives, there remains a need for voices that esteem the common good over the pursuit of
private interest. Following James would not lead to a greater war against
nature even if his misleading words called for that. He desired neither deforestation with electric chain saws nor chemical pollution of the water
and air; his examples of the war against nature include the building of
homes, the repairing of roads, feeding the hungry, and developing a robust
character by challenging ourselves in nature. Both men and women can
do all of those things. 77 Despite his vocabulary, James did not have a gender-specific definition of action, and he indicated that women are as capable of political virtue as men.
The question then becomes, Does James's model of action foster in
men and women an aggressive, hyper-masculine character? I sympathize
with Henry Adams's desire to protect "timid natures." Is there sufficient
room in James's ideal for people who are gentle, soft, and shy, qualities once
associated with women? We might be inclined to agree with James when
he demanded of Holmes, Leave the shy people alone! There is a political
problem with such a stance. Can gentleness be accepted in a radical democracy if each citizen is expected to take part in political action and
politics requires a thick skin? If democracy does demand a certain type of
temperament, one worries about the coercion necessary to create that
temperament and the type of character that might be lost. This worry may
be quite fantastic since most personalities are rendered passive and silent
by bureaucracies and undemocratic forms of power in schools, the workplace, and government; participatory democracy promises to fulfill far
more human potentialities than it would frustrate. 78
A second political issue raised by the ideal of robustness is that, as
Hartsock suggested, such an ideal might easily become aggressive and
burst the boundaries of law and civility. James did not create aggression,
but he acknowledged it and called for channeling it away from violence,
imperialism, and war into sports, wilderness adventure, and contributions
to the public good such as teaching in inner-city schools, joining a union,
or risking one's life by working with gangs or escorting women and doctors
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into abortion clinics. Although the manly ideal might degenerate into violence, violence is not the usual result of political actors behaving in the
vigorous manner prescribed by James. The real problem with James's military metaphors for citizenship is their conception of authority as command
and obedience. "Martial virtues must be the enduring cement," James
avowed in a passage quoted earlier in Chapter 2, "intrepidity, contempt of
softness, surrender of private interest, obedience to command, must still remain the rock on which states are built." 79 The relationship of citizens to
rulers is not that of soldiers to their commanders, a relationship that may
be justified under conditions of war but offers no standard for democracies
in which leaders should be questioned as well as followed. There are models of authority appropriate to a democratic community, the chief criterion
of which is that authority encourage independent thinking and action on
the part of the citizens, but the regular, rarely questioned obedience of
military life is not one of those models.
Finally, the .question must be raised whether gender categories any
longer make sense in discussing political action. Borrowing a theoretical
device employed by political theorist Hanna Pitkin, one might ask what
the difference is between manly action "at its best," as described by someone like James or Arendt, and feminist action at its best, as described by
someone like Pitkin or Brown? Both sides appeal for risk, vigor, courage,
and contribution to the community. Feminist theory and the action of
thousands of courageous women have resulted in genuine progress so that
women and men need no longer meet arbitrary standards of masculinity
and femininity. James's ambiguity and encouragement of women may have
added a bit to this progress. Freed from gender specificity, a term that does
not quite fit James, his advocacy of action constitutes an addition to democratic theory despite the dated and unnecessarily gender-laden vocabulary
he employed. Democratic citizenship requires of all citizens the vigor, courage, and self-discipline advocated by James.

Chapter 3

Sources of Respect
I
Sustaining friendly relationships among citizens as they resolve their disputes democratically requires mutual respect. Justice Learned Hand interpreted "the spirit of liberty" as "the spirit which seeks to understand the
minds of other men and women." 1 Without some degree of unity among
individuals and groups, politics-the peaceful resolution of conflictbreaks down and differences are resolved, if at all, by the weaker yielding
to the superior power. Unity's effects might be attained by suppressing disagreements or invoking a hegemonic identity ("to be a good citizen you
must believe this and practice that"), or, and this ideal is far more difficult
to achieve, genuine unity could be created by encouraging citizens to cherish their commonalities and to esteem people of different colors, religions,
classes, income levels, degrees of power, genders, ideologies, and sexual
preferences. One could imagine the following exhortation, "By virtue of
our citizenship in this country, we share a common past, laws, language,
and institutions, although we also belong to particular groups with unique
histories, customs, and languages, that make distinctive contributions to
the collectivity."2
The historical context in which William James thought about these
matters is significantly similar to the present. U.S. foreign policy frequently
manifests the racism and xenophobia that James saw in U.S. interventions
in Cuba, the Philippines, Venezuela, and Haiti, 3 and at home, there are
echoes of the intense class warfare of the late nineteenth century; flashpoints for hostility then and now include race, religion, region, gender,
sexuality, and ideology.Just as immigrants from Germany, Eastern Europe,
and Ireland once altered the ethnic composition of the United States, a
corresponding transformation is now occurring as a result of immigration
from Mexico, Central America, Cuba, Africa, and Asia. Cuban immi-
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grants clash with African Americans in Miami for political power, and the
tension between blacks and Jews has been intense since the demise of the
civil rights movement. In Crown Heights, Brooklyn, blacks and Orthodox
Jews battle for scarce city resources that neither control, and in 1994 a
prominent Yale historian of slavery chose not to speak at Howard University because he feared anti-Semitic heckling. 4
Racial, religious, and ethnic tensions are expressed in ideological debates over affirmative action, the means of fairly representing minorities in
Congress, the content of school curricula, and the use of languages other
than English in education and public affairs. Clashes over homosexuality
have been waged more openly than ever before in schools, the military,
and street assaults on gays and lesbians, and a women's educational and
cultural retreat started by two lesbians in Mississippi became an armed
camp in response to threats from hostile neighbors. 5 In reaction to the
decline of culturally sanctioned truths and a multiplicity of perspectives,
some political and religious movements express their positions as indisput-·
able and nonnegotiable. The militia movement, neo-Nazis, Black Muslims,
and certain fundamentalist Jewish and Islamic sects combine absolutism,
hatred, and violence. Women have been murdered in Algeria for not wearing the veil. 6 Even "moderates" divide the world into the righteous and
the damned: some of the groups just listed have become pariahs for the
rest of us. 7
Given the fact that previous grounds of unity-such as respect for law
or acquiescence to hierarchies dominated by whites, males, and Protestants-are eroding, will domestic conflicts become increasingly violent?
Will the United States go the way of Algeria, Egypt, and the former Yugoslavia? The Los Angeles riots, terrorist bombings, and attacks on abortion clinics are worrisome signs.
What institutions, customs, ideology, or temperament could unify or
at least dampen the hostility in our diverse society? All answers to that
question will meet with skepticism. One consequence of the philosophic
dispute over relativism and subjectivism (does truth exist outside of individual or cultural preference and self-interest?) has been the abandonment
of the old ideal of neutrality, i.e., one should and can find a position untainted by interest that represents the common good. Today, every claim
made in the name of the common good is exposed for its selfish interests
or will to power. 8
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The Federalist founders claimed to have discovered a substitute for
unity: divide the people so that no one faction can predominate while increasing the scale of government and using checks and balances to distance political institutions from popular will. 9 The powerful, centralized
state fills one function of unity when it suppresses conflict through the
army, police, courts, and incarceration system. Madisonian means of resolving discord are less available to direct democracies; refusing to transfer
power to the state gives citizens more personal responsibility and requires
them to enter into political relationships with fellow citizens. 10 A democracy cannot abolish disagreements or strong feelings among citizens, but
both must be tempered if they are not to erupt into violence.
The United States has resources in its theoretical and political traditions to help in the creation of a multicultural society in which groups
negotiate their differences without demonizing each other. According to
literary critic Giles Gunn:
While pragmatic criticism advocates no particular policies, it does possess a specifiable politics. It is a politics distinguished by the democratic
preference for rendering differences conversable so that the conflicts
they produce, instead of being destructive of human community, can
be potentially creative of it; can broaden and thicken public culture
rather than depleting it.11
It may not be much of an exaggeration to say that the pragmatic criticism
described by Gunn was largely invented by William James, although he
went beyond Gunn's ideals to delineate the kinds of conditions, prerequisites, and behaviors that are needed in order to render differences conversable.
James exemplified mutual respect, sometimes even embarrassing his
friends with his openness to advocates of eccentric causes such as parapsychology. In an obituary that identified democracy with egalitarian tolerance, Walter Lippmann declared that James
was simply keeping America's promise: he was actually doing what we,
as a nation, proclaimed that we would do. He was tolerant; he was
willing to listen to what seems preposterous, and to consider what
might, though queer, be true. And he showed that this democratic
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attitude of mind is every bit as fruitful as the aristocratic determination
to ignore new and strange-looking ideas. James was a democrat. He
gave all men and all creeds, any idea, any theory, any superstition, a respectful hearing ... . It is an encouraging thought that America should
have produced perhaps the most tolerant man of our generation. 12
W. E. B. Du Bois revered James for being first among Harvard's transformative national intellectual leaders, "unshackled in thought and custom
who were beating back bars of ignorance and particularism and preju. ,,13
dice.
Perfect harmony was not James's ideal; he believed that conflict was
healthy. So he did not endeavor, even at the level of theory, to discourage
the social struggles of late-nineteenth-century American society, but in
order to preserve democratic institutions, he sought to reduce hatred and
misconceptions in confrontations between capital and labor, natives and
immigrants, blacks and whites, men and women. 14 In protesting U.S. intervention in the Philippines and Cuba and condemning the SpanishAmerican War, James wanted to curb the feelings of superiority toward
other countries that fueled American imperialism. 15 Not only does imperialism violate abstract principles of right, but James believed that tolerance
and self-determination are embodied in the Declaration of Independence,
and thus constitutive of the American political spirit, and imperialism corrupts that spirit.
In analyzing the causes of corruption, James did not find fault with
either liberalism or American political institutions, which at their best preserve liberty. Grasping social psychology shaped by ideologies and values,
leadership and social structures, was for James crucial to exposing the root
of the problem. In despair over the Spanish-American War, James said:
Seriously speaking, this whole business has thrown a most instructive
light on the way in which history is made, and has illustrated to perfection the psychologie des foules [crowd psychology]! The basis of it all
is, or rather was, perfectly honest humanitarianism, and an absolutely
disinterested desire on the part of our people to set the Cubans free .
. . . On this, various interests worked for their purposes in favor of war. 16
He identified a common source of domestic political violence and imperi-
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alism: both result, at least in part, from a "blindness" that creates contempt
for cultures and outlooks other than one's own. He analyzed the causes of
this blindness and indicated an approach to overcoming it.

II
James's conception of mutual respect combined tolerance, based on the
faith that others are equal in value and possess a share of truth, with
the conviction that failure to perceive this equality results from an inevitable cultural process. If incognizance is impossible to dispel, every effort
should be made to withhold judgment. "International comparisons are a
great waste of time-at any rate, international judgments and the passing
of sentences are. Every nation has ideals and difficulties and sentiments
which are an impenetrable secret to one not of the blood. Let them alone,
let each one work out its salvation on its own lines." 17 James specified the
greatest danger to other cultures as being imperiousness, arguing that we
must not
be forward in pronouncing on the meaninglessness of forms of existence other than our own; and [the result of the inquiry into the
causes of blindness] commands us to tolerate, respect, and indulge
those whom we see harmlessly interested and happy in their own ways,
however unintelligible these may be to us. Hands off: neither the whole
of truth, nor the whole of good, is revealed to any single observer, although each observer gains a partial superiority of insight from the
peculiar position in which he stands. 18
James's tolerance was not anarchic; he insisted that antagonists should remain within the boundaries of the law. American democracy is based on
two inveterate habits carried into public life.... They can never be
too often pointed out or praised. One of them is the habit of trained
and disciplined good temper towards the opposite party when it fairly
wins its innings-it was by breaking from this habit the slave States
nearly wrecked our Nation. The other is that of fierce and merciless
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resentment towards every man or set of men who break the public
peace-it was by holding to this habit the free States saved her life. 19
One might wonder if James here reveals that his concept of democracy is
founded on the coercion feared by a postmodernist such as Connolly, but
it should be remembered that James's rhetoric is colored heavily by the
Civil War experience so that he was thinking not only of people who break
the peace but of those who would destroy the union. 2 Commitment to
democratic rules of settling disputes was, for James, one element of mutual
respect along with appreciation of others, self-criticism, and an acknowledgment of an innate inability to fathom others fully.
Mutual respect is the ideal relationship among citizens in a democracy,
but we need not go to democratic dreamland: to respect every positionfor example, to deny that the Holocaust occurred or to posit the genetic
inferiority of African Americans-is to sanction evil. New Yorker critic
Adam Gopnick parodied a mad objectivity that could be confused with
mutual respect:

°

You sometimes have the depressing feeling that if the Beer Hall Putsch
took place in America today there would be an investigation in the
news magazines of Hitler's claim ("Though Hitler's charge that Jews
control the media remains unproved, it has sparked a welcome debate
on the relationships between Jews and other Germans. In the long run,
this may be the best thing to come from this miserable incident"). 21
James placed limits on tolerance:
The first thing to learn in intercourse with others is non-interference
with their own peculiar ways of being happy, provided those ways do not
assume to interfere by violence with ours. No one has insight into all the
ideals. No one should presume to judge them off-hand. The pretension
to dogmatize about them in each other is the root of most human injustices and cruelties, and the trait in human character most likely to
make the angels weep.22
Democratic action requires mutual respect because it makes peaceful
disagreement viable. Mutual respect implies a friendly attitude toward one's
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fellow citizens, including political opponents. That friendly attitude includes a theory of truth, a tendency to dismiss hierarchies as indicators of
who merits respect, and an appreciation for the variety of contributions
made by various people in a society.
In certain moods, James professed that virtually everyone detects part
of the truth and no one apprehends the whole. 23 A stranger's ideas, way of
life, character, or culture probably have something worthy in them that we
often cannot recognize since they differ from our own portion of the truth.
One therefore should strive to observe the world, especially in a confrontation, from the other's point of view, even learning from them if possible.
"Respect has to be treated as a very difficult demand because in a society
where you emphasize toleration of diversity you are going to have to do a
lot of respecting," remarks Wolin. "That is more than simply the type of
respect one must show in personal relationships. Respect is strained when
one has all kinds of groups, ideologies, and interests to think about, with
all their various spokespersons. And that also makes it difficult to see the
world from their point of view because in the context of differences you've
often got a bewildering variety of points of view." 24
James opposed our common tendency to designate the voices of some
groups as worth hearing while ignoring others altogether. Some people
turn deaf ears to women, blacks, the working class, New Age devotees,
evangelists, politicians, professors, and journalists. Some accept nothing as
true if it cannot be validated by mainstream science. For example, in a
reversal of common sentiments, the father of a friend of mine was so convinced by a study he had read of marijuana's benefits that he refused to acknowledge, even when it was described to him from experience, the damaging effects of his own son's addiction to the drug. In contrast, James tried
to listen to everyone, including advocates of weird theories and partisans
of lost causes, with an open mind.
To engage James on this issue requires confronting an ancient problem
in political theory: What is the value of a citizen? From the standpoint of
the community, are all citizens of the same worth? Do they deserve the
same rewards? In The Politics, Aristotle contended that "the good in the
sphere of politics is justice; and justice consists in what tends to promote
the common interest. General opinion makes it consist in some sort of
equality.... [l]t considers that persons who are equal should have assigned to them equal things ... . [Y]es; but equals and unequals in what?"

Sources of Respect

61

(bk. 3, chap. 12, 1-2). Superior people should receive superior rewards,
but Aristotle asks what makes a superior person. Surely not complexion or
height. He concludes that "claims to political rights must be based on the
ground of contribution to the elements which constitute the being of the
state. There is thus good ground for the claims to honour and office which
are made by persons of good descent, free birth, or wealth" (bk. 3, chap.
12, 8) . He rejects the assertion, which he labels "democratic," that the
people who are equal in one thing should have an equal share of all things
(bk. 3, chap. 13, 1).25
James may have come close to Aristotle's formulation in holding that
while everyone can and should make a contribution to the country, those
contributions are of different worth. He tried to avoid esteeming exclusively the working class or the elite. He favorably quoted Tolstoy's praise
for those at the bottom of society-"If I could show you these men and
women, all the world over, in every stage of history, under every abuse of
error, under every circumstance of failure, without hope, without help,
without thanks, still obscurely fighting the lost fight of virtue, still clinging
to some rag of honour, the poor jewel of their souls!"-and responded:
All this is as true as it is splendid and terribly do we need our Tolstois
and Stevensons to keep our sense for it alive.... [Yet] Tolstoi overcorrect[s] our social prejudices, when he makes his love of the peasant so
exclusive, and hardens his heart towards the educated man as absolutely as he does . . .. Is it so certain that the surroundings and circumstances of the virtue do make so little difference in.the importance of
the result? Is the functional utility, the worth to the universe of acertain definite amount of courage, kindliness, and patience, no greater if
the possessor of these virtues is in an educated situation, working out
far-reaching tasks, than if he be an illiterate nobody, hewing wood and
drawing water, just to keep himself alive? Tolstoi's philosophy, deeply
enlightening though it certainly is, remains a false abstraction. It savors
too much of that oriental pessimism and nihilism of his, which declares the whole phenomenal world and its facts and their distinctions
to be a cunning fraud .26
One discerns in this approach to equality James's odd mixture of egalitarianism and patrician arrogance, radical critique of and respect for the status

62

Chapter Three

quo. James called for an appreciation of both the workers' and the nonworkers' contributions. Intelligence, intellectual innovation, vigor, character, and occupation all are significant, James insisted. Yet great skill and
courage in brain surgery or diplomacy are more praiseworthy than the
same attributes in plumbing, essential as the latter might be. This is the
point at which James broke with Tolstoy, who came to value the life and
work of peasants while condemning every other type of life, including the
novelist's. James's individualism led him to add that one's place, occupation, membership, dress, and wealth are not certain indicators of merit,
which should be judged not solely on the type of contribution one makes
but on the effort one expends to make it as well. 27
The acceptance of inequality erodes the democratic temperament and
replaces it with passivity. We have grown accustomed to hierarchies in everyday life: bosses, owners, boards of directors, and the wealthy give orders
to the managers, workers, and secretaries who carry them out. All people
are allowed to vote and receive a fair trial, which perpetuates the legitimating illusion of equal power despite the grinding reality of inequality.
Marx articulated the essence of the situation: "The state abolishes, after
its fashion, the distinctions established by birth, social rank, education, occupation, when it decrees that birth, social rank, education, occupation
are non-political distinctions; when it proclaims, without regard to these
distinctions, that every member of society is an equal partner in popular
sovereignty. "28 Despite freedom to criticize the state, you disagree with the
boss at your peril, particularly if you lack tenure or a union contract. In a
participatory democracy, legal equality, even as an ideal, is insufficient: the
goal should be to equalize power both in politics and in everyday life.
Such equalization is both a condition and a result of mutual respect.
You would not attempt to give your fellow citizens power unless you had a
generous attitude toward them. James did not appeal for the transformation of the United States into a radical democracy, but his commitment
to mutual respect and participation is in the spirit of radical democracy. A
political meaning of "respect" might be as follows: Even if I disagree with
your views and work against their realization, I will try not to hate you. I
will try to fathom your way of viewing the world and will think about what
you say rather than punish you for speaking your ideas or ignore the fact
that you have spoken. 29
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A disrespectful teacher ignores or openly disdains the comments of
students. The recommendation that every person should be heard runs
counter to the idea that only a few people matter because of their education, wealth, color, or status. Philosopher Maurice Natanson expressed
something like this, during an interview, in discussing his teacher Alfred
Schutz:
I learned a lot about human existence from Schutz precisely in terms
of what's at issue when you're dealing with another person. And at one
point he told me, "Natanson, these are human beings." You say, "Well,
Professor So-and-So's done this, and this person's done that; there's
this quarrel and that difficulty." But basically it isn't whether the paper
was given the right grade, or whether you did the right thing, or the
position you took was this, ·that or the other. It was basically that you're
dealing with persons, and that's what I came to realize. 30
Natanson's formulation implies, as does a theory of radical democracy, that
people have intrinsic worth despite criticisms of them and regardless of
their social roles.
In a democracy, each citizen is entrusted with some power to decide
the direction of the polity, and therefore citizens are not nonentities and
are more than possible converts or political targets; potentially, they are
one's teachers. According to Gandhi and Martin Luther King, Jr., while
working for change we should try to sympathize with and even love our
opponents. King preached, "The Christian virtues oflove, mercy and forgiveness should stand at the center of our lives." Love of one's enemies
"might well be the salvation of our civilization."31 Even though respecting
someone does not require liking them or admiring them, creating respect
is still a political goal. Christopher Lasch disagrees:
We are determined to respect everyone, but we have forgotten that
respect has to be earned. Respect is not another word for tolerance.
. . . Respect is what we experience in the presence of admirable
achievements, admirably formed characters, natural gifts put to good
use. It entails the exercise of discriminating judgment, not indiscriminate acceptance. 32
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I appreciate Lasch's use of "respect" but cannot completely accept it because democracy is built on respect of a certain kind for everyone-even
the unpleasant, the unlearned, the untalented, and the failed. 33
It is hard to define what kind of respect. One wants to avoid deprecating all those with whom one disagrees without pretending to "respect"
every person and position no matter how wicked. In commenting on the
manuscript version of this book, Carey McWilliams proposed that democratic respect may lie in holding everyone accountable to the appropriate
standards. This idea seems plausible until one encounters a bizarre theory
of respect in an prominent American public policy text, Mickey Kaus's The
End of Equality. 34 Kaus believes "social equality" as a goal is superior to
"monetary equality" because of the impossibility and negative effects of
redistributing wealth, whereas social equality would guarantee that people
are respected regardless of their income. He then details as appropriate
standards for respect work, politeness, and the fulfillment of obligations;
in other words, people who do not work are unworthy of respect. Kaus's
contempt is directed not at the idle rich or nonworking spouses in the
middle and upper classes, but at the "threatening" black underclass, which
he presumes would vanish in a good society. One could say that Kaus does
not fairly apply his own standards or the right standards of respect, but
what are the right standards for writing off people as citizens and human
beings?
Christian theologians have wrestled with the same dilemma: at their
worst, they have condemned to hell atheists, non-Christians, and nonchurch members; at their most generous, they have offered forgiveness and
love to every human being no matter how low one has fallen in society or
how vile one's crimes. Perhaps that latter religious goal is politically impossible because societies require common ideals, laws, and limits on membership. "If you do such and such, God may forgive you, but we cannot."
Nevertheless, countries that would be democracies must promote respect even for political opponents. 35 This attitude, in which respect permits peaceful disagreement, is illustrated by the speech of Nelson Mandela
upon winning election as the first president of postapartheid South Africa.
I would ... like to congratulate President de Klerk for the strong showing the National Party has displayed in this election. I also want to
congratulate him for the many days, weeks and months and the four
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years that we have worked together, quarreled, addressed sensitive
problems and at the end of our heated exchanges were able to shake
hands and to drink coffee.... The calm and tolerant atmosphere that
prevailed during the election depicts the type of South Africa we can
build .... We might have our differences, but we are one people with
a common destiny in our rich variety of culture, race and tradition. 36
Mutual respect can be furthered by attempting to imagine the viewpoint of opposition groups and individuals. What is their history and present situation? Under what pressures do they labor? How do they interpret
the controversy? Realizing that no group is monolithic, what are the lines
of disagreement within that group? It may be easy in a pejorative sense to
identify others' contradictions-"If they believe in peace, why do they stir
up trouble?" "They oppose abortion because it destroys life but they support the National Rifle Association and the death penalty"-but it is
more difficult to give a generous account of an adversary's position. What
are the strongest, most appealing arguments to be made for the other
side?37
The effort to comprehend is not identical to respect and toleration.
Some people should be understood-neo-Nazis or members of the Ku
Klux Klan, for example-if only for self-protection, but they should be neither respected nor, depending on their actions, tolerated. Toleration, when
appropriate, is a minimal relationship toward others; respect is more substantial. 38 In traditional liberalism, toleration implies letting others alone;
you need not consider the views of your opponents, just allow them to be
expressed. You can tolerate others while ignoring them. 39 Tolerance is preferable to unjustified persecution, but respect goes further.
The difference between toleration and respect might be illustrated by
imagining a college campus that for most of its history formally excluded
women from the student body and restricted the number of blacks and
Jews. The college might finally enroll those it once excluded or restricted
yet never incorporate them into the dominant campus culture. On many
campuses, virtually every public portrait is of white males, except for the
occasional donor's wife, who is also white. Many cafeterias serve no food
influenced by the cooking of Asia, Africa, or South America, although
students at the schools come from those places. Colleges have clubs for African Americans; international students; friends of gays, lesbians, bisexuals;
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and women's groups as well as sites for Hillel and the Newman society, but
the dominant culture tends to remain straight, white, and male. There is
toleration but not the mutual respect that would alter the character of the
community.
Political action with toleration but not respect is old-fashioned pluralism: each group struggles for power; some participants are broadened by
their participation, and some are affected by witnessing the activity; but
little interpenetration or learning takes place among different groups in
the society. Mutual respect does not demand admiration or affection; it
begins with tolerance, proceeds to recognition, and continues to knowledge and transformation. James's contribution is not only to the expression
of that ideal but to an analysis of the impediments to creating and attaining it.

III
At the root of what today would be called prejudice, racism, sexism, and
imperialism, James saw "blindness," by which he meant that the lives of
people different from us are rarely understood or appreciated. James attempted to make contact with the ordinary and the commonplace without
being overly sentimental and realizing their limitations. The search for
what is common to common people, and making that into something
common to us all, is a crucial element of James's democratic thinking. 40
I use the brief term labor-question to cover all sorts of anarchistic discontents and socialistic projects, and the conservative resistances
which they provoke. So far as this conflict is unhealthy and regrettable-and I think it is so only to a limited extent-the unhealthiness
consists solely in the fact that one-half of our fellow-countrymen res
main entirely blind to the internal significance of the lives of the other
half. 41

If mutual respect is the ideal relationship for democratic citizens, "blindness" is the great psychological obstacle to achieving it. When a group or
nation fails to see others' virtues or truths, it looks down on them, which
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opens the door to violence and domination. Even though the rich and
middle classes share the same society, they understand neither the plight
nor the contributions of the working class and the poor-and the working
class and poor misperceive the bourgeoisie.
James detected this blindness in himself and, in attempting to overcome it, confessed an inability to recognize the strengths of workers. In a
related admission of obtuseness, he dramatized his reaction to the cleared
land called a "cove" in the North Carolina mountains:
The impression [of the coves] on my mind was one of unmitigated
squalor, but after a local resident informed him "we ain't happy here
unless we are getting one of these coves under cultivation" ... [I] instantly felt that I had been losing the whole inward significance of the
situation.... In short, the clearing, which to me was a mere ugly picture on the retina, was to them a symbol redolent with moral memories
and sang a very paean of duty, struggle, and success. 42
James's effort to grasp what was meaningful to the Carolinians foreshadowed James Agee's attempt in Let Us Now Praise Famous Men to capture
the inner experience of poor southern families during the Great Depression rather than portraying only their external squalor, as he had been sent
to do. 43
After designating incognizance as a major cause of social conflict and
imperialism, James sought to pinpoint its causes, enumerating at least four:
the origin of opinions in feelings; the tendency to transform differences
into hierarchies; the emphasis on monetary success that obscures the
worth of other goals; and the belief that our own views, ideals, and ways
of life rest on an objective foundation. 44 I discuss the last, the relationship of truth and action, in Chapter 4. As to the first, our opinions do not
flow from a rational examination of the alternatives. Instead, philosophical, religious, and political standpoints originate in personalities and feelings. 45 Reason therefore cannot be of paramount importance in overcoming blindness; hearing "reasonable" arguments against one's position will
rarely produce a change. Then too, our feelings are restricted in their objects: we feel most intensely our own pain and pleasure and only empathize
with those around us. The misery of having a broken leg is much worse
than the reaction to hearing a report, even from a friend, of the agony of
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a broken leg. Generally, we care most about our own body, family, neighborhood, city or region, college or club, religion, country. 46 The further
you get from the self, the more difficult it is to sympathize. The loyalties
of others for their friends, pets, schools, fraternities or sororities, and causes
are often perplexing.
''l\.ncestral" prejudice, which reifies differences among social groups, is
a second cause of blindness. Although we may have once understood that
human beings are essentially equal in their ability to contribute to the
common good and in believing their lives to be significant or meaningful, we come to regard the people with money, status, family connections,
style, or the "right" color of skin as being of a higher human order. James
discovered prejudices in himself and admitted that they were directed particularly against workers and poor southerners. 47 He finally became aware
that the heroism he feared to be passing out of American life is to be found
in the lives of the working class-and that he had been unable to see that
fact because "I had been steeping myself in pure ancestral blindness."48
Concerning the third cause, wealth, too, creates blindness. James posited the existence of psychological connections among blindness, capitalism, and imperialism. 49 The contempt for other cultures produced by capitalism sanctions interference. James did not quite condemn the pursuit of
material success as immoral but in a Thoreauvian vein, maintained that
it conceals the worth of other goals and experiences. 50 Powerfully focusing
the energy of many Americans and organizing their activities and time,
seeking wealth is seen as a form of nirvana-and replaces all other goals.
So blind and dead does the clamor of our own practical interests make
us to all other things, that it seems almost as if it were necessary to
become worthless as a practical being, if one is to hope to attain to any
breadth of insight into the impersonal world of worths as such, to have
any perception of life's meaning on a large objective scale. Only your
mystic, your dreamer, or your insolvent tramp or loafer, can afford so
sympathetic an occupation which will change the usual standards of
human values in the twinkling of an eye, giving to foolishness a place
ahead of power, and laying low in a minute the distinctions which it
takes a hard-working conventional man a lifetime to build up. You may
be a prophet at this rate; but you cannot be a worldly success.51
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When almost all citizens are materialists, one must abandon society to
appreciate ways of life organized around values other than money, success,
and technological advancement.
We of the highly educated classes (so called) have most of us got far,
far away from Nature. We are trained to seek the choice, the rare, the
exquisite, exclusively, and to overlook the common .. . . The remedy
under such conditions is to descend to a more profound and primitive
level. ... The savages and children of nature to whom we deem ourselves so much superior, certainly are alive where we are often dead ...
and could they write as glibly as we do, they would read us impressive
lectures on our impatience for improvement and on our blindness to
the fundamental static goods of life. 52
James may have been substituting positive stereotypes of the "primitive"
for negative ones; nevertheless, the purpose of promoting empathy with
"primitives," and insinuating that "savages" have an access to truth denied
to the elite of Western civilization, is to undermine the proposition used
to justify American imperialism that "advanced" societies should guide or
control "primitive" ones.
In short, blindness toward other cultures is produced by the conviction
that opinions have objective foundations, the parochial nature of feelings,
the tendency to tum superficial differences into hierarchies, and the drive
for material wealth. As a result, common action becomes impossible, and
the divisions within a society that should be mediated or resolved politically become fierce. The questions then arise, What should be the grounding for mutual respect? What kind of society would induce people to overcome their blindness, seek commonality with their fellow citizens, and
tolerate the citizens of other countries?
James's proposals for overcoming blindness are implied in his analysis
of its origins. In order to appreciate others' lives and values we must become less materialistic, and in political struggles we must abandon the
stance that our side has a monopoly on truth. 53 Above all, we should acknowledge the formidable barriers to developing compassion for others, especially those much different than ourselves. It is too easy for the poor and
working classes to see only the selfishness and softness of the bourgeoisie,
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and all too likely that the American Brahmins will find nothing to admire
in workers and poor people. Gazing from a train at workmen building a
bridge, James had a democratic vision:
As I awoke to all this unidealized heroic life around me, the scales
seemed to fall from my eyes; and a wave of sympathy greater than anything I have ever before felt with the common life of common men
began to fill my soul. ... In God's eyes the differences of social position, of intellect, of culture, of cleanliness, of dress, which different men
exhibit, and all the other rarities and exceptions on which they so fantastically pin their pride, must be so small as practically quite to vanish .
. . . [Each person has difficulties to overcome.] The exercise of courage,
patience, and kindness, must be the significant portion of the whole
business.... [Whenever we think that distinctions mean too much]
some new leveller in the shape of a religious prophet has to arise-the
Buddha, the Christ ... some Rousseau or Tolstoi-to redispel our
blindness. Yet, little by little, there comes some stable gain; for the
world does get more humane, and the religion of democracy tends toward permanent increase. 54
James himself attempted to be a democratic prophet and dispel the blindness that contributed to violence at home and imperialism abroad.
He argued in his essay "A Certain Blindness" that the people who care
about something see its true value, and in making a judgment about it,
the indifferent ones should defer to those who care.
The spectator's judgment is sure to miss the root of the matter and to
possess no truth. The subject judged knows a part of the world of reality which the judging spectator fails to see, knows more whilst the
spectator knows less; and wherever there is a conflict of opinion and
difference of vision, we are bound to believe that the truer side is the
side that feels the more and not the side that feels the less. 55
The one with experience and care knows more. To explain this point,
James employed an analogy from personal life, writing that a particular
person may appear drab to everyone else, but to the one in love with them
their strengths are revealed. 56
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Surely poor Jill's palpitating little life-throbs are among the wonders of
creation, are worthy of this sympathetic interest; and it is to our shame
that the rest of us cannot feel like Jack. For Jack realizes Jill concretely,
and we do not. [Jill responds to being known, however imperfectly,
by seeing the best in Jack.] May the ancient blindness never wrap its
clouds about either of them .... We ought, all of us, to realize each
other in this intense, pathetic, and important way... . The vice of the
ordinary Jack and Jill affection is not its intensity, but its exclusions
and its jealousies. Leave those out, and you see that the ideal I am
holding up before you, however impracticable to-day, yet contains
nothing intrinsically absurd. 57
James was not proposing that romantic love should become the model for
political relationships-it is impossible to care intensely about everyonebut that we should recognize the psychological barriers to appreciating
other people fully.58 Admitting how difficult it is to value outlooks and ways
of life different from our own might take some steam out of conflict. For
James, mutual respect results from egalitarianism, rejection of materialism,
obedience to the law, and self-doubt. Turning from James's framework,
there are alternative paths toward mutual respect.

IV
The topic of tolerance has become a major preoccupation of political theorists under such headings as "democracy and diversity," "multiculturalism,"
and "postmodernism and fundamentalism." Political theorists are doing
their job by scrutinizing this critical issue in an era characterized by a
breakdown of shared viewpoints and a rise of absolutist and fundamentalist movements. Questions of unity and disorder have been critical issues
in the United States since the Puritans, and these issues became acute
during the constitutional era and at the time of the Civil War. James's
theory of mutual respect is in a tradition of which Abraham Lincoln was
an important founder and in which sociologist Mary Parker Follett and
political theorist John Schaar have been significant practitioners. Like
them, William Connolly, a contemporary theorist deeply engaged with
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postmodernism, wants to create a democratic society in which citizens are
sufficiently unified to act politically without suppressing local and individual differences. Connolly is, however, critical of the communitarian elements of radical democracy.
Connolly dispenses with state and national principles as a source of
unity and draws on Nietzsche and Foucault in developing a position that
is in some respects similar to that of James. They both see abandoning the
claim to possess absolute truth as an important way to diminish antagonisms, and like James, Connolly designates such claims as a major source
of domestic and international intolerance. 59 The formation of a personal
or national identity is inevitable, but inherently dangerous; to adopt an
identity requires labeling those unlike oneself as "others."60 To illustrate
Connolly's argument, I offer the following examples: Jews need the goyim
(non-Jews) to help demarcate Judaism; Jews are the ones who do not drink
milk with meat and do not work on the Sabbath. An expositor of Jewish
customs explains:

It should .. . be noted that Jewish conduct has always been greatly influenced by the practices of the outside world, particularly the Gentile
world. For example, the Talmud ... suggests that Jews in mourning not
wear black shoes because this was a distinctly Gentile practice. What
prompted Jews to require the wearing of a headcovering at religious
services was an aversion to the Christian practice of keeping heads uncovered during worship. 61
An important part of both black and white self-definition is knowing
that each is not the other. 62 The majority culture typically needs the minority in order to feel the simultaneous movements of connection among
themselves and exclusion of outsiders. Differences easily slide into hostility.
"I have become a highly disciplined student, unlike those lazy good-fornothings who sit in the back of the class." And one still hears statements
like, '½.s an American, I am a citizen of the greatest country on earth;
foreigners lack American freedom, democracy, wealth, and opportunity."
Such proclamations justifiably annoy citizens of other countries who trust
in their own country's virtues.
Because defining oneself against those who are different is an inherent
part of identity formation, simply preaching tolerance as James did will
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have little effect. According to Connolly, efforts to create a unified community, nation, or international order will strengthen a hegemonic identity that suppresses resistant elements, classifying them as deviant. Instead
of unity, Connolly advocates, in a Jamesian spirit, learning to value ambiguity, difference, and conflict in an "adversarial" democracy. The usual
relationships among those who disagree are "conquest, conversion, community, or tolerance," but Connolly imagines a more dynamic possibility:
Sometimes one shows respect for another by confronting him with alternative interpretations of himself, sometimes by just letting him be,
sometimes by pursuing latent possibilities of commonality, sometimes
by respecting her as the indispensable adversary whose contending
identity gives definition to contingencies in one's own way of being. 63
Connolly puts his ideal another way: to negotiate differences with others
is "to convert an antagonism of identity into an agonism of difference in
which each opposes the other ( and the other's presumptive doctrines)
while respecting the adversary at another level as one whose contingent
orientations also rest on shaky epistemic grounds."64 In other words, instead of fearing difference as if it were a disease and trying to cure it, antagonists should learn to welcome and even enjoy it. The premises of
"agonistic" respect are twofold: first, one does not presume that one's position is grounded in absolute truth, and second, one acknowledges the
necessity of opposition in creating identity and therefore is grateful to one's
opponents for one's individuality.
Even after conceding that contestation over identity is an inherent element of political struggle, it is difficult to imagine political relationships
forged by gratitude for alternative interpretations of oneself. 65 As president,
Richard Nixon pictured himself as the country's protector from enemies
foreign and domestic, but Senators Sam Ervin and George McGovern and
thousands of antiwar protestors presented Nixon with a much different description of his identity, for which he never seemed particularly thankful.
Civil rights activists give white supremacists and liberals accounts of their
actions other than the ones they give themselves: segregationists are racists, not upholders of democratic localism; moderates and gradualists are
identified as part of the problem. When Vietnam War protesters, who felt
like patriots and highly moral friends-of-humanity, were called Commu-
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nist dupes and traitors, they found such accusations surprising and painful.
Connolly warns that discovering ambiguities in oneself is in itself insufficient grounds for generous action, because sometimes awareness of those
ambiguities creates a discomfort and an anxiety that lead to violence. For
example, the homophobe who discovers he is attracted to other men might
strike out against gays.66
In what sense is a conflict of identities generous or amicable? When
the foe of abortion accuses a woman who is terminating her pregnancy of
being a "murderer," that is an adversarial but not a respectful interpretation of the woman's identity. Connolly might counter that the very process
of rebutting an adversary's mislabeling is part of the identity formation for
which one should be grateful. He illuminates a little-noticed element of
political psychology, but his appealing suggestion to base generous relationships on gratitude for identity definition seems impossible to realize.
Like Connolly, John Schaar rejects some forms of unity as abstract,
artificial, and dangerous. Schaar's enemy is nationalism, yet he endorses
the national covenant as formulated by Lincoln as the best framework for
mutual respect, community, and democratic participation. In Schaar's vision,
Americans, a motley gathering of various races and cultures, were
bonded together not by blood or religion, not by tradition or territory,
not by the walls and traditions of a city, but by a political idea. We are
a nation formed by a covenant, by dedication to a set of principles and
by an exchange of promises to uphold and advance certain commitments among ourselves and throughout the world. Those principles
and commitments are the core of American identity, the soul of the
body politic.67
Lincoln and Schaar both designate the Declaration of Independence as
the source of common principles, and, again paraphrasing Lincoln, Schaar
exhorts his fellow citizens to
see as the chief task of political life the task of political education: inculcate respect for valid laws as a "political religion": retell on every
possible occasion the story of the struggle; teach tirelessly the principles
of the founding. The only guardian of the compact is an informed citi-
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zenry, and the first task of leadership is the formation of such a citizenry.68
Schaar softens Lincoln a little, implying that only "valid" laws should be
respected. When he recommends that the founding principles should be
"taught tirelessly," he means "considered both appreciatively and critically." Although he repudiates nationalism, a national covenant necessarily excludes the people who do not subscribe to its principles. What is the
membership status of those not committed to individual rights, independence, and equality of opportunity? Presumably political theorists,
whose work it is to examine reigning values, would find it difficult to remain loyal members of a society if they did not subscribe to its covenant. 69
As Schaar explains, Lincoln sought unity among the multiple cultures
and creeds of the citizens of the United States by asking for their commitment to national principles and obedience to the laws. If disagreements
erupt into violent conflicts, both the "lawless in spirit" and their victims
will disrespect the government. 70 To safeguard against revolution, Lincoln
entreated:
Let every American, every lover of liberty ... swear by the blood of
the Revolution, never to violate in the least particular, the laws of the
country; and never to tolerate their violation by others.... Let reverence for the laws, be breathed by every American mother, to the lisping babe, that prattles on her lap-let it be taught in schools, in seminaries; and in colleges;-let it be written in Primmers, spelling books,
and in Almanacs;-let it be preached from the pulpit, proclaimed in
the legislative halls, and enforced in courts of justice. And, in short,
let it become the political religion of the nation; and let the old and
young, the rich and poor, the grave and the gay, of all sexes and
tongues, and colors and conditions, sacrifice unceasingly upon its altars. 71
Lincoln's covenant is problematic because first, like Schaar's, it seeks to
establish a national identity; second, unlike Schaar's, it prohibits civil disobedience; and third, the strong state that will promulgate laws and promote their acceptance may spread passivity among the citizens. 72 Schaar
embraces Lincoln's formula because it overcomes "parochialisms of race
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and religion, and . .. severs patriotic devotion from the cult of national
power."73 This interpretation may be wishful thinking: it could be argued
that Lincoln helped create the cult of centralized power by giving, partly
through the concept of a national covenant, a religious fervor to American
nationalism and by serving as its highly attractive symbol. 74 Could unity
be nurtured among diverse and participatory American communities
without inculcating national principles; might it emerge instead from a
cross-cultural dialogue, a dialogue established on the critical study of one's
community, other communities, and national history and political ideas?
One traditional path to mutual respect was explicitly rejected by the
Federalists and revived by Tocqueville, Follett, and Arendt: political participation in community. Whereas the Federalists linked action with contentiousness, a more democratic tradition has viewed participation as the
simultaneous creation of a common life and the self-conscious appreciation of it. 75 The initial motivation for becoming involved might be self-interest-people want their road repaired or their group to get a tax breakbut through sustained interaction with their opponents they may come to
appreciate them more and even value the democratic process itself. 76 For
this transformation to occur, the political contact must be face-to-face.
Genuine dialogue creates common ground in what Follett called a "subtle
process of the intermingling of all the different ideas of the group." We
come to see our connection with one another by putting forward our own
ideas and being open to those of others. "Unity, not uniformity, must be
our aim," she counseled. "We attain unity only through variety. Differences must be integrated, not annihilated, nor absorbed." 77
To summarize the different viewpoints of a statesman, a philosopher, a sociologist of the early twentieth century, and of a late-twentiethcentury political theorist, all want to preserve popular action, unity, and
diversity and affirm love for one's own country and respect for other countries. Lincoln and James asserted that the institutions created by the Constitution are necessary to attain that balance; both advocated reverence
for the laws as a central element in unity. Another approach to mutual
respect, enunciated by Lincoln and Schaar, is founded on the inculcation
of a national covenant and a common set of values contained in the Declaration of Independence. This covenant would be imparted through public exhortation or, less coercively, in Schaar's version, through the critical
study of national history and political thought combined with an exami-
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nation of other cultures, local and international. Connolly offers a different path to amiable relations among democratic citizens; he wishes they
would result from a recognition that people unlike ourselves shape our
identities. Finally, James, Follett, and Schaar thought of political participation as creating a foundation for mutual respect, and each of these theorists offers insight into the causes of cultural discord and the directions for
overcoming it. A mixture of face-to-face political participation; humility
about one's own righteousness combined with hesitance to condemn others; and the study of national, international, and local cultures seem to be
three appealing, noncoercive paths toward mutual respect.

V
I anticipate objections. Some readers will label James a "relativist" who
might aid and abet such groups as Nazis, either by sanctioning their dogmas as being equal to anyone else's or by fostering appeasement. This
charge would reveal a complete misinterpretation of James's position. He
may have been generous in surmising that most people grasp part of the
truth, but he was no fanatic. He recognized the existence of evil and
thought that it should be combated, but he cautioned that sometimes we
demonize those who disagree with us.
The Enlightenment promised that reason could unearth a truth that
would be clear to all rational people, but James argued that reason offers
no sure path to truth. Reason cannot disclose universal, unquestionable
principles of right. Most people choose causes congruent with their personalities, so at best, reason may help us establish consistent principles and
judge the consequences of our actions. Most of us act on faith mediated
by some thinking and a modicum of evidence. Although we might not be
able to prove it to an resolute opponent, we know that we are right about
who should win an election or what to do about poverty, the death penalty, or nuclear testing. Our opponents are either deluded or people of bad
intentions, yet they are as adamant as we are. A feeling of certainty cannot
be the measure of truth.
James never denied the existence of truth and falsehood; the problem
is that you can never be sure that you know the truth so you take a risk
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when you act according to your convictions. Like Hegel's owl of Minerva,
which flies only at dusk, we are not sure until long afterward whether we
did the right thing. Coming close to Socrates' notion of a "knowledge of
ignorance" in "The Apology," James implied that we have some inkling
of the truth, so that even if we lack certainty, we are not completely in the
dark.
In addition, James stipulated that only "harmless" pleasures, a difficult
term to define, should be tolerated. When genuine harm is done, intervention may be necessary. Mutual respect does imply the end of judgments
about other cultures. When we perceive injury occurring in other countries, for example, in Haiti or Bosnia, any action we may need to take
should be rooted in knowledge of that culture, including the existing diversity of positions. 78 We also need to remain aware, however, of our tendency to blindness.
James's theory of blindness and respect can also be criticized for being
politically naive. He concentrated so much on the psychology of intolerance that he neglected institutions, power, ideology, and interests as causes
of hostility. 79 For example, Marxists have contended that racism is not innate but has been fomented to divide working and poor people and to
justify imperialism. Class interest, not psychology, is at the heart of social
conflict, and James neglected the intuition of Rousseau in The Social Contract that a society cannot find commonality unless there is at least an
approximate equality of wealth. 80 Without equality, conflicting groups will
not see themselves as members of one society, and self-interest will then
fuel hatred and make respect impossible.
Psychology is not more fundamental than power and interest in causing social conflict, but James illuminated the psychological dimension of
conflict. To the assertion that the crucial problem to be addressed is not
intolerance but injustice, James might have replied that he did not profess
that pragmatism would create justice or end social strife but he did anticipate that a widespread adoption of the pragmatic outlook would reduce
hatred so that conflicts could be resolved more peacefully. It may be that
social harmony is impossible without the creation of just institutions and
practices; such a hypothesis requires that a standard of justice be agreed
upon and that a society would willingly be shaped according to it. How
can that standard be determined? Whose interpretation of justice would
be given institutional form? James clarified why such questions are difficult
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to resolve from the psychological standpoint and delineated the spirit
needed to achieve their resolution. He may have added little to the analysis
of the institutional dimension of the problem, but he contributed to the
comprehension of the psychology of conflict and mutual respect.
The materialist critique of James cannot be easily dismissed and raises
the broader issue of the practical effects of normative political theory.
Theorists can argue for respect, direct democracy, or ideal speech communication, but who is listening? Theorists may suspect that in putting forth
their alternative visions they are only giving solace to themselves and a few
sympathetic readers. 81 The people who need to hear the argument for respect will not listen to it-if the Bosnian Serbs had read either James or
a critique of nationalism such as Benedict Anderson's Imagined Communities, would they have stopped the killing ?8 2
Can the rhetoric of toleration, coming from academic, political, or religious sources, appeal to a large audience? It can sound cliched or utopian
and perhaps will reach only the people who subscribe to it already. The
language of hatred, on the other hand-the language of Louis Farrakhan
or Ariel Sharon-always sounds tough-minded; it may be appalling, but
it wins new followers. Is the discourse of equality and respect-from Jesus
to Tolstoy, Locke to Mill, Gandhi to King-all superstructure, or has it
had an influence in restraining violence and hatred? Evidence could be
mustered that nonviolent, democratic visions have had an effect as they
have helped lead the way to the civil rights and feminist movements.
A second dimension of the question concerning the power of political visions is more specific to academic political theory. Although every
theorist dreams of advising fellow citizens and even readers abroad, the
reality is that comparatively few people read scholarly books and any one
teacher reaches only a handful of citizens in college classrooms. On the
other hand, a lot of people go to school, and from universities to grammar
schools, American education has been altered by challenges to the Western canon, new attention to anthropology, non-Western history, women's
history, gay and lesbian studies, radical democratic thought, feminist and
postmodern philosophies. These educational innovations can be seen as a
democratic "correction" of the sort that James attributed to Christ, Rousseau, and Tolstoy.
Recent movements for civil rights, feminism, radical democracy, and
equal rights for gays and for the handicapped might be seen as democratic
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efforts to overcome an "ancestral blindness" that prevent us from recognizing the contributions of previously disrespected groups. Yet I recognize
that we seem to be entering a period of a sweeping reaction against equality, and James's faith that "little by little, there comes some stable gain; for
the world does get more humane, and the religion of democracy tends toward permanent increase" appears to be more solace than an accurate prediction of the near future. The anti-equality movements also have their
theorists opposing affirmative action and equal rights for gays and lesbians,
and some of those theorists are fundamentalists who reject democratic debate as moral weakness. One hopes that both sides adopt a tincture of
Jamesian mutual respect so that the struggle can proceed nonviolently.

Chapter 4

Faith and Doubt: Action's Wellsprings
James wanted to cultivate in Americans both action and mutual respect,
and he developed a model of a democratic political temperament that
would hold them together. He urged citizens to adopt the pluralist conception of truth, i.e., political actors should seek to fulfill their ideals without
taking those ideals to be objectively or absolutely true. If people will accept
the fact that they alone are responsible for their fates, then they must strive
together to create the conditions they desire. And in recognizing that
truths and institutions are human choices, people are less likely to embrace
their ideals zealously. 1 This process of creating a democratic temperament
requires both demystification and the strength to persevere in taking action. "The pragmatism or pluralism which I defend has to fall back on a
certain ultimate hardihood, a certain willingness to live without assurances or guarantees. "2
In Pragmatism, James asserted, exaggeratedly, that demystification had
already been accomplished in politics and religion and now needed to be
adopted by philosophy. "In other spheres of life it is true that we have got
used to living in a state of relative insecurity. The authority of 'the State'
and that of an absolute 'moral law,' have resolved themselves into expediencies, and holy church has resolved itself into 'meeting houses.' "3 Elsewhere, James suggested that uncertainty had not been widely embraced.
In order to respect others, fervent political actors should acquire some
doubt about their convictions while realizing that even their opponents
possess a share of the truth. 4 The joining of committed action with comprehension of the opposition is appealing and even necessary for direct
democracy, but James disguised the psychological difficulty of keeping
them together.
Although James offered pluralism as a source of both action and respect, the psychological roots of the one are incompatible with the other.
He understood that action usually springs from a passionate belief in a
principle and that this passionate belief leads the typical political actor to
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resist pluralism. Most political actors will neither doubt the truth of their
positions nor deeply respect their opponents, and if they did, they might
cease to act. According to Wolin: "Under present circumstances, any kind
of recognition of the other person's point of view is seen as ammunition
by political consultants for labeling opponents as wafflers. James's analysis
shows-even though he did not intend it-some of the practices we've
slipped into in recent years that make political dialogue very difficult." 5
Dismissing James at this point for being "unrealistic" in his call for mutual respect may be based on a static conception of political action. Perhaps, as Mary Parker Follett suggested, the process of interpersonal political interaction under certain conditions can produce a sympathetic
understanding between engaged adversaries. "It is possible to maintain
that at one point the civil rights movement had the effect ofleading southerners to understand the black position," suggests Wolin, "or at least their
own treatment of blacks in a somewhat different light. It is hard to say what
we have now. "6 A second avenue toward mutual respect offered by pragmatism must also be explored: Will pragmatism's refocusing of political discussions from principles to consequences reduce hostility?

I
As James examined the prospects for American democracy at the end of
the nineteenth century, he saw two equally problematic groups of citizens
who constituted politically relevant audiences for his pluralist theory: one
that acts on faith and another paralyzed because its members lack faith.
Of course if any one comes along and says that men at large don't need
to have facility of faith in their inner convictions preached to them,
[that] they have only too much readiness in that way already, and the
one thing needful to preach is that they should hesitate with their convictions, and take their faiths out for an airing into the howling wilderness of nature, I should also agree. But my paper ["The Will to Believe"] was n't addressed to mankind at large but to a limited set of
studious persons, badly under the ban just now of certain authorities
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whose simple-minded faith in "naturalism" also is sorely in need of an
airing-and an airing, as it seems to me, of the sort I tried to give. 7
The first, and larger, group engaged in action based on unquestioned
faith. They had admirable, public-minded energy but tended toward fanatic violence and imperialism. The second group, "studious persons," had
withdrawn into private life because they had lost faith in a God who cared
about human affairs, including politics in the United States. What good
is action if it is not guided or assured by God or some other principle of
meaning, such as Hegel's absolute spirit or Marx's theory of history? The
classic articulation of this despair is Henry Adams's Education. 8 As a path
out of resignation and toward democratic action, James offered the pluralist explanation of the universe to both believers and skeptics. Pluralism
would allow the doubters to act based on choice in place of their lost faith;
it would also reduce the fervor of the citizens who continue to act upon
faith.
What view of truth did James offer to these groups? To put it briefly,
he imagined a "pluralist universe" in which no higher power determines
human fate, in which beliefs are chosen rather than discovered or proved
and cultures and institutions are construed as human constructions.9
"Laws and languages ... are thus seen to be man-made things." 10 According to James, God has not written a discernible text of commandments
for humanity to obey; truth exists, but it cannot be clearly apprehended.
Therefore, people create social realities by acting upon their best guesses
as to what the good actually is. These guesses should be based on reason,
study, knowledge of accepted truths, customs, personality, and, finally,
faith. 11 Truth functions in moral, religious, and political life as a hypothesis. We do not know if we are members of the true church, but our church
will thrive only if we believe in it. 12
People who act must be reconciled to the possibility of failure. Some
initiatives for new parties, organizations, institutions, vocabulary, and
theories are successful, but most, whatever good they might do for those
who participate and witness them, fail to become permanent or achieve
their goals. 13 Would-be founders take two kinds of risks. First, despite their
best intentions, their aims and tactics may be misguided-e.g., by running
a third-party candidate the lesser of two evils lost the election; when
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protestors did not compromise, government hard-liners got the upper
hand. Second, sometimes advocates of the most moral cause simply lack
the means to succeed. Action has no guarantees. James surmised that this
view of truth would give something important to both believers and skeptics. Embracing uncertainty would, he hoped, make citizens more energetic and political partisans more generous toward their opponents.

II
I would like now to elaborate the effects that James intended for pluralism
to have on his two different audiences. He wanted them to come to the
democratic temperament from two different directions. James did not consistently believe that we are motivated to act by the idea of a pluralist universe; by nature, he often said, we are inclined the other way, i.e., we need
faith in the grounding of our ideals. Perry remarked, "For James life assumes a heroic form only when the moral subject believes in the superiority of his own ideal, not as merely his, but as in some sense absolute or
infinite." 14 James wrote that the political actor is like the Christian saint
in that both are moved by a truth that they take to be greater than themselves. The saint has
a feeling of being in a wider life than that of this world's selfish interests; and a conviction, not merely intellectual, but as it were sensible,
of the existence of an Ideal power. In Christian saintliness this power
is always personified as God; but abstract moral ideals, civic or patriotic
utopias, or inner visions of holiness or right may also be felt as the true
lords and enlargers of our life.
The saint's energy and, one can infer by analogy, the energy of committed
political actors come in large part from their "sense of the friendly continuity of the ideal power with our own life, and a willing self-surrender to
its control." 15
James's description of the saint captures a fundamental strain of the
American political tradition. He could have been speaking about Jefferson,
Paine, Hamilton, or William Lloyd Garrison when he wrote, "Political re-
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formers accomplish their successive tasks in the history of nations by being
blind for the time to other causes." 16 This way of thinking may not be
peculiarly American, but it is an American tradition to believe that when
we act, God is on our side. 17 The Puritans saw New England as a light for
the entire world, and American revolutionaries and the constitutional
framers similarly posited a unique historical role for U.S. political principles
and practices.
When individuals claim that their rights are being violated, they tend
to echo Jefferson's formulation, "We hold these truths to be self-evident,
that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their creator with
certain inalienable rights." 18 "It has been frequently remarked," wrote Alexander Hamilton in the first number of The Federalist, "that it seems to
have been reserved to the people of this country, by their conduct and
example, to decide the important question, whether societies of men are
really capable or not of establishing good government from reflection and
choice, or whether they are forever destined to depend for their political
constitutions on accident and force." 19 If the United States failed, given
its highly favorable circumstances and ability to make a fresh start, then
no country could establish a free government. Most subsequent steps in
American history, including the civil rights movement, have sought to
link God, country, and cause. For example, many of the people who supported the war in Vietnam believed that the United States embodied good
while the North Vietnamese were evil incarnate. James's critique could
also be applied to the Christian right and the anti-Communist crusade
that depicted the Soviet Union as the evil empire.
Although James respected, for the good it produced, the American
tradition of action based on faith, he wanted to transform that tradition
in order to reduce the imperialist impulse and to make political resolution
of differences possible. Mutual respect will be fostered if people with excessive zeal, a group that includes ordinary citizens as well as political activists, accept the pluralist model of the universe. The fervent ones need to
learn hesitation and doubt so they will toil for their causes without claiming to possess all virtue. A tincture of self-doubt makes democratic respect
feasible. Perry summarized James's position:
The grip of the hand on the sword is relaxed by the reflection that the
other's cause is as real and warm to him as is mine to me, and has its
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own inner and equal justification. If the principle of sympathy be given
priority over the principle of self-assertion it is still possible, however,
to save the militant and heroic qualities. The principle of sympathy is
itself a cause for moral and even for physical courage. 20
James's description of typical political action based on fervent belief in
one's convictions contrasts sharply with the pluralist model he proposed.
Without ever saying so explicitly, he appears to have been calling for a
transformation of the traditional American political consciousness. Wolin
augments this argument: "If you ask, what does the person of faith, the
devout person, have to give up in order to embrace a pluralist universe, the
answer is 'quite a bit.' James is demanding a great deal that would involve,
one might argue, a radical change of character. He or she would cease to
be a fervent believer." 21 From James's characterization of committed actors
in Varieties of Religious Experience, there seems to be little grounds for success in effecting this metamorphosis, even though he proposed pragmatism as an alternative at the end of that book. Would he have had a better chance of altering the outlook of his second audience, those who lack
faith?

III
In addition to the people who have excessive certainty, James spoke to
those who fear there is no solid ground for taking action, a paralyzing
doubt that has recently assumed different forms. In the sixties and seventies, many people said they could not engage in politics "until they got their
heads together.'' In part, this was a statement of priorities, but it also identified "the head" as the filter of values, visions, programs, and actions; if
the head were "not together," a person might make destructive choices and
act inefficiently. I remain friends with a woman who entered a would-be
revolutionary party, a cult really, instead of finishing college. Upon her
escape from it, under threat to her life, she became disillusioned with all
politics because she does not know whom to trust. After Watergate, Vietnam, the Soviet Union, the Cultural Revolution, and Tiananmen Square,
what will replace unquestioning conviction as an inspiration for action?

Faith and Doubt

87

James asked the same question in response to a much different set of
events. In the nineteenth century, the carnage of the Civil War, the corruption of the second Grant administration, and the Darwinian revolution were interpreted as indicators of the universe's absence of meaning. 22
As a young man, James himself experienced a loss of faith and suffered a
nervous breakdown, recovering only after reading the work of the philosopher Charles Renouvier, who posited that principles could be freely chosen
instead of scientifically discovered. 23 James addressed his essay "The Will
to Believe" to people who feared they could not act meaningfully in a random and chaotic universe. He prescribed to American skeptics the cure
that had worked for him: beliefs grounded in choice rather than ontology
and the fact that ideals need not be based on external, objective foundations.
For pluralistic pragmatism, truth grows up inside of all the finite experiences. They lean on each other, but the whole of them, if such a
whole there be, leans on nothing. All "homes" are in finite experience;
finite experience as such is homeless. Nothing outside of the flux secures the issue of it. It can hope salvation only from its own intrinsic
promises and potencies. 24
James's response to this lack of certainty became, Believe in what you
need. When asked in an interview whether he believed in God, he said
yes, because he needed Him. Of course, James's assertion can be made to
seem absurd-I need a glass of water so I believe it is there-but James's
proposition is actually close to everyday experience. Is the job worth doing?
For example, is it worthwhile to write books or attempt to teach young
people in a "postliterate" age? Should time be spent in dingy offices making
fliers for rallies that will draw only a handful of people? We can and should
advance evidence and arguments in favor of our positions, but we cannot
prove that our activities matter. Yet, in order to stick with them, we need
to believe that they do. 25
James hoped that adopting this outlook would not only help skeptics
overcome paralysis but make their eventual actions less belligerent. He was
arguing not simply for a recovery of traditional American faith but for a
redefinition of faith to incorporate self-conscious doubt. Faith, he wrote,
is "belief in something concerning which doubt is still theoretically possi-
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ble." This new understanding would be accepted, James thought, because
people would rise to a challenge. •~ny mode of conceiving the universe
which ... makes the man seem as ifhe were individually helping to create
the actuality of the truth whose metaphysical reality he is willing to assume, will be sure to be responded to by large numbers. "26
I have shown that James offered the pluralist universe to two types of
political actors. He invited the faithful to a measure of doubt and skeptics
to generous action based upon new guiding principles. Ideals would remain
the inspiration for action, but the political actors would not assume those
ideals to be guaranteed by anything other than choice. Having described
James's pluralism as one element of a democratic political temperament, I
now want to turn to another tool he offered democratic citizens, pragmatism.

IV
In everyday language, pragmatism implies the practical and the concrete.
In politics, the call to "be pragmatic" means to settle for what you can get.
Its opposite is rigid idealism or an insistence upon inopportune discussion
of principles when the situation demands action. These definitions are
only indirectly related to James's position, which proffers pragmatism as
both a theory of truth and a method of resolving fierce philosophical and
political conflicts. His concerns intersect with everyday language at one
point, however: to take a "pragmatic" view of truth in political discussions
is to consider the consequences of a proposed idea rather than dispute first
principles.
Instead of posing such dilemmas as, What is justice? or Should a society guarantee equality of condition or only equality of opportunity? political opponents should imagine the potential results of implementing their
res~tive principles. James would try to redirect a political conversation
towa~d the query, If we accept your view to be true rather than mine, what
difference does it make to our course of action?27 Where there is no difference in result, James posited, there is no meaningful difference in principles. James thought that disputes often could be resolved by showing that
if either position were implemented the effects would be the same. In poli-
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tics, policy debates usually create different repercussions; where they do
not, James is right, the debate can cease. But once anticipated effects are
established, political opponents must assess them, which leads back to fundamental principles.
One might assume that pragmatism is the enemy of political theory
because it disparages an overlong consideration of ideals. Machiavelli was
an ancestor of political pragmatism, given this definition of it: in politics power, context, and consequences must always be considered. ''A great
many men have imagined states and princedoms such as nobody ever saw
or knew in the real world, for there's such a difference between the way we
really live and the way we ought to live that the man who neglects the
real to study the ideal will learn how to accomplish his ruin, not his salvation. "28 The just person who goes into the world unarmed will be ineffectual. Machiavelli never denied the existence of justice and truth, and
never suggested that might makes right, but he had no faith that right
makes might.
Political theory's stock-in-trade is debate of first principles, and so it
will always be an enemy of vulgar pragmatism, but this fact does not foreclose consideration of the narrower issue of turning to consequences as a
method for reducing the intensity of political conflict. As a rhetorical strategy, James's proposal is attractive, but it is unlikely to be effective because
there is no clear distinction between first principles and consequences. It
would be splendid if turning to outcomes reduced terrorism:
The national government is indeed dangerous, but if you bomb
either the plane or the building many innocent people will be hurt.
Really? Then forget the whole thing.
Civilian deaths are not assessed uniformly. Some people believe that no
lives of the enemy are "innocent." Deaths are unfortunate, but necessary
to gain attention for the cause. People are dying all the time at the hands
of military force, and some lives must be sacrificed in order to stop injustice. This view might remind some readers of Machiavelli's insight that a
discussion of repercussions requires as much imagination as does a debate
about principles because in politics, and even in life, no one knows what
the actual effects of an action will be. Anticipated consequences are often
ironically related to intentions.
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It might be countered that examining consequences rather than debating first principles would reduce emotions and make resolution more
likely, but it is remarkable how little impact pragmatic arguments have on
those people who assert that only morality matters. In the abortion debate,
one might say, "Let us not focus solely on the question of when life begins
and whether all human life must be protected but instead remember that
the outcomes of making abortions illegal would be that only wealthy
women could afford them while other women would have more unwanted
children and many women would seek dangerous illegal abortions." Some
Catholics among others argue that the most serious consequences of free
choice on abortion will be a callousness about life and an avoidance of
personal responsibility, and one cannot convince an orthodox Catholic or
Jew that abortion or birth control is necessary to prevent the consequence
of overpopulation. Flannery O'Connor wrote in a letter:
The Church's stand on birth control is the most absolutely spiritual of
all her stands and with all of us being materialists at heart, there is
little wonder that it causes unease. I wish various fathers would quit
trying to defend it by saying that the world can support 40 billion. I
will rejoice in the day when they say: This is right, whether we all rot
on top of each other or not, dear children, as we certainly may. Either
practice restraint or be prepared for crowding.29
I do not accept O'Connor's view, but it reveals that even if effects should
be considered in assessing the validity of a proposed action, it is unlikely
that political actors motivated by faith will be willing to shift consideration
from first principles to consequences or that they would weigh those consequences similarly. To suggest that someone shift from a consideration of
principles to consequences is really to ask them to change their identity.

V
James sought to inspire both citizen action and mutual respect with his
conception of a pluralist universe in which beliefs are grounded in choice
rather than in something external. Would this vision be compelling
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enough to inspire skeptics to act? Would it soften the hard edges of those
driven by faith without discouraging them altogether? James himself supposed that great political action was usually fueled by deep faith. Even if
activists have never heard of debates about epistemology, they tend to hold
to their beliefs tenaciously, acting as if those beliefs were objectively true.
The cultivation of doubt and tolerance might make political actors more
generous but less impelled to act. Doubt may be an essential component
of scholarship, but not of politics; fervent political actors are usually not
skeptics. The rest of us may often recognize strong arguments on both sides
of an issue, and be thankful that we do not have to decide, but partisans
feel their cause to be righteous. Would the notion of a pluralist universe
really motivate action if, as James posited, action typically emerges from
faith in a cause? Can a freely chosen ideal, experienced as freely chosen,
produce the same inspiration? His description of action inspired by faith
seems truer to the experience of transformative political action; the proposed alternative, action based on choice and respect for others, is attractive but difficult to achieve.
As James conceded, confidence in the absolute virtue of one's aims has
been a typical component of great political efforts. An intellectual biographer of Frederick Douglass writes:
Without a spiritual anchor to rely upon, without a God of justice to
overrule a society that promised only injustice, without the simple but
powerful theory that history is a process where things somehow get
better, and without a fierce commitment to agitation, black leaders
could not realistically have continued to exhort their people to remain
hopeful of a life and opportunity and dignity in the face of oppression.30

If James exhorted, "Believe in what you need," what were the psychological needs of Ida B. Wells who tried in the 1890s to stop lynching and
attain the vote for women in the face of massive, often violent resistance,
even from white suffragettes? Did she not need unquestioning conviction
in the justice of her struggle?31 Could Martin Luther King, Jr., who tried
to love his enemies, have continued his work if he had not believed that
racial equality was an unequivocal good? He wrote, "We will win our freedom because the sacred heritage of our nation and the eternal will of God
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are embodied in our echoing demands."32 lt is difficult to picture a pluralist,
postmodern King who did not tie his crusade to heavenly will. 33
Recognition of a pluralistic universe might give strength to some people
in despair, but it could undermine the determination of committed activists. One can imagine a person who is afraid that nothing can be changed
because everything is controlled by large forces-you can't fight city hall
or progress, to say nothing of late capitalism-being able to find inspiration in the notions that those forces do not govern history, present conditions have not been sanctioned by God or the march of history, and
people can, at least to a degree, affect the world in a meaningful way. But
one can also envision activists who become discouraged if they adopt the
vision of a pluralistic universe and conclude that their cause lacks objective
superiority. In short, action and respect may have contradictory sources.
What produces one undermines the other so that the natural tendency is
toward either fanatic action or tolerant passivity. Are these the only alternatives?
The authors of The Federalist had a solution: since politics inflames the
passions, they designed institutions to reduce political participation.34 Although James may have supported the Constitution in principle, institutions and practices that promoted passivity were unacceptable to him, and
thus he implicitly rejected the Federalist contempt for action. An inert
populace is unlikely to be more tolerant than an active one, if only because
political participants often learn about their opponents by working with
them politically rather than fearing them as imaginary enemies. James demanded that the person of deep faith should continue to work for his or
her causes but become more pluralistic upon entering the realm of politics.
In effect, James was calling for a new type of political actor, yet he made it
clear why that type will be difficult to create. The tension between faith
and pluralism that can be seen in James's theory does not mean that i:he
democratic temperament is impossible to engender, but it does mean that
it will not be easy to do so. James's proposed combination of action and
mutual respect should be judged to be, not so much a contradiction, as a
formidable and worthy goal.

Chapter 5

Democratic Teaching
For William James, the school was a crucial site for imparting the democratic temperament. James insisted that the welfare of the nation depends
upon having thoughtful citizens who attempt to realize their ideas and
ideals while respecting other citizens and cultures. Therefore, the ideas disseminated in the classroom should produce activity. For James, it would be
insufficient for students to discuss conceptions of justice; they should then
try to create just conditions in the world. Nevertheless, James's proposal
for the distribution of knowledge at first appears to be quite elitist: his call
for the creation of an aristocracy of the college educated might be heard
as an appeal for a well-trained ruling class. In this chapter, I try to establish
that the elitism of James's educational program is mitigated by its demo- ·
cratic function, preparing citizens for self-rule, and that democracy is not
incompatible with elitism of a certain kind.

I
Recently, the most prominent debates about the relationship between politics and education have emphasized the importance of the curriculum
while neglecting a different aspect of politics and education, i.e., that of
student character or personality. Yet this concern has been central to the
tradition of political theory, especially in the works of Plato, Rousseau,
Thoreau, Tocqueville, Weber, and Foucault. In the Oxford English Dictionary education and character are linked in one definition of "education":
"culture or development of powers, formation of character, as contrasted
with the imparting of mere knowledge or skill." The character of the good
student is similar to that of the democratic citizen. True students and citizens are courageous, independent, and willing to engage others in spirited,
but ultimately respectful dialogue about differences. These students and
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citizens energetically respond to their world. The same spark that produces
inquiry creates an inclination to action, which is common to both learning and democracy.
Spiritless students become passive citizens who cannot shoulder the
burdens of governance. They are unable to seek the truth behind the manipulative rhetoric of politicians and advertisers, and they lack the energy
and skill to analyze complexities of power and the nature of justice, much
less engage in collective action. Passive students do not learn well. They
let the words of the books pass before their eyes, and the lectures and class
discussions float past their ears, but little except the discipline-the tests,
grades, required attendance-penetrates to their souls, where real learning
occurs. Many educational practices undermine democracy by promoting
submissiveness in the students. From the 'perspective of the educator, passivity is disastrous, as widespread resignation indicates a tragic stifling of
the human capacity for free action grounded in reason, passion, and commitment.
Some readers might feel uncomfortable with applying political categories to teaching because they believe the classroom should be independent
of politics. Perhaps at the office or factory, workers might have to watch
carefully what they say about politics or company policy-free speech is
not protected on the job-but in the classroom and in writing, students
should be free to disagree with each other, with the text, or with the professor so long as they accept rules of evidence, grammar, rhetorical argument, and civility. The classroom should indeed be a space for the free
exchange of ideas, but a few moments' reflection reveals that education is
neither power-free nor purely democratic.
Democracy aspires to equality of power, but power in the classroom
and power in the institution are not equal. The legitimacy of the teachers'
authority to give students grades or evaluations derives from the formers'
superior command both of the subject and of the standards of academic
excellence. The students also have strength: they can kill discussion
through sullen silence, or by entering it they can enable even mediocre
teachers to transmit their knowledge. Student evaluations give the students additional leverage, particularly over untenured faculty. Although
many evaluations are filled out thoughtfully, some students use them as a
form of revenge against professors. Many faculty members bitterly resent
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student evaluations, finding it humiliating to be criticized by young people,
especially undergraduates, and their resentment may emanate, at least in
part, from the power reversal. Such faculty members often are the most
jealous of their privileges and power, and their contempt for students often
surprises me: "No eighteen-year-old is going to tell me how or what to
teach." By contrast, William James contended that if students were given
more power in governing a university, they would begin to act more responsibly. (Although James did invite students to criticize his courses, today's student evaluations, which are usually written in haste and anonymously, tend not to embody this principle of responsibility.) James
attempted to develop a theory of pedagogy in which power in the classroom would be used to foster the democratic temperament.
Democratic pedagogy does not imply equal power for teacher and student but, instead, the preparation of students for democratic citizenship.
Ideally, the classroom is a place where students acquire the abilities to articulate their thoughts both orally and in writing, to scrutinize and appreciate traditional wisdom while being open to new and strange ideas, and
obtaining the historical, linguistic, and theoretical knowledge needed to
begin to comprehend their own and other cultures. Finally, the democratic classroom imparts to students a certain character (partly described
in Chapter 2), which involves being intellectually independent, critical,
courageous, imaginative, and respectful of others.
I fear that many of my students, admirable as they are in other ways,
lack this democratic character. For the purpose of analysis I will describe
an ideal type, in the Weberian sense, of student. As with all ideal types,
many students do not fit it, yet I believe it captures part of the ethos of
generation X. Many of today's students are curious but intellectually indolent. If a book, newspaper, or challenging film is not assigned, they will
ignore it. They do not want to appear foolish or so concerned about matters intellectual or political that they seem depressed or weird. They are
more comfortable in front of a screen-television, computer, or video
game-than in front of a book. They have good intentions: they would
stop pollution, war, prejudice, and rape; they want to feed the hungry and
shelter the homeless. But they do not want to speak in class or in public,
much less organize any sort of political action. 1 They are cynical about
authorities but eager to please their parents, teachers, and each other.
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They experience and accept the classroom as power-laden. Why must
they attend class and arrive on time? If they come late or not at all, it's
their loss, not the professor's. They read books they hate, attend classes
that bore them, record and repeat on examinations lecture formulas that
often make no sense to them. Papers must be submitted by arbitrary deadlines. Professors always win in a dispute about grades, even though the
student knows more about how much was learned in the class than the
teacher does. The students endure teachers who are cruel and sarcastic,
sexist or politically correct in order to get the grade that is necessary for a
good job or admission to some type of graduate school. 2 The questions, Is
this what I really think? Is this what I really want to do? rarely arise.
Students often embody Karl Marx's description of alienated laborers.
What constitutes the alienation of labour? First, that the work is external to the worker, that it is not part of his nature; and that, consequently, he does not fulfill himself in his work but denies himself, has
a feeling of misery rather than well-being, does not develop freely his
mental and physical energies, but is physically exhausted and mentally
debased .... His work is not voluntary but imposed, forced labour. It
is not the satisfaction of a need, but only a means for satisfying other
needs. Its alien character is clearly shown by the fact that as soon as
there is no physical or other compulsion, it is avoided like the plague .
. . . We arrive at the result that man ( the worker) feels himself to be
freely active only in his animal functions-eating, drinking, and procreating, or at most also in his dwelling and in personal adornment. 3
Some college students cannot wait for weekends, which begin Thursday
night, when they can get blind drunk and relieve the tension created by
hypocrisy. Silent in the classroom, they are boisterous in the bar, at the
rock concert, and on the playing field. Drawing on James's Talks to Teachers
and his public letters on education, one could attribute the students' alienation to their feeling of powerlessness as students, citizens, and workers. 4
Professors hate the silence of the students and their lack of initiative.
We want them to care about their own learning-to do extra reading, not
the minimum. We wish they would appear more eager about class. It is
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disheartening to watch students cheer when they see a sign posted that a
professor is ill and must cancel class. Class periods often begin with some
student faces covered with boredom, heads down on the desks, showing
every sign of still suffering from a vicious hangover at two in the afternoon. During discussions, many appear unresponsive; they do not want
to answer the teacher's questions and they ask none of their own. After
years of paranoia, I have learned that blank looks may not indicate that
students don't care: they may be interested, but they refuse to reveal it in
their faces or in any other aspect of their behavior.
Student passivity and anti-intellectualism are built into the culture and
into the structure of educational institutions, but what effect do professors
have upon the students ?5 Do we contribute to student resignation or disrupt it? Using Foucault's language, we might ask, What disciplinary practices do professors exercise upon the students, and what type of character
or subjects do we create through those disciplinary practices? 6 Have we
encouraged their dependence on us for approval of their ideas? In correcting and reproving students, have we broken their will, made them feel stupid and incompetent to think or write clearly? Can the teacher's authority
be used to undermine student apathy? If we are tired of the listlessness of
young people today, the bored looks, the silence, how can we wake them
up? I am not suggesting that classrooms or families be transformed into
little Greek assemblies, but I would argue that in a democracy, professors
and parents should use their authority to invigorate young people in the
classroom and the world outside.
William James linked the active student with the citizen in his writings
about education. These writings can be read politically by placing them in
the context of his call for a dynamic body politic, his description of aggressive human instincts that require taming by reason, and his celebration of
heroes and geniuses. James advocated a pedagogy that would encourage
students to be responsive and strong-willed, but he was not entirely democratic in his thinking about the distribution of knowledge. He wanted the
college-educated to serve as a leadership class to balance popular instincts,
and he urged the people to act vigorously while being led and checked by
an intellectual elite. Is this a contradiction, and if so, what is its meaning?
Was James ambivalent about democracy, or is this type of educational elite
actually, as he claimed it to be, consistent with democracy?

98

Chapter Five

II
James called for Americans to overcome paralysis by embracing action
founded on chosen beliefs, and he developed an influential pedagogy compatible with democratic action. He applied his psychological theories explicitly and his political principles implicitly to the art of teaching in his
influential text Talks to Teachers on Psychology, which was widely used in
teacher training and reprinted twenty-three times between 1899 and
1929. He considered teaching to be his vocation, of both Harvard students
and the American public, and he identified education as a crucial component in preserving American democracy. 7 James was an innovative
teacher. 8 A famous story is told about Gertrude Stein who studied with
James when she attended Radcliffe. After reading the questions on a final
exam, Stein wrote a note, "Dear Professor James, I am so sorry but really
I do not feel like an examination paper in philosophy today," and left the
class. The next day she received James's reply: "Dear Miss Stein, I under stand perfectly how you feel. I often feel like that myself." He gave her the
highest mark in the class. 9 He enjoyed being challenged during lectures,
and as a proto-Bakthinian, disliked delivering monologues. 10 He surprised
his students by asking them at the end of his courses to assess them.
James's wish that citizens should be forceful, independent, and generous flowed from his pedagogical principles, and he sought to create in students a balance between action and thought. Teaching must be conducted
in such a manner that the dynamic character of the students, who are
naturally bold, curious, and energetic, will be maintained. He asserted that
teachers should stimulate students' imaginations, inspire them, and discipline them without paralyzing their wills. ''Although you have to generate
in your pupils a large stock of ideas, any one of which may be inhibitory,
yet you must also see to it that no habitual hesitancy or paralysis of the
will ensues, and that the pupil still retains his power of vigorous action." 11
James feared that elements of the intellectual life might induce paralysis: the universe could appear frighteningly complex; the habit of study induces rumination rather than reaction; one could become so balanced in
outlook, so used to seeing all sides of the question, that one becomes unable to act. James declared, "Not to be able to proceed to extremities, to
be still able to act energetically under an array of inhibitions-that indeed
is rare and difficult." 12 Although some inhibitions are necessary-only a
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maniac behaves and speaks without inhibition while a "melancholiac is so
inhibited that he does not act at all"-in the ideal citizen, action overcomes inhibitions. 13 James repudiated reckless, impulsive action without
regard to consequences as dangerous, but the opposite and equal danger is
no action at all. "There is no more contemptible type of human character than that of the nerveless sentimentalist and dreamer, who spends
his life in a weltering sea of sensibility, but never does a concrete manly
deed." 14
Because education's primary purpose is not to transmit ideas or information, but to supply students with resources for action, James held that
pupils should be encouraged to react to what they learn rather than
memorizing and repeating it. 15 In order to create something other than
submissive students, teachers should appeal to student interest, not fear.
Reliance on coercion to gain the students' attention "is a wasteful method,
bringing bad temper and nervous wear and tear as well as imperfect results.
The teacher who can get along by keeping spontaneous interest excited
must be regarded as the teacher with the greatest skill." 16 James also subscribed to "a complete system of self-government by the students." Students should be treated as adults and given responsibility for their own
affairs. 17 He claimed that students at Harvard had become more mature
in large part because of an "all but complete remission of paternalism in
the Faculty-government." The way to improve the conduct of students is
. t hem more power. 1s
to give
James exhorted colleges to impart to their students (and students to
the rest of the society) a liberal temper, tightening up the minds of the
romantics-making them clearer thinkers who establish evidence for their
propositions-while "softening" those trained exclusively in the hard sciences-leading them to realize the importance of poetry, questioning, and
imagination. 19 He desired that students be able to think vigorously and
independently and hoped they would develop open, tolerant, and unconventional minds.zo Knowing "the chief rival attitudes towards life," he
wrote, is the "essential part of liberal education. Philosophy, indeed, in one
sense of the term is only a compendious name for the spirit in education
which the word 'college' stands for in America."21 The students who imbibe this spirit of action and openness would serve as the teachers of the
democratic citizenry, which leads to the question, What is the source of
authority for democracy's teachers?
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III
If James's theory of pedagogy was democratic, his model for distributing
knowledge was elitist. What is the meaning of this new Jamesian paradox?
How was his elitism different from that of democracy's true enemies? Before
trying to salvage James as a democrat, I will describe his vision of the educational elite, the function of that group, and the processes of creating it
and spreading its influence.
The most antidemocratic element of James's educational theory was his
sharp distinction between extraordinary leaders and the common people.
As I showed in Chapter 1, James believed that communities determine
their fate by following rare individuals.22
The notion that a people can run itself and its affairs anonymously is
now well known to be the silliest of absurdities. Mankind does nothing
save through initiatives on the part of inventors, great or small, and
imitation by the rest of us-these are the sole factors active in human
progress. Individuals of genius show the way, and set the patterns,
which common people then adopt and follow. 23
The world ... is only beginning to see that the wealth of a nation consists more than in anything else in the number of superior men that it
harbors .... Geniuses are ferments; and when they come together as
they have done in certain lands at certain times, the whole population
seems to share in the higher energy which they awaken. 24
The distinction between "superior" and "ordinary" cannot be debated
here, but it can be noted that the role of the "superior" ones is to awaken
energy in "the whole population." Although it is true that James chose
representative rather than direct democracy, he did not say that the people
cannot govern themselves-after all, he called for student self-government-only that they cannot do so "anonymously," i.e., without leaders.
He also argued, as Tocqueville did in Democracy in America, that democracies require an influential aristocratic component. "In our democracy,
where everything else is so shifting," James wrote, "we alumni and alumnae of the colleges are the only permanent presence that corresponds to •
the aristocracy in older countries.... We stand for ideal interests solely,
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for we have no corporate selfishness and wield no powers of corruption.
We ought to have our own class-consciousness."25
Wolin responds: "James says that intellectuals need their 'own class
consciousness,' but before that he says that there are no interests and
selfishness. Would the formation of class consciousness not lead to the formation of corporate selfishness, and do teachers not have tremendous powers of corruption? A reader would want to know why James's sceptical powers suddenly are suspended." 26 By "class consciousness," James did not
imply material interests or the formation of teacher unions but was using
the political vernacular to state something like, We should recognize that
we are intellectuals and be proud of that fact, despite the attacks of antiintellectuals, because we have a public contribution to make. The present
danger is that intellectuals are not reaching audiences outside the academy
and are exclusively interested in concocting ideals rather than ensuring
that those ideals are realized in the world. His overstatement that intellectuals have no "corporate selfishness" may have been a function of the
rhetoric: calls for change often lack doubt.
Like Plato, James placed education at the center of his scheme for social
transformation. In The Republic and according to James's plan, leaders
would be qualified by their learning. Of course, the theories of the two
men are quite different. According to an old-fashioned reading of The Republic, Plato imagined well-trained philosophers who would apprehend
the truth in the forms and govern society according to what they see. 27
The conflicts and power struggles at the heart of politics would be eliminated because the correct path would be apprehended by the philosophers
and their authority would be undisputed by the many. A significant component of his educational plan and proposed social arrangements is to prepare the people to accept them.
Unlike Plato, James was committed to citizen action and to voting,
implying that he respected the average citizen's capacity for courage and
commitment to the common good. 28 For James, "geniuses" are characterized, not by what they know, but by the quality of their minds and temperament. By teaching the teachers of the many, the geniuses will transmit
their qualities to the people and thus prepare them for self-government, which means in large part that the people will become capable of
recognizing "good men" to serve as political leaders. For both James and
Plato, philosophers embody the brain and reason of the country while the
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many tend to be guided by instinct or desire. 29 James did not want to destroy the people's spirit, he wanted it ruled by reason. Both Plato and James
criticized political and economic institutions that inflame covetousness
and undermine reason. The college-educated, in James's approach, like
Plato's philosopher-kings, help reason ascend over passion, and thereby
produce sagacious public decisions.
Not unlike traditional images of the political theorist, James's
"geniuses" would lead the culture forward by interpreting both history and
the present in new ways, providing visions of new and more generous institutions and policies, and disseminating a magnanimous temperament
that would dampen the popular instinct for war. 30 Imagination, critical
perspective, and the ability to reason would be disseminated by genius-professors to their graduate students in universities who would become college
professors; college professors would prepare high school and elementary
school teachers. The transformation of the country begins with "the
reflective members of the State, and spreads slowly outward and downward. "31 Students trained in graduate schools would be the most contemplative, creative, and intelligent citizens. The healthy effects of education
would be widely distributed among the population by "inoculating as many
young Americans as possible with a general culture of the college grade,"
and professors would extend their benign influence on the nation via their
students. 32
Such men are the backbone of the country. And no one can question
the advantage to the country of having the largest possible number of
them go to college, broaden their intellectual outlook, gain the sense
of kinship with intellectual things, become once for all members of the
free-masonry of the Educated, and continue to be voters for ideal interests during the remainder of their life. 33
James did not always clearly distinguish between geniuses and teachers
since he anticipated that the former would pass their "spark" on to the
latter and through them to their students. It may be elitist to distinguish
geniuses from ordinary people but egalitarian to hold that the many are
capable of being influenced by the geniuses; and it is democratic to call for
the spread of college education to everyone with the capacity for study.
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American college students should come "from all degrees and ranks of society," not just the wealthy. James compared U.S. colleges favorably with
Oxford and Cambridge because the latter "are, on the whole, aristocratic
and not democratic schools. "34 Of course, not everyone has the intellect,
wish, or funds to attend university, but the masses of people would still be
affected by geniuses when they were taught in high school and grammar
school by the college students who had had direct encounters with the
geniuses or students of geniuses.35 Because of their crucial function of disseminating the democratic temperament, "the teachers of this country,
. rmture m
. t he1r
. hands. ,,36
one may say, h ave 1ts
How would these teachers be developed? In essence, college students
would learn by coming into contact with exceptional books and teachers.37

It is the quality of its men that makes the quality of a university. You
may have your buildings, you may create your committees and boards
and regulations, you may pile up your machinery of discipline and perfect your methods of instruction, you may spend money till no one can
approach you, yet you will add nothing but one more trivial specimen
to the common herd of American colleges, unless you send into all
this organization some breath of life, by inoculating it with a few men
at least who are real geniuses. 38
To say that there should be a few geniuses indicates that the task of education will be carried on by many who are not geniuses but who are educated. Nevertheless, the process of transmitting the spirit of geniuses to
ordinary people is made complicated precisely because of the distinction
James made between them. Will the ordinary folks listen to and be capable
of receiving the teaching of the geniuses? In a paper supporting a proposal
at Harvard to reduce the number of years at college from four to three,
James acknowledged the gulf between the people who are committed to
ideas and practical people, who will be touched by the scholarly temperament but will not become scholars. James did not believe that the aim
of education is to make all students "intellectuals," and since contemplation is not the natural temper of most students, it would be fruitless to try
to transform them. Such an exercise frustrates both the student and the
professor. "Listlessness, apathy, dawdling, sauntering, the smoking of ciga-
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rettes and living on small sarcasms ... are the direct fruit of keeping these
men too long from contact with that world of affairs to which they rightfully belong."39
What could induce practical people to take advice, within the university and without, from scholars? What would give the geniuses authority?
James thought academic style must change to attract popular interest. The
curriculum should not be arcane but speak to subjects in a lively way.
Whereas many people see colleges as exhibiting "a kind of sterilized conceit and incapacity for being pleased," colleges need to become robust and
hearty because "if a college, through the inferior human influences that
have grown regnant there, fails to catch the robuster tone, its failure is
colossal, for its social function stops: democracy gives it a wide berth, turns
toward it a deaf ear." 40
In college, the curriculum should help to form democratic students,
ironically by giving them an appreciation of excellence. James lived in a
time when the terms "masterpieces," "excellence," "superiority," and
"great deeds" were not impugned as being inherently antidemocratic or
culturally biased. He stressed the truths and standards of great books, saying that at college, students should learn respect for the first-rate and disdain for the trashy and impermanent ( 108). The aim of colleges is to promote "the higher culture."41 College, James said, teaches what "superiority"
.is. "Universities are already a sort of agency providentially provided for the
detection and encouragement of mental superiority."42
Although James did not believe in a canon and argued for broadening
the college curriculum to include modern works, he maintained that students should learn the nature of excellence by reading "masterpieces" of
thought and studying great historic deeds. Masterpieces stimulate the
mind while promoting standards of excellence and visions of alternative
societies. 43 In language highly unfashionable today, and not particularly
pluralist, James postulated that great books contain standards for action.
"The ceaseless whisper of the more permanent ideals, the steady tug of
truth and justice, give them but time, must warp the world in their direction" ( 110). By studying history, which describes the activities that "have
stood the test of time; we acquire standards of the excellent and durable"
( 108). Wolin remarks: "This is a very old fashioned notion that goes back
to the eighteenth century and earlier. It was always summarized by the
popularity of Plutarch in the education of gentlemen because Plutarch has
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a series of great lives and great men who were supposed to serve as models."44 James's traditional conception of education exposes his faith in truth
and the progressive direction of history.
James tempered the elitism of his paean to excellence in two ways.
First, he called for sympathy with people's mistakes and the pathos of lost
causes. 45 Then he said that great books were not the only source of an
education in excellence; people who did not attend college should receive
a trade education, which also confers upon its students the means to recognize quality in fine workmanship. That knowledge would impart the
ability to recognize and respect excellence in politicians.
It is not immediately apparent how teachers might follow James's advice
today in shaping the curriculum. And even after his caveat to remember
and empathize with the losers, one wonders if a steady diet of the excellent
and extraordinary in college prepares students to appreciate their fellow
citizens. As I showed earlier, James was torn on this issue, alternately praising the heroic pursuit of excellence and criticizing the American obsession
with "the bitch-goddess Success."46 This is not to say that James equated
excellence and success; success can be attained by standards lower than
excellence.

Having explicated James's theory of geniuses and the process of creating
them, I would suggest that his theory is not as elitist as it first appears, and
I will assess it by employing three criteria: its stated purposes, the method
of selecting the geniuses, and the relationship of the many with the few. I
argue that the elitist language James employed belies an egalitarian intention. He showed that a certain kind of elitism, the search for excellence
in intellectual and political leadership and its dissemination among the
many, is compatible with democracy.
James's democratic intention can better be discerned by looking at the
political and historical contexts of his theory. The "anti-Dreyfus craze"
fomented popular cries against les intellectuals; aristocrats indicted American populist impulses for undermining knowledgable guidance in public
affairs; •and the masses did appear to possess a hearty appetite whetted by
demagogues for imperialist wars. Against these challenges, James affirmed
that intellectuals serve the crucial function of moral and political leader-
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ship in a democratic society. 47 James has already been depicted as being
unafraid of popular action, even militant conflict, but he did fear the populist impulse behind imperialism, lynching, and corruption in urban machines and national government. Instead of being restrained by public
leaders, the human instinct for aggression was being incited by the tabloid
press, Theodore Roosevelt, and other demagogues. The same dynamic occurs today when some politicians and public intellectuals play on widespread fears of crime, unemployment, poverty, and the temptation for children to use drugs or engage in promiscuity ( and thus risk attendant
diseases or unwanted pregnancy) . Such leaders respond to these fears with
calls for harsh punishment of criminals, a buildup of the military, invective
toward real and imagined domestic and foreign enemies, and an end to
affirmative action, welfare, and government support for education, the
arts, and the humanities.
In the nineteenth century, James's friend Henry Adams expressed his
belief that the Constitution of 1789 was outmoded, in part because it left
power in the hands of the masses who were unqualified to wield it and
because those who possessed sensitivity, perceptiveness, and restraint were
excluded from positions of authority. 48 Such criticisms were at the heart of
the Progressive call for civil service reform and the replacement of machine
politics with managers. James conceded the force of these arguments,
agreeing that democracy "may undergo self-poisoning," but he did not support the elimination of popular rule-on the contrary, he invoked faith
in democracy, calling it "a kind of religion, and we are bound not to admit its failure." Democracy requires civic education so that citizens will
act wisely and, above all, choose good leaders. 49 This is the first political purpose of education in excellence: to help citizens recognize and
vote for representatives who embody the democratic temperament, i.e.,
who are committed to an active citizenry and mutual respect at home and
abroad. 50
Earlier in this chapter I showed that James's pedagogy was appropriate
for direct democracy, and then I contrasted his pedagogical theory with a
seemingly elitist formulation of the intellectual's function in society. I have
tried to suggest that despite James's overly sharp division between intellectuals and other citizens, ultimately the purpose of intellectual leadership is
to augment, not replace, democracy.
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IV
I began this chapter with a discussion of the need for a pedagogy that is
appropriate to democracy: Teaching that relies upon the coercion of grades
to elicit responses from students will only reinforce the passivity that
teachers say they detest. Professors should use their authority to undermine
student submissiveness, to wake them up. Certain teaching strategies, or
forms of discipline, such as requiring students to speak in class, can be
employed to motivate students to become active learners. As Rousseau
might have said, professors need to force students to be free.
James provided a cautionary objection to my argument that coercion
can be used democratically. He saw a danger in relying on it too much as
a mode of teaching and, instead, urged professors to make their subjects
engrossing to the students. "The genius of the interesting teacher consists
in sympathetic divination of the sort of material with which the pupil's
mind is likely to be already spontaneously engaged, and in the ingenuity
which discovers paths of connection from that material to the matters to
be newly learned. The principle is easy to grasp, but the accomplishment
is difficult in the extreme."51 Reliance on coercion to gain the students'
attention "is a wasteful method, bringing bad temper and nervous wear
and tear as well as imperfect results. The teacher who can get along by
keeping spontaneous interest excited must be regarded as the teacher with
the greatest skill. "52
Do not, then, for the mere sake of discipline, command attention from
your pupils in thundering tones; do not too often beg it from them as
a favor, nor claim it as a right, nor try habitually to excite it by preaching the importance of the subject. Sometimes, indeed, you must·do
these things; but the more you have to do them, the less skilful teacher
you will show yourself to be. 53
In place of stimulating student interest, teachers threaten students with
low grades, including points off for absences, late submission of papers and
tests, lack of participation in discussion, spelling and grammar errors, and
failure to do assigned reading.
Forsaking coercion is, however, problematic. Students of teachers who
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have forsaken compulsion often use their freedom to avoid learning. How
have things come to this point? Students who become accustomed to strict
discipline in the early grades do not always adapt well to freedom later.
They do not know how to work for something other than the grade, and
they become extremely nervous when they are unsure what the teacher
wants of them and when they are asked to develop their own ideas about
a subject rather than presenting those of the author or professor.
A highly disciplinary model of pedagogy serves the needs of our economic and political system. Guided by their parents, many students use
their college years to prepare for careers rather than pursuing intellectual
interests. Colleges and universities, eager for the tuition dollars of a shrinking pool of students, most of whom are anxious about their future, try to
accommodate demands for vocational courses such as advertising in the
Art Department, journalism in English, law in Political Science, and accounting and business in Economics. Students then complain of boredom
in classes they did not really care about in the first place, and which do
not speak to their curiosity or larger questions of meaning; students are at
other times impatient with courses that lack immediate relevance to their
job aims or to negotiating "the real world." The conception has become
rare in the enterprise of higher learning that students might not use their
undergraduate years primarily to prepare for a place in the world, but develop a critical perspective on that world, and even attempt to shape it
according to ideals acquired from their education. Unfortunately, the students do not complain enough about excessive discipline, which they assume to be part of the price that must be paid for success. Such students
will probably not assume leadership roles in democratizing American politics and civil society.
In the spirit of James's teachings about education, I would like to put
forward some suggestions for democratic change, even though I realize that
the maxims and the proposals that follow will seem old hat to anyone
interested in educational reform since the beginning of the century. I was
lucky to attend first a progressive high school that employed Deweyan
teaching methods and later the University of California, Santa Cruz,
which had no grades, no textbooks, rare examinations, few firm deadlines
for papers, and no attendance requirements. The university teachers assumed that the students had come to learn, and in most cases that as-
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sumption was correct. I heard many splendid lectures, but questions and
challenges to the teachers' positions were welcomed.
I have now taught for a number of years in more traditional institutions and have found the students, overall, more inert and the professors
more disciplinary and less experimental. Innovation now seems to mean
"group projects." Textbooks and examinations are the norm. Students
groan that they are required to sit through endless lectures without being
given the opportunity to react, and they should object more than they do
about being able to graduate from college without having to encounter
great works of philosophy, history, literature, religion, and psychology. The
idea of student participation in governing specific departments and the
university itself has largely been dropped. Student evaluations, distributed
and completed by rote, are what remains of the call for "student power"
that became popular in the sixties.
Given the present situation, it seems useful to articulate again the principles of democratic teaching. They include the disruption of inher,ited
ideas by questioning, indirection, and the presentation of alternative
worldviews; challenging students to become independent thinkers and political actors by having them read significant books that are meaningful to
the professor and potentially so to the students; sharing as much power as
possible with the students; and finally, having sympathy with and affection
for the students.
Translating these Jamesian principles into concrete reforms, here are
some suggestions. First, James called for students to experience "great"
authors and books. Even recognizing that the term "great" is highly contested and has been invoked in heated debates over expanding the canon,
perhaps both traditionalists and innovators can agree that the resurgence
of textbooks which, with few exceptions, are not brilliantly written should
be questioned. Their very emphasis on clarity and neutrality induces mental laziness in the process of acquiring knowledge. Students should, for the
most part, be exposed to powerful minds.
Second, reliance on examinations should also be reconsidered. Some
exams rigorously challenge students and require them to pull together the
various readings and ideas presented in the course, but too often testing
demands only a restatement of the professor's ideas and the information in
the text without eliciting a reaction from the student. Generally, it is better
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to allow students the time to write essays that analyze the text and respond
to it. This recommendation is an amendment of James, who apparently
took exams for granted.
Third, professors should require students to take an independent stand
in writing papers and in commenting in class, or at least to state their
difficulties in arriving at their own position. Students should not be rewarded for simply repeating the ideas of the professor or the text. This idea
is in the spirit of James, who told students always to react to what they read
and hear: "No reception without reaction, no impression without correlative expression-this is the great maxim which the teacher ought never to
forget." 54
Fourth, while making students aware of the classic works of Western
civilization, the teacher must show the students how their concerns are
addressed by authors of various countries, languages, periods, races, and
genders, including their own. White male students can learn from nonwhite authors and from women writers just as women and people of color
have always learned from white male writers. A multicultural education is
particularly necessary in order to engender mutual respect in the diverse
society of the United States. This point is a minor amendment of James,
who believed in teaching powerful books in addition to the classics, and
points in the direction of Dewey's multicultural classroom.
Fifth, outside the classroom, students should regularly participate in
department meetings and serve on search committees. By participating
more in the running of the university, students will better understand it,
and upon graduation, become more articulate supporters of higher education. The more responsibility the students are given on campus, and the
less they think of themselves as a subjugated group, the more lively they
will be in the classroom. James explicitly called for students to take greater
responsibility for student life on campus, so this proposal only expands his.
Sixth, academic departments and the administration should set an example for the students by being models of democratic decision making.
Decisions should be made openly and with the involvement of the entire
department, including the students. Democracy in the United States cannot be built from the top down, and we should start where we live and
work. This suggestion supplements James's thinking.
These steps, among others, might help release the intellectual energy
of the students, and invigorated students will be more likely to compre-
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hend the world outside the college and to react to it in a humane and
generous manner. Jamesian pedagogy would create citizens who are not
content with merely voting for qualified representatives. Such students
would not accept the lack of democracy in the United States and would
critically analyze and challenge the hierarchical organization of politics,
corporations, schools, and other institutions. Given the powerful economic and political forces that shape education, I, following James, may
overemphasize the ability of professors to change the character of the citizenry and create democratic forms of politics and work in America. Yet it
may be as Henry Adams counseled that "a teacher affects eternity; he can
never tell where his influence stops."55 On bad days, it is hard to tell where
a teacher's influence begins. But why not try?

Conclusion

I
Various political regimes reflect and shape different temperaments among
the citizenry. In a totalitarian society, for example, the citizens are generally isolated and fearful. 1 The Oxford English Dictionary defines "temperament" as a "constitution or habit of mind," 2 and related words are character, disposition, and personality. We usually apply these words to individuals,
but they can also pertain to a particular people, as when we say that southerners tend to be warm while New Englanders are more reserved.
James was preoccupied with two essential elements of a democratic
temperament that he believed were appropriate for citizens of the United
States: the inclination to action in the service of an ideal and mutual respect for all citizens and people in foreign countries, including those with
different aims. He was by no means the first to talk about the values of
democracy and mutual respect, but he articulated them well. He revealed
a great deal of what is best in the American democratic tradition or character, much of which may be in danger of vanishing.
Citizens in a democracy cannot always rely on representatives, bureaucratic officials, or lawyers to act for them. Citizens need to say: "Don't do
that for me; let me try. I want to have a hand in running it so let me learn
how it's done." Tocqueville captured this aspect of the democratic temperament in Democracy in America:
The inhabitant of the United States learns from birth that he must
rely on himself to combat the ills and trials of life; he is restless and
defiant in his outlook toward the authority of society and appeals to
its power only when he cannot do without it. The beginnings of this
attitude first appear at school, where the children, even in their games,
submit to rules settled by themselves and punish offenses which they
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have defined themselves. The same attitude turns up again in all the
affairs of social life. If some obstacle blocks the public road halting the
circulation of traffic, the neighbors at once form a deliberative body;
this improvised assembly produces an executive authority which remedies the trouble before anyone has thought of the possibility of some
previously constituted authority beyond that of those concerned ....
[I]f an American should be reduced to occupying himself with his own
affairs, at that moment half his existence would be snatched from him;
he would feel it as a vast void in his life and would become incredibly
unhappy. 3
The second element of the democratic temperament is respect for
other political actors, based in part on modesty about one's cause. I will
now put James's position, to which I subscribe, into my own words. We act
as if our causes were absolutely true, but James wanted us to temper that
belief, to realize that we cannot locate an objective foundation for it. Discovering that we cannot find such foundations should lead us to two somewhat contradictory conclusions. First, we should not be paralyzed but instead comprehend that we can choose our campaigns without guarantees
of their ultimate goodness or success. We cannot know for a long time,
perhaps not in this life, whether or not we chose rightly. Second, because
we do not possess certain knowledge that our cause is just, and we could
be wrong, we should be more generous to our opponents. In this spirit,
we might say: "This is how I see it, but I could be mistaken. It's only my
best guess. The changes we want might make things worse-freedom of
speech might permit fascism to flourish, the doctrine of localism could
lead to ethnic fighting, school busing may provoke more segregation-but
we hope that they will not, and we must run the risk. Try to see it my way,
but if you don't, we will remain friends. Let's keep thinking and talking
about the issue."
Tentativeness, acknowledgment of risk, self-doubt, and magnanimity
toward opponents may sound idealistic and quite alien to the actual texture of political life. Political actors tend not to be wracked by doubt. And
yet, democratic disputes are a part of ordinary politics and of everyday life,
and politicians have to respond civilly to critics and the opposition. Teachers hear views, often from their favorite students, that give them pain. The
professor might believe in community, but the student champions indi-
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vidualism. The teacher is a feminist, but the student clings to traditional
gender roles. Even friends cannot agree on everything: one is a socialist,
the other a capitalist; one eats no animals, another no animal products,
and a third eats meat regularly. Somehow these friends dine together without rancor or completely burying the issues. Disagreements can become
terrible-as when friends and families divided over the Vietnam War-but
within families, in the classroom, among friends, and in the body politic,
conflicts need to be tempered to prevent violence and dissolution of relationships. Conflicts can be restrained with a combination of humor, courtesy, respect, self-questioning, a thick skin, and recalling common bonds
and areas of agreement. Such a democratic attitude is necessary, yet fragile,
both for politics and society.
To say that there is a democratic temperament appropriate for all citizens will strike some readers as dangerous, particularly because James used
gender-biased language to describe that temperament. He labeled the ideal
citizen "manly" and the resigned person "feminine." In Chapter 2 I argued
that despite his language, James believed both men and women could be
energetic and active citizens. This ideal does not eliminate the problem
that trying to mold citizens to a democratic temperament might be coercive. Some people do not want to participate, engage others in dialogue,
or speak up when things are bothering them; they want to remain quiet,
reflective, and uninterested in politics. True coercion, however, comes
from the systems of command and obedience in the schools and in the
workplace, and democratic authority conflicts with those hierarchical
methods of shaping the character of the citizenry. I do not mean that shy
people have no place in a democracy, but teachers and bosses should do
everything they can to develop rather than quench the creative and active
impulses of students and workers. 4
James not only prescribed action and mutual respect but revealed their
complexity and the difficulty of having them both at once. Preaching tolerance or mutual respect is easy enough, but those attributes are hard to
achieve because most action is grounded in faith. James acknowledged that
the usual cause of action is a person's fervently held beliefs. One person
feels so strongly that Israel is endangering its future by giving back land
won in war that he joins a demonstration to protest government policies.
He believes that God has given the land to the Jewish people and that any
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government initiative to the contrary opposes God's will. This person potentially poses a problem for a democratic society. Democracies want their
citizens to act on their beliefs but must perpetually draw the line between
the fervent and the fanatical. Fanatics who believe that their aims are absolutely right, sanctioned by God, beyond doubt, and undisputable, are
dangerous to democracy both because of the violence they may commit
and because of the poisonous rhetoric they employ.
Although James argued that reason should be employed to temper differences-a key function of educators and political leaders-he was not
sanguine about reason's capacity for mediation because most people hold
ideas based on their emotions and personalities. And emotions tend to be
both revealing of their objects ("I understand her more than you do because I care about her") and selfish ("I care about her, and everyone else
can go hang"). Emotions tend to override reason and do not easily produce respect. The natural psychological inclination to disrespect means
democracies must rely not only on citizen temperament but on the restraints of laws and institutions.
The mention of reason embodied by the college-educated and virtuous
public leaders points to yet another seeming paradox in James and in democracy. Although people in a democracy should strive to respect everyone, achieving that goal requires leaders and teachers. Sometimes James
writes as if only the few geniuses and great individuals matter in a society;
at other times, he seems to value, even romanticize, the contribution of
ordinary people. Clearly, James's nonelitist interpretation of authority is
more useful for democracy. Democratic leaders and teachers moderate
popular passions and encourage the people to elect virtuous leaders, but
they also stimulate action and let the citizenry know that the nonheroic
activities of attending to politics, studying the issues, and voting for honorable politicians are essential to preserving the body politic. Such a vigorous citizenry might design new ways to institutionalize participation and
redistribute power from the center to the community.

During the last several years, there has been something of a pragmatist
renaissance. Many books are being written and symposia being held on
pragmatism, Dewey, Charles Peirce, and even James. 5 Richard Rorty, a
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prominent philosopher at the University of Virginia, and Camel West of
Harvard, perhaps the foremost African-American intellectual in the
United States today, are at the center of the revival.
John Dewey (1859-1952) tends to get more attention from the neopragmatists than James does from people interested in politics, although
Dewey himself acknowledged James's influence on his philosophical, political, and educational ideals. Dewey, a less-inspired writer, was more explicitly concerned with politics than James and put greater stress on the importance of community. Both men believed in the values of action and
mutual respect. Like James, Dewey saw the school as a central institution
for disseminating the democratic temperament and developed the conception of the school as a site where diverse groups of citizens could foster
mutual respect by getting to know each other's cultures.6 Dewey was far
more optimistic than James about the capacity of scientific methods to
guide government and technology in a healthy direction. 7
Rorty uses pragmatism to justify liberalism in the United States. Toleration, overcoming cruelty, and solidarity with others would flow from
the discovery of similarity between others and ourselves, and from the
need to relieve pain.
I want to distinguish solidarity as the identification with "humanity as
such" and as the self-doubt which has gradually, over the last few centuries, been inculcated into inhabitants of the democratic statesdoubt about their own sensitivity to the pain and humiliation of others, doubt that present institutional arrangements are adequate to deal
with this pain and humiliation, curiosity about possible alternatives. 8
Rorty undermines his call for doubt and solidarity by his peculiar use of a ·
second theme from William James: the will to believe. Rorty infers from
that will that Americans or people in any liberal democracy can champion
their own political systems as the best even if they cannot prove its superiority. In this reworking of a Jamesian theme, there is a strain of cultural and political self-satisfaction that is rarely found in James. Rorty
stakes out a position summarized as "postmodernist bourgeois liberalism,"
which he defines as the "attempt to defend the institutions and practices of the rich North Atlantic democracies without using [traditional
Kantian] buttresses." Rorty exults, "Lately our species has been making up
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a particularly good nature for itself-that produced by the institutions of
the liberal West." He identifies in human beings a "most advanced, sophisticated subspecies-the well-read, tolerant, conversable inhabitant of a
free society."9 If James praised the college-educated in similar language, he
also criticized their tendencies toward blindness and a false sense of superiority. Rorty urges both reform and pride in the existing order but gives
the impression that his heart is really with the status quo. In placing himself in the tradition of James and Dewey, Rorty understates the critical
stances of both toward American political culture.
Cornel West preserves James's critical spirit, finding in pragmatism elements of a political and moral vision. 10 He characterizes pragmatism as an
action-centered theory that respects the experiences of ordinary people
and finds in it justification for democracy, individual freedom, worker selfmanagement, and cultural heterogeneity. By contrast, bureaucracy, objectification, and commodification turn people into passive spectators.
West sees in pragmatism a melding of Jefferson, Emerson, and Lincoln.
Interpreting Jefferson and Emerson differently than I do, West finds in Jefferson individuality and community, in Emerson appreciation for the
heroic action of ordinary people, and in Lincoln a deep sense of evil encountered in the fight for justice. West declares, "Unique selves acting in
and through participatory communities give ethical significance to an
open risk-ridden future," and he endorses the pragmatic idea that people
determine the future through their own actions, not by triggering an inevitable historical process. 11
As a theorist, West models himself after W. E. B. Du Bois, James's student. Pragmatism offers West an alternative to the dogmatic versions of
Marxism, liberalism, and black nationalism, and he alternately labels the
type of political theory and theorist he favors as "prophetic criticism," being a "critical organic catalyst," and "genealogical materialist analysis."
Prophetic criticism exposes illegitimate authority, revealing how meaning
is produced and mobilized to maintain domination. It perceives the dignity in ordinary lives while encouraging social experiments based on improvisation. The critical organic catalyst studies and takes the best ideas
from the mainstream books; the theorist should tie the intellectual life
with the best political forces in the community. West adopts prophetic
pragmatism because it helps prophecy avoid the danger of dogmatism.
Prophecy becomes self-critical, but retains moral outrage. He also main-
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tains the prophetic element in his theory, drawn from Judaism and Christianity, because without it there would be a loss of "higher moral and political ground" for theorizing. "Genealogical materialist analysis" requires
intellectuals, in addition to studying various texts, to turn their eyes to
actual conditions in the world and the concrete history of those conditions. West's description of the theorist's vocation possesses a Jamesian
. . of moral senousness.
.
i2
spmt
West disapproves of certain strains in pragmatism and distinguishes
two political directions in it: the first linked with traditional liberalism
and social engineering; the second, with political critique, social reform,
and individual liberty. He claims that the neopragmatism associated with
Rorty, like the old pragmatism, ignores power and understates the impor.
1·1ty. 13
tance of mequa
I hesitate to find fault with Cornel West because I so greatly admire
his generous vision, public activities, and conception of the theorist's vocation. He has attempted to act as a bridge between left-wing academics
and the black community by trying to explain the preoccupations and
vocabulary of each to the other. I do, however, have some concerns about
West's work. He does not analyze in detail the texts he treats; he urges us
to focus theoretical attention on power, but does not himself analyze it
much; he lacks humor and irony; he does not acknowledge tensions and
dilemmas in his own ideals or the sacrifices and risks implied in his political vision. He desires community and individualism and respects Farrakhan and the Jews, the working class, and new age morality. A few lines.
from James may be appropriate here: "Most of us have a hankering for the
good things on both sides of the line [distinguishing contrary philosophical positions] ... [But we] cannot preserve a good intellectual conscience
so long as we keep mixing incompatibles from opposite sides of the line." 14
That said, I think West's description of pragmatism is essentially accurate,
although he may understate James's potential contribution to the politics
he endorses.

I have not tried to claim that James was a political theorist rather than a
philosopher. Instead, I have argued that political concerns were central to
his intellectual work and that studying James while remaining aware of
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those concerns is useful for political theorists and anyone interested in the
future of democracy. James should be read for the elegance of his prose, his
genius and generous spirit, and his insights into the possibilities and paradoxes of American democratic political consciousness.
He did not provide the analysis of power and institutions required by
a complete political theory, but theory does not offer one-stop shopping, and other theorists such as Marx, Weber, and Tocqueville may be
more useful on those themes. But James did specify the obstacles to equality and participation in the United States: the creation of large institutions, a natural drive toward elitism that requires constant restraint, and
the overvaluing of material success. He confessed and tried to root out his
own feelings of superiority while developing a language of respect for ordinary people that is appropriate for true democracy, a language that is at
once demanding and appreciative of the heroic nature of everyday efforts.
Among James's great contributions to American political thought is his
analysis of political psychology, particularly the necessity and difficulty of
achieving what I have called the democratic temperament: a vigorous citizenry respectful of differences among themselves and with other nations.
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the political life of a community and am trying to avoid an association with the
currently popular language of personal growth. The suggestion that public activity
can be fulfilling does not mean that politics should be seen as part of the self-help
movement.
24. Arendt is at her most democratic in The Human Condition and in Crises
of the Republic (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1972). She is far less democratic when she supports the Federalists and criticizes the Antifederalists for being
anti-institutionalists in On Revolution (New York: Viking, 1962). See Miller, Rise
and Fall, 9-10, 61.
25. Perry, Thought and Character, 2:315-16.
26. "Robert Gould Shaw: Oration by Professor William James," in Essays in
Religion and Morality, 73-74.
27. Quoted in Lloyd Morris, William James: Message of a Modem Mind (New
York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1950), 74.
28. "Politics as a Vocation," From Max ~ber, trans. and ed. H. H . Gerth and
C. Wright Mills (New York: Oxford University Press), 82, 95, 93-95, 77, 115.
29. Perry, Thought and Character, 2:574.
30. Talks to Teachers, 164.
31. In rereading Marx recently, I was struck by similarities between Marx and
James on the theme of thought and action. Like James, Marx demanded action,
asserting that merely changing consciousness was ineffectual. Also, Marx said in
"Theses on Feuerbach" that truth was not to be discovered in the world but ac-
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complished through practice. The possibility of meaningful work, for example, is
not a philosophical question but a call for society to create it. James expressed this
same sentiment repeatedly.
32. Browning, "William James's Philosophy of the Person," 163. Christopher
Lasch said that the sick soul described by James in Varieties of Religious Experience
becomes the "strenuous lover of life" (The True and Only Heaven [New York: Norton, 1991], 292).
33. Intellectual historian Bruce Kuklick disagrees, denigrating James, Josiah
Royce, and Charles S. Peirce as being apolitical, although he claims that "both
Royce and James popularized their moral and religious ideas." Kuklick writes:
"George Santayana put it well, if acerbically, when he said of the Harvard philosophers that they had an acute sense of social responsibility 'because they were
conscientiously teaching and guiding the community, as if they had been clergymen without a church . . . at once genuine philosophers and popular professors.' "
Yet, Kuklick concludes: "Whatever their concern for ethics and religion, James
and Royce gave little time to social and political philosophizing. Their output in
these areas was slight, their analyses lacked intellectual substance, and their applications were conventional and often trivial" (Bruce Kuklick, The Rise of American Philosophy: Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1860-1930 [New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977], 306-7). Obviously, I disagree with Kuklick's conclusion.
34. "Social Value of the College-Bred," 111. By "inferior human influences"
James may have meant priggishness and fear.
35. Arendt, The Human Condition, 178-79. The similarity between James
and Arendt on this point comes from Wolin's editorial comments.
36. On the public/private distinction, see Carole Pateman, The Disorder of
Women: Democracy, Feminism, and Political Theory (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1989), 118-40.
37. Talks to Teachers, 163.
38. 'htion, therefore, could be defined as an internal effort which had little
to do with physical activity. It was the kind of heroism that keeps sensitive and
thoughtful men from suicide, not the kind that wins battles" (George Fredrickson,
The Inner Civil War: Northern Intellectuals and the Crisis of the Union [New York:
Harper and Row, 1965], 232).
39. Talks to Teachers, 163-64. See also Browning, "WilliamJames's Philosophy
of the Person," 163-64.
40. He wrote, "The solid meaning oflife is always the same eternal thing-the
marriage, namely, of some unhabitual ideal, however special, with fidelity, courage,
and endurance; with some man's or woman's pains" (Talks to Teachers, 166).
41. Letters of William James, ed. Henry James, 1: 130-31 (emphasis in origi-
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nal) . In "The Moral Equivalent of War," James mentions "dish-washing, clotheswashing, and window-washing ... road-building and tunnel-making" (Essays in
Religion and Morality, 172).
42. "What Makes a Life Significant," 161 , 161-62, 163.
43. Will to Believe, 218, 137-38, 145-46, 227; see also James, The Principles
of Psychology, 2:123 5, and Browning, "William James's Philosophy of the Person,"
164.
44. See Sumner, What Social Classes Owe to Each Other, and Henry Adams,
The Education of Henry Adams, ed. Ernest Samuels (1918; reprint, Boston:
Houghton Mifflin, 1974), 224-36 and passim. Grant Allen (1848-1899) was a
prolific novelist and writer about Darwin and evolution (Who Was Who in America, vol. 1, 1897-1942 [Chicago: A. N. Marquis Company, 1942]). Allen visited
James in New Hampshire in 1886 (Perry, Thought and Character, 1:604). For
Grant Allen's direct response to James's criticisms of him, see "The Genesis of
Genius," Atlantic Monthly 47 (March 1881): 371-81. Richard Hofstadter's Social
Darwinism in American Thought (Boston: Beacon, 1955) is the classic work on its
subject.
45. Political theorist John H. Schaar's work has been in large part devoted to
the analysis of the causes for withdrawal from politics and to exhorting his fellow
citizens to join public life. See especially his essay "Power and Purity" in Schaar,
Legitimacy in the Modem State (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1981),
313-30.
46. Hofstadter, Social Darwinism, 133. See Will to Believe, 236. Hofstadter
added, "The pragmatists' most vital contribution to the general background of
social thought was to encourage a belief in the effectiveness of ideas and the possibility of novelties-a position necessary to any philosophically consistent theory
of social reform" (125). Philosopher Henry D. Aiken said that according to James,
"The world, and man as a central being in the world, is malleable, subject to
mutations brought about by the determined decisions and actions of ordinary
human beings" ("William James as Moral and Social Philosopher," Philosophic Exchange 3 [Summer 1980]: 58).
47. "Rationality, Activity, and Faith," Princeton Review 2 (July 1882): 77; see
also Will to Believe, 150, 235, and Hofstadter, Social Darwinism, 125, 132. "Great
Men" and "The Dilemma of Determinism" are in Will to Believe, 145-83, 21654.
48. Will to Believe, 246, 251.
49. Ibid., 218, 150. Note that James's list of historical agents includes both
leaders and ordinary citizens.
50. Pragmatism, 137-38 (emphasis in original).
51. Ibid., 138, 139.

Notes to Pages 22-27

129

52. William James, The Principles of Psychology, 2:1235; Will to Believe, 226,
248, 260. The account of Darwinism is drawn from Browning, "William James's
Philosophy of the Person," 164-65. Cotkin distinguishes James from Nietzsche,
saying that James believed most people could not be overmen and that God was
needed for most people to act (William James, 102-3 ). But James sometimes seems
to agree with Nietzsche that only the few count, and James's antifoundationalism
comes close to atheism.

Will to Believe, 227.
Talks to Teachers, 152.
Ibid., 159.
Will to Believe, 247-48, 100.
Perry insightfully claims in Thought and Character: "The heat which he
missed in Emerson, William James found in Carlyle. The essays published in 1898
under the title of The Will to Believe [which includes "Great Men and Their Environment"] were composed in part as early as 1879, and they prove how deeply
in his youth their author had drunk of Carlyle" (1:145). In American Monroe
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), S. Paige Baty's discussion of
53 .
54.
55.
56.
57.

Emerson on the great man and masses dialectic is highly reminiscent of James

(88-89).
58. Coon, "Courtship with Anarchy: The Socio-Political Foundations of William James's Pragmatism" (Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 1988), 67, 81-84,
114, 122-218; Cotkin, William James, 124; James, "Social Value of the CollegeBred," 106-12.
59. "The Social Value of the College-Bred," 108-10. Note that James shifts
his own identification between being one of the elite ("we alumni") and one of
the many ("the rest of us"). For the type of view James is repudiating, see Adams,
Education of Henry Adams, 248-49, 280-81. One can read Adams's suggestion
that the Constitution is outmoded as a rejection of democracy on the grounds
that a corrupt American public cannot choose competent and moral leaders.
60. "Robert Gould Shaw," 66-67. See also Talks to Teachers, 154-56.
61. "Robert Gould Shaw," 66, 72, 73.
62. This self-hatred may be largely confined to people raised in activist eras
such as the Civil War, the Roosevelt era, or the sixties, but I have also detected
it in some of my students.
63. See James in Perry, Thought and Character, 2:250-51.
64. Will to Believe, 242-43.
65. "Developing Community Leadership: Ella Baker," in Black Women in
White America, ed. Gerda Lerner (New York: Vintage, 1973), 348. Baker cautioned against excessive reliance on leadership saying, "I have always felt it was a
handicap for oppressed peoples to depend so largely upon a leader, because unfor-
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tunately in our culture, the charismatic leader usually becomes a leader because
he has found a spot in the public limelight" (351).
66. Ibid., 352.
67. Starhawk, Truth or Dare: Encounters with Power, Authority, and Mystery
(New York: Harper San Francisco, 1990), 269. On discussions of leadership in
new feminist and antinuclear movements, see Barbara Epstein, Political Protest and
Cultural Revolution (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991).
68. Will to Believe, 260-61.
69. Come! West also called for leadership: "There is no one who is willing to
be prophetic in a bold and defiant manner with a deep, all-inclusive moral vision
and a sophisticated analysis of the distribution of wealth and power and resources
in our society" ( Come! West and Bell Hooks, Breaking Bread [Boston: South End
Press, 1991], 48).
70. Clayborne Carson, In Struggle: SNCC and the Black Awakening of the
1960s (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981), 139, 171.
71. Ibid., 303.
72. Political theorist W. Y. P. Elliott wrote that "only a romanticist can follow
James as far as he leads in the direction of ... irrationalism and pluralistic individualism" (The Pragmatic Revolt in Politics [New York: Macmillan, 1928], 46).
Philosopher John J. McDermott said that "few thinkers have had James's
confidence in the capacity of individuals to transform their world by tapping the
energy of a voluntaristic ethic.... Nevertheless ... the individual is a social category, contexted over and over again by the swirling factors of institutional and
communal history" (The Writings of William James, ed. John J. McDermott [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977], xi) . See also ibid., xi-xiii.
73. Flathman, Willful Liberalism, 5; see also 69-70. In "William James as
Moral and Social Philosopher," Aiken said that in contrast to Royce and Peirce,
James was an individualist (55).
74. Come! West, The American Evasion of Philosophy (Madison: University of
Wisconsin Press, 1989), 60. West says that James possessed "apolitical notions of
how to change the world" (59).
75. Hofstadter, Social Darwinism, 134.
76. See Gerald E. Myers, William James: His Life and Thought (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1986), 439-42.
77. Santayana, Persons and Places: Fragments of Autobiography, ed. William G.
Holzberger and Herman J. Saatkamp, Jr. (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1987), 403 .
78. Gary Jacobsohn, Pragmatism, Statesmanship, and the Supreme Court {Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977), 45 n .15; Fredrickson, Inner Civil War, 237.
One might think of the Populists and Edward Bellamy, as well as Progressives like
Herbert Croly in The Promise of American Life (New York: Macmillan, 1909), who
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criticized individualism. See McWilliams, The Idea of Fraternity in America, 469-

506.
79. James to William Salter, 11 September 1899, Letters of William James , ed.
Henry James, 2:100-101 (emphasis in original).
80. Talks to Teachers, 4.
81. Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, ed. J. P. Mayer, trans.
George Lawrence (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1969), 506.
82. "The Dilemma of Determinism," 174-75; Pragmatism, 139.
83 . In Essays in Religion and Morality , 169.
84. James to Thomas Ward, January 1868, Letters of William James, ed. Henry
James, 1:132 (emphasis in original). See also Varieties of Religious Experience , 299;
Will to Believe, 232; "Robert Gould Shaw," 72; Browning, "William James's Philosophy of the Person," 170.
85. "Thomas Davidson: Individualist," in Essays, Comments, and Reviews, 8697. Davidson (1840-1900) was a "philosopher and wandering scholar" who was
born into a poor family in Scotland, studied classics in college, taught public
school in St. Louis, and fell in with neo-Hegelians there who influenced him to
reject positivism without embracing Hegel. He taught men and women from the
Lower East Side in association with the People's Institute and the Educational
Alliance of New York and went on to organize "a Bread-Winners' College" to
bring the fruits of higher culture to wage earners (Dictionary of American Biography, vol. 5, ed. Allen Johnson and Dumas Malone [New York: Charles Scribners'
Sons, 1946]). On the relationship of Davidson and James, see Perry, Thought and
Character, 1:731-61, and Coon, "Courtship with Anarchy," 84-102.
86. Myers, William James, 430; Hofstadter, Social Darwinism, 135; McDermott, "Introduction," in Writings of William James, xxxi-ii. James may be close to
George Kateb's notion of democratic individuality described in The Inner Ocean
(Cornell University Press, 1992).
87. "Thomas Davidson: Individualist," 94.
88. In Essays in Religion and Morality, 170. In "What Makes a Life Significant," in Talks to Teachers on Psychology, James asserts, "the distribution of wealth
has doubtless slowly got to change" (166). James's socialism was influenced by
Fourier, through his father Henry James, Sr., and H. G. Wells (Perry, Thought and
Character, 1:60, 2:289; Myers, William James, 439). In a passage interesting for
what it says about James's way of thinking, James paraphrased Wells's defense of
socialism in New Worlds for Old: "The commonest vice of the human mind is
its disposition to see everything as yes or no, as black or white, its incapacity for
discrimination of intermediate shades. So the critics agree to some hard and fast
definition of socialism, and extract absurdities from it as a conjurer gets rabbits
from a hat. Socialism abolishes property, abolishes the family, and the rest. The
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method, Mr. Wells continues, is always the same: It is to assume that whatever
the socialist postulates as desirable is wanted without limit of qualification ... it
is to imagine that whatever proposal is made by him is to be carried out by uncontrolled monomaniacs, and so to make a picture of the socialist dream which
can be presented to the simple-minded person in doubt-'This is socialism'-or
pluralism, as the case may be. 'Surely!-SURELY! you don't want this'" (William
James, A Pluralistic Universe [Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977], 40).
Cotkin rejects the notion that James was a socialist of any kind, labeling him an
"existential anarchist" (William James, 172-75 ).
89. Sheldon Wolin comments: "ls his individualism so concerned with leaving
a place for action as it is allowing variety to flourish even to the point of welcoming eccentricity? That's a different emphasis than other writers take with individualism. The starting point for James's individualism is his pluralism, not a kind of
atomism. Pluralism suggests that while there are differences and variety, there are
also webs of affiliation between the differences" (Wolin editorial comment).
90. Substantiation for these points can be found in Wolin, Presence of the Past,
and Miller, Rise and Fall of Democracy in Early America.

2. James and Gender
1. Varieties of Religious Experience (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1985), 45.
2. "Moral Equivalent of War," in Essays in Religion and Morality (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1982), 170. See also letter to Henry James, 22 September 1893, in William and Henry, 1885-1896, vol. 2 of The Correspondence of William James, ed. lgnas K. Skrupskelis and Elizabeth M. Berkeley (Charlottesville:
University Press of Virginia, 1993 ), 240.
3. "Moral Equivalent of War," 171 (emphasis in original). The term is misleading since in context James seems to refer to cleaning, building, and hiking.
On the dangers of masculine domination of nature, see Reweaving the World: The
Emergence of Ecofeminism, ed. Irene Diamond and Gloria Orenstein (San Francisco: Sierra Club Books/Random House, 1990); Wendy L. Brown, Manhood and
Politics (Totowa, N.J.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1988), 199-200; and Jane Roland
Martin, "Martial Virtues or Capital Vices? William James's Moral Equivalent of
War Revisited," Journal of Thought 22 (Fall 1987): 32-44; here citing p. 34.
4. Martin, "Martial Virtues," 39.
5. For a range of feminist thinking today, see Linda J. Nicholson, ed., Feminism/Postmodernism (New York: Routledge, 1990), and Marianne Hirsch and Evelyn Fox Keller, eds., Conflicts in Feminism (New York: Routledge, 1990). In this
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chapter I draw on Brown, Manhood and Politics; Christine Di Stefano, Configurations of Masculinity : A Feminist Perspective on Modern Political Theory ( Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 1991); Nancy C. M. Hartsock, "Prologue to a Feminist
Critique of War and Politics," in Women's Views of the Political World of Men, ed.
Judith H. Stiehm (Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Transnational Publishers, 1984), 121-50;
Martin, "Martial Virtues"; Hanna Fenichel Pitkin, "Justice: On Relating Public
and Private," Political Theory 9 (August 1981): 327-52; and Ann Popkin, "The
Personal Is Political: The Women's Liberation Movement," in They Should Have
Served That Cup of Coffee, ed. Dick Cluster (Boston: South End Press, 1979),

181-224.
6. See, for example, the striking difference between Wendy Brown's Manhood
and Politics and her recent States of Injury : Power and Freedom in Late Modernity
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995).
7. Brown, Manhood and Politics, 172.
8. Di Stefano, Configurations of Masculinity, 60. She writes that greatly emphasizing "self-creative abilities" is "misogynist because it perpetuates a fear of and
consequent need to dominate naturalized, and hence dangerous women" (129).
She criticizes male autonomy on 164, 168, 173.
9. Ibid., 22.
10. Brown, Manhood and Politics, 25-26. This critique of masculinity implicitly links feminism with pragmatism's traditional emphasis on concrete ends over
debates about abstract ideals.
11. Ironically, one of the clearest expressions of this distinction can be found
in Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition ( Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1958). See Pitkin, "Justice," and Brown, Manhood and Politics, for feminist critiques of Arendt's distinction. In Chapter 1, I showed that James did not sharply
differentiate public from private life and is thus close to radical feminism on this
point.
12. "Male gender identity, Nancy Chodorow has argued, is based on difference
from the mother" (Michael Paul Rogin, "The Great Mother Domesticated: Sexual
Difference and Indifference in D. W. Griffith's Intolerance," in Discovering Difference, ed. Christoph K. Lohmann [Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993],
180). See Chodorow, Reproduction of Mothering (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), 106.
13. Di Stefano, Configurations of Masculinity, xiv; see also 157.
14. Several of Sheldon Wolin's and Carey McWilliams's editorial comments
on the draft manuscript of this book seem worth citing directly. In commenting
upon this passage, McWilliams asks: "ls there no connection created when boys
identify with their fathers? And what happens to girls brought up by two gay men?
How do they create their identities?" (McWilliams editorial comment).
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15. Pitkin, "Justice," 341; Hartsock, "Prologue," 149.
16. Brown, Manhood and Politics, 116-17.
17. Hartsock, "Prologue," 149; Martin, "Martial Virtues," 39; Pitkin in "Justice," writes, "The appeal to heroism and glory unconnected to any standard of
right transcending the individual is bound to produce at best empty posturing, at
worst, violence and war" (341). See George Cotkin, William James , Public Philosopher (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990), 126, 146, 148, on
James's effort to break the tie between manly virtues and war. See also Christopher
Lasch, The True and Only Heaven (New York: Norton, 1991), 283.
18. Hartsock, "Prologue," 123, also 143, 146; Brown, Manhood and Politics,

79.
19. Martin, "Martial Virtues," 34.
20. Brown attempts to answer this question in Manhood and Politics, 189-211.
Pitkin in "Justice" describes a highly attractive form of democratic politics devoid
of heroic display, but she does not specifically call this a feminist vision ( 343-48).
21. On women's psychology, see Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's Development (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1982). On women's experience, see Sandra Lee Bartky, Femininity and Domination (New York: Routledge, 1990). See also Joan C. Tronto, Moral Boundaries: A
Political Argument for an Ethic of Care (New York: Routledge, 1993), and Sara
Ruddick, Maternal Thinking: Toward a Politics of Peace (Boston: Beacon, 1989).
22. Di Stefano, Configurations of Masculinity, 172. For a recent rendering of
the violence in cowboy life, see Cormac McCarthy, All the Pretty Horses (New
York: Knopf, 1992).
23. Command and obedience are sometimes necessary but they need not be
perpetual. After the crisis, there is room for more discussion. On feminist practice, see Barbara Epstein, Political Protest and Cultural Revolution (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991); Starhawk, Truth or Dare: Encounters with Power,
Authority, and Mystery (New York: Harper San Francisco, 1990); and Popkin,
"The Personal Is the Political."
24. Sheldon S. Wolin editorial comments.
25. Michael C. Adams, The Great Adventure: Male Desire and the Coming of
World War I (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990), is a powerful and
lucid description of how men understood gender roles in the late nineteenth century. I was surprised to see how much James's vocabulary both reflected and deviated from the Victorian discourse of masculinity.
26. Elizabeth Scarborough and Laurel Furumoto, Untold Lives: the First Generation of American Women Psychologists (New York: Columbia University Press,

1987),27-30,35-36.
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27. The Principles of Psychology, 2 vols. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1891), 2:1033, 939, 1054.
28. Varieties of Religious Experience, 73; Principles of Psychology 2:991, 1054.
29. Charlotte Bronte, Jane Eyre (New York: New American Library/Signet,
[1847]), 112-13.
30. See Gerald E. Myers, William James : His Life and Thought (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1986), 428-29. Martin, "Martial Virtues," would reject this
line of argument, believing that James's discussion of "manliness" applied specifically to men (36, 42).
31. James to Margaret James, 26 May 1900, Letters of William James, ed.
Henry James, 2 vols. (Boston: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1920), 2:130; emphasis
added.
32. "One could say that women have taken James's advice here, especially
since World War II, and thus have incorporated James's ideal of manliness"
(Wolin editorial comments).
33. Early feminists expanded the political significance of motherhood in order
to have a public role denied to them by men. There has been significant debate
about whether this move was liberating or confining (Linda Kerber, Women of the
Republic: Intellect and Ideology in Revolutionary America [Chapel Hill: University
of North Carolina Press, 1980]).
34. Varieties of Religious Experience, 212. Similarly, James wrote in his Principles of Psychology: "The passionate devotion of a mother-ill herself, perhaps-to
a sick or dying child is perhaps the most simply beautiful moral spectacle that
human life affords. Contemning every danger, triumphing over every difficulty,
outlasting all fatigue, woman's love is here invincibly superior to anything that
man can show" (2:1056). Although the sentimentalism and emphasis on maternity may be a bit nauseating, it is undeniable that James attributes to women the
capacity for being heroic, ascetic.
35. Letter to family, Dresden, 24 July 1867, in Ralph Barton Perry, The
Thought and Character of William James, 2 vols. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1935),
1:239-40; letter to Mrs. Alice James, 24 September 1882, in Letters of William
James, 1:211. The two statements of praise for the German peasant women are
fifteen years apart, written when James was twenty-five and forty.
36. This insight, along with several others in this chapter, comes from Elaine
Thomas's comments on an early draft.
3 7. Today, rhetoric against dependency is invoked as a justification for cutting
welfare and other forms of aid to the poor, but it would be incorrect to attribute
that motive to James in an era before the welfare state was created.
38. Myers, WilliamJames, 429.
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39. Essays, Comments, and Reviews (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1987), 246-56; the quotations that follow can be found on pp. 255, 250, 251
(emphasis in original), and 252.
40. Ibid., 253-54. A more reasonable objection to Mill's position, James implies, is that many marriages may be dissolved if they are based purely on affection
rather than on egotism and self-sacrifice.
41. Myers, William James, 426.
42. "The Strenuous Life," in Theodore Roosevelt, The Strenuous Life (New
York: Century, 1902), 3-4.
43. Henry Adams, The Education of Henry Adams, ed. Ernest Samuels (1918;
reprint, Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1974), 505. See also 379-90.
44. "Gospel of Relaxation," in Talks to Teachers on Psychology (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1983 ), 117-31; "Vacations," in Essays, Comments, and
Reviews, 3- 7; see also Don Browning, "William James's Philosophy of the Person,"
Zygon 10 (June 1975): 169; Henry D. Aiken, "William James as Moral and Social
Philosopher," Philosophic Exchange 3 (Summer 1980): 62-63; and Perry, Thought

and Character, 2:353.
45. "Moral Equivalent of War," 171.
46. Principles of Psychology, 2:1022-57.
47. Ibid., 2:1029-33, 1039-43, 1049-55; The Will to Believe (1897; reprint,
New York: Dover, 1956), 82-83; "Remarks at the Peace Banquet," 121-22;
"Robert Gould Shaw: Oration by Professor William James," 72; "Moral Equivalent
of War," 164-65, all in Essays in Religion and Morality; Robert L. Beisner, Twelve
Against Empire: The Anti-Imperialists, 1898-1900 (New York: McGraw-Hill,
1968), 40, 42; Deborah J. Coon, "Courtship with Anarchy: The Socio-Political
Foundations of William James's Pragmatism" (Ph.D. diss., Harvard University,
1988), 168. Although James does not elsewhere write much about political theorists other than Plato and Hegel, his Principles of Psychology contains many references to Hobbes's Leviathan and Locke's Essay Concerning Human Understanding.
48. James's pejorative account of homosexuality can be found in the next paragraph in Principles of Psychology, 2:1054-55. But while defending the eternal nature of heterosexual romantic love, he also proclaims: "Friendship exists now as
much as it ever did, but we fail to find in it food for the same literary treatment.
Young fellows inspire romantic affection still in old fellows' breasts, but the old
fellows are a little ashamed of owning to this form of emotional susceptibility now.
In ancient times it was the fashion, and they were proud of it" (review of Romantic
Love and Personal Beauty by Henry T. Finck in Essays, Comments, and Reviews,

404).
49. James says that the declaration of war on Spain reflected the problem when
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"the excitement of action gets loose.... Human Nature is everywhere the same;
and at the least temptation all the old military passions rise, and sweep everything
before them" {letter to Francois Pillon, 15 June 1898, Letters of William James,
2:73-74 ). See also letter to Frederic Myers, 1 January 1896, in Perry, Thought and
Character, 2:305, 309-17; ''.Address on the Philippine Question," in Essays , Comments, and Reviews, 85 ; Principles of Psychology, 2:1056-57; Varieties of Religious
Experience, 374; letter to Flournoy, 17 June 1898, in The Letters of William James
and Theodore Flournoy, ed. Robert C. Le Clair (Madison: University of Wisconsin
Press, 1966), 73 ; and Coon, "Courtship with Anarchy," 129-32, 149.
50. "Remarks at the Peace Banquet," Essays in Religion and Morality, 121;
Browning, "William James's Philosophy of the Person," 166-67.
51. Varieties of Religious Experience, 214-15 .
52. "Moral Equivalent of War," 170. James wrote, "Militarism is the great preserver of our ideals of hardihood, and human life without hardihood would be
contemptible ("Moral Equivalent of War," 166)." See also 169 and Myers, William

James, 441.
53. James's pacifism is revealed in "Moral Equivalent of War," 170. See also
"Robert Gould Shaw," 73, and Perry, Thought and Character 2:277-78. See also
George Fredrickson, The Inner Civil War: Northern Intellectuals and the Crisis of
the Union (New York: Harper and Row, 1965), 235, and Cotkin, William James,
121. James's anti-imperialism can be seen in Letters of William James and Theodore
Flournoy, 72. He exclaimed in a letter, "God damn the United States for its vile
conduct in the Philippine Isles" (quoted in Beisner, Twelve Against Empire, 4445).
54. Jean Bethke Elshtain finds James's formulation a necessary result of liberalism's "binary opposition between war and peace" (Women and War [New York:
Basic Books, 1987], 230-31). George Cotkin has suggested thatJames's fondness
for the rhetoric of manly heroism was due to the guilt he felt for sitting on the
sidelines during the Civil War, the great event of his generation (William James,
21, 29, 100-101). Read psychologically, James's call for the moral equivalent of
war was an attempt to claim some of the soldier's glory for civilians like himself.
R. B. Perry adds that James's "exhortation to action was addressed primarily to
himself" because of his periodic depressions (Thought and Character, 2:67 4).
55. Principles of Psychology: 1:130. In "Gospel of Relaxation" in Talks to Teachers, James wrote: "By regulating the action, which is under the more direct control
of the will, we can indirectly regulate the feeling, which is not. ... There is . . .
no better known or more generally useful precept in the moral training of youth
or in one's personal self-discipline, than that which bids us pay primary attention
to what we do and express, and not to care too much for what we feel" ( 133). See
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also "Moral Equivalent of War," 173-74; "Energies of Men," in Essays in Religion
and Morality, 136; Principles of Psychology, 2:948-49; and Browning, "William
James's Philosophy of the Person," 168-69.
56. Principles of Psychology, 2:1058, 1077-78, 1080-81, 1085-86. See Gerald
E. Myers, "Introduction," in Talks to Teachers, xxiii-iv.
57. On the cultural encouragement to violence in the United States, see James
William Gibson, Warrior Dreams: Paramilitary Culture in Post-Vietnam America
(New York: Hill and Wang, 1994).
58. McWilliams points out that societies not only curb destructive feelings but
frequently provoke prejudice and violence (editorial comment).
59. Will to Believe, 174-75. Of course, some effort to control fate is the essence
of politics. Pitkin writes, "What distinguishes politics, as Arendt and Aristotle
said, is action-the possibility of a shared, collective, active intervention in our
fate, in what would otherwise be the by-product of private decisions" ("Justice,"
345; see also 343-45).
60. Letter to H. G . Wells, 11 September 1906, in Letters of William James,
2:260; Varieties of Religious Experience, 117. One hopes that James's use of two
feminine images in referring to success as an enemy does not indicate unconscious
misogyny.
61. Varieties of Religious Experience, 72,318; Talks to Teachers, 141.
62. Quoted in Lloyd Morris, William James : Message of a Modem Mind (New
York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1950), 77.
63. See Plato, "The Apology." James's model presumes democratic institutions
that will not allow coercion of the poor when they attempt to act.
64. Varieties of Religious Experience, 240-56; Will to Believe, 101-2; Essays in
Religion and Morality, 169-73; Talks to Teachers, 172-75, 189.
65. It hurts to walk past a homeless person and to hear the long soliloquies
pleading for money in the subway cars just as it is painful to read the stories about
and see the pictures of refugees in Bosnia, corpses and survivors hacked by machetes in Haiti, the swollen stomachs of starving children in Somalia, and victims
of terrorist bombings, incest, rape, and murder. Although nothing like the suffering of the victims, empathetic pain must also be borne. How could Hegel have
found the will of God revealed in the morning newspaper?
66. Oliver Wendell Holmes, "Speech at a Dinner Given by the Bar Association of Boston," 7 March 1900, in The Occasional Speeches of Justice Oliver \¾ndell Holmes, ed. Mark DeWolfe Howe (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,

1962), 122-27.
67. Perry, Thought and Character, 2:251.
68. Perry is perplexed by the fact that James criticized in Holmes what "James
himself seemed so often to be preaching ... action for the action's sake" (ibid.).
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Perry claimed that James demanded that people "serve ... a moral ideal," but that
is something different.
69. Talks to Teachers , 163 (emphasis in original).
70. "Governor Roosevelt's Oration (1899)," in Essays, Comments , and Reviews, 163. See Fredrickson, The Inner Civil War, 236.
71. Brown, Manhood and Politics, 206. She also writes, rather ominously: "ls
this a clarion call for the death of politics, of heroism, of striving and glory, of
men? No, we must keep them all, relieve them of their pathologies and incorporate into them what they have excluded, repudiated, suppressed, and denied"
(187). On the difference between male and female heroism, see Di Stefano,
Configurations of Masculinity, 99-100.
72. "Certainly there are countless examples of people arguing for the courage
of one's convictions, of standing up for the things you believe. It does not always
have to do with death. Maybe with Machiavelli it courts death, but that is a very
special condottiere conception of courage" (Wolin editorial comments).
73. "Moral Equivalent of War," 170.
74. See Hartsock, "Prologue," 142. In "The Apology" and "Crito," Socrates
offers a model of being willing to suffer and to die in acting upon one's convictions, which he explicitly claims is based on the heroism of Achilles.
75. Varieties of Religious Experience, 214-15.
76. I recognize that the constrictions of gender roles have begun to be loosened only recently, that historically, women have been discouraged from taking
full part in sports and combat, and that women's athletics still do not receive the
attention and funding equal to that of men. For example, a generation ago women
were not allowed to guide rafting trips as often as they are now, and the following
comment about the ski industry is applicable to many other sports: "Skiing is a
very masculine sport," said Tedann Olsen, an advertising coordinator for a manufacturer of skiing equipment. "Men's racing has been better funded than women's,
and the equipment and sales reps are men" (quoted in Barbara Lloyd, "Women
Are Courted by Makers of Snow Boards," New York Times (11 January 1996],
Bl 7).
77. Adams, The Great Adventure, links James's suggestions for a moral equivalent of war with feminist efforts to find substitutes for military glory and says that
neither caught the imagination of the American public (82) . See "Moral Equivalent," 171-72, for a list of possible substitute actions.
78. "Shyness needs to be related to a substantive problem such as those who
by temperament or by inclination do not want to take part. Radical democracy
does not force people to take part; there's no need for that sort of Rousseauist coercion. Radical democracy is certainly about participation, but supposedly people
are rational enough to realize that their interests and concerns are at stake in
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what's being decided, and they should take part in their own interests" (Wolin
editorial comments).
79. "Moral Equivalent of War," 170 (emphasis added) .

3. Sources of Respect
l. Quoted in Benjamin DeMott, "The Twentieth Century, 1900-76," in
America in Literature, vol. 2, ed. Alan Trachtenberg and Benjamin DeMott (New
York: John Wiley and Sons, 1978), 808.
2. At least theoretically, the unity produced by mutual respect could produce
a strong state and a hegemonic identity.
3. See Michael H . Hunt, Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1987). Prominent recent examples include intrusions into Vietnam, Grenada, Panama, and the Persian Gulf. Recent U.S. interventions in Somalia and Haiti are ambiguous.
4. Steven A. Holmes, "Howard University Postponed Lecture by a Jewish
Historian," New York Times, 16 April 1994, A9.
5. "Mississippi Town Roiled by Lesbians' Plan for a Women's Camp," New
York Times, 9 January 1994, sec. 1, p. 14.
6. On veiling and the control of women in "established" Islam, see Leila Ahmed, Women and Gender in Islam: Historical Roots of a Modem Debate (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992), especially 149-55, 220-34, and Peter Steinfels,
"Beliefs," New York Times, 1 July 1995, sec. 1, p. 10.
7. See William E. Connolly, "The Problem of Evil" and "Responsibility for
Evil," in Connolly, Identity/Difference (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991),
1-15, 95-122. "The peculiar practices of Islam with respect to women had always
formed part of the Western narrative of the quintessential otherness and inferiority of Islam" (Ahmed, Women and Gender in Islam, 149).
8. This paragraph was suggested by Wolin.
9. See Federalist No. 10 and "The Ghostly Body Politic: The Federalist Papers
and Popular Sovereignty," in Joshua Miller, Rise and Fall of Democracy in Early
America (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1991), 105-29.
10. I will show later that Connolly has apprehensions concerning the responsibility that political community devolves on the citizens.
11. Giles Gunn, Thinking Across the American Grain (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1992), 3 7. Arendt also advises that in politics positions should not
be advocated as absolute and demands should not be nonnegotiable (see especially
Hannah Arendt, "On Humanity in Dark Times: Thoughts About Lessing," in
Arendt, Men in Dark Times [New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, 1968], 24-
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25). See Sidney Hook, "M & S Attitudes: A Reply," Social Frontier 4:32 (February
1938): 156. Wolin cautions that coercion may lurk in the ideal of negotiation:•~
politics that is strongly dependent on the practices of negotiation will be perplexed
or alarmed by the presence of stubbornly maintained differences and hesitate to
extend recognition or do it grudgingly" ("Democracy, Difference, and Re-Cognition," Political Theory 21 [August 1993]: 467).
12. Walter Lippmann, '~n Open Mind: William James," Everybody's Magazine
23 (December 1910): 800-801.
13. W. E. B. Du Bois, The Education of Black People, ed. Herbert Aptheker
(Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1973), 89.
14. On the domestic front, see John Higham, Strangers in the Land: Patterns
of American Nativism, 1860-19 25, 2d ed. (New York: Atheneum, 1963), 14, 21,
30-33, 68-72, 120-22, 144, and Harold Faulkner, Politics, Reform, and Expansion: 1890-1900 (New York: Harper, 1959), 163-84. For a similar concern with
cultural diversity by one of James's contemporaries, see William Graham Sumner,
Folkways (Boston: Ginn and Company, 1907).
15. Frank Lentricchia, in Ariel and the Police (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1988), posits that pragmatism developed out of James's anti-imperialist activity ( 112). On the historical background of American imperialism, see
Higham, Strangers in the Land, 144; Richard E. Welch, Jr., Response to Imperialism
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1979), 8-33; Frederick Merk,
Manifest Destiny and Mission (New York: Vintage, 1963), 234-65; and Walter
LaFeber, The New Empire: An Interpretation of American Expansion, 1860-1898
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1963 ). On American opposition to imperialism, including that of James, see Robert L. Beisner, Twelve Against Empire:
The Anti-Imperialists, 1898-1900 (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968), especially
38-48.
16. Letter to Theodore Flournoy, 17 June 1898, in Ralph Barton Perry, The
Thought and Character of William James, 2 vols. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1935),
2:307. In a footnote at the bottom of that page, James despairs: "The worst of
it is the complete destruction of the old belief in the vox populi. There is no
doubt of collective attacks of genuine madness over peoples and stampeding
them."
17. James to Mrs. Henry Whitman, 5 October 1899, Letters of William James,
ed. Henry James, 2 vols. (Boston: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1920), 2:105. McWilliams asks if James would have written these words a hundred years later-after
the crimes of Hitler, Stalin, and the Khmer Rouge, which involved deadly regimes
destroying large numbers of their own people (editorial comment). Wolin responds: "James's argument is not so much an embarrassment because of
Hitler, Stalin, and the Khmer Rouge but because it is a continuation of nine-
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teenth-century concepts of national self-determination and a forerunner of Wilsonianism. In the next quotation James uses the word 'harmlessly,' indicating that
the type of national self-determination that he is willing to defend is not aggressive and genocidal" (editorial comment) .
18. "On a Certain Blindness in Human Beings," in Talks to Teachers on Psychology (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983), 149. Note that here the
solution is to admit that you cannot understand other cultures. Elsewhere James
seems to think that you can understand cultures other than your own.
19. "Robert Gould Shaw: Oration by Professor William James," in Essays in
Religion and Morality (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982), 74. See also
Letters of William James , 1:252. The problem is that James calls for respecting not
only one's opponents but also the established rules of the game. What if the rules
institutionalize inequality and thus themselves conflict with the respect principle?
20. This insight comes from Wolin.
21. Adam Gopnick, "Read All About It," New Yorker, 12 December 1994, 98.
22. Talks to Teachers, 150; emphasis added.
23. W. Y. P. Elliott, The Pragmatic Revolt in Politics (New York: Macmillan,
1928), 47. In the Jamesian spirit, Robert Dawidoff writes, "Democracy requires
that one have a certain elemental sympathy with what other people think they
want" (The Genteel Tradition [Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press,
1992], 196).
24. Wolin editorial comments.
25. The Politics of Aristotle, ed. and trans. Ernest Barker (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1946), 129-32.
26. "What Makes a Life Significant," in Talks to Teachers, 158-59.
27. Ibid., 159.
28. Karl Marx: Early Writings, trans. and ed. T. B. Bottomore (New York:
McGraw-Hill, 1963), 12 (emphasis in original).
29. "Would you go so far as to say one should go further than not punishing
people for their ideas or not thinking about what they are say? Does one also have
an obligation not to promote political, social, or economic policies that will, in
effect, serve to eradicate that idea or make it difficult to hold for practical reasons?"
(Wolin editorial comments).
30. The Prism of the Self: Philosophical Essays in Honor of Maurice Natanson,
ed. Steven Galt Crowell (Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1995), 301 (emphasis in original).
31. Martin Luther King, Jr., "Facing the Challenge of a New Age," in King, I
Have a Dream, ed. James Melvin Washington (New York: Harper San Francisco,
1992), 21.
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32. Christopher Lasch, with Jeffrey Isaac, "Modernity and Progress: An Exchange," Salmagundi 93 (Winter 1992): 107.
33. McWilliams asks if these very terms are laden with disrespect (editorial
comment). Certainly, they are based on social standards that others are judged
not to have met. Can one remain respectful while saying, "That guy never did
much with his career," or must one, to be respectful, make no judgment, or go
even further and find something to admire in the man?
34. Mickey Kaus, The End of Equality (New York: HarperCollins, Basic Books:
1995), quotation and statement are from pp. 161, 163.
35. In a wonderful passage too lengthy to quote here, John Stuart Mill described his father as a model politician, in this characteristic at least, because although he disliked his adversaries, as activists are wont to do, he was fair-minded
enough to acknowledge the good points in his opponents' characters and positions
(Autobiography, ed. John Robson [New York: Penguin, 1990], 57) .
36. "Mandela and De Klerk: Words on a Transition," New York Times, 3 May
1994, A15. What led Mandela to give this gracious speech? Perhaps it was the
strength of his character, an educational influence, de Klerk's virtues, and a pragmatic assessment of the consequences of revenge.
3 7. Some political activists believe that academics are contemptibly weak
when they try to understand and speak moderately about their opponents and
that moving people politically requires fervid, unbalanced rhetoric. The second
point may be true.
38. In Men in Dark Times, Arendt uses different terms to indicate a generosity
beyond toleration. "This has very little to do with tolerance in the ordinary sense
. .. but it has a great deal to do with the gift of friendship, and with openness to
the world, and finally with genuine love of mankind" (26) .
39. On toleration generally, see Ingrid E. Creppell, "The Genesis of Toleration
as a Value" (Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago, 1994 ). Admittedly, James's examples of overcoming blindness are about acquiring a new point of view toward other
cultures, not studying them.
40. This sentence and the previous one were suggested by Wolin.
41. Talks to Teachers, 165-66. Violence and the reconciliation of labor and
management were central themes of political and religious theorists in the 1880s.
Although James shared with "social Christians" a belief in social harmony and
dialogue, along with a critique of capitalism's excesses, he did not put organized
religion at the center of his thinking about how to improve understanding between classes. See Andrew Feffer, The Chicago Pragmatists and American Progressivism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993 ), 67-116. Nor did James share socialists' faith that redistribution of the wealth would end all major conflict.
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42. Talks to Teachers, 133-34.
43. James Agee, Let Us Now Praise Famous Men (Boston: Houghton Mifflin
Company, 1941 ) .
44. I discuss the relationship of truth and action in Chapter 4.
45. Talks to Teachers, 132-33. Although I agree with James that reason is not
the root of most opinions, I would place greater emphasis on personal and cultural
influences, e.g., the groups into which one is born, the influential people one encounters.
46. For a discussion of parochialism and democracy in the context of early
American politics, see Miller, Rise and Fall of Democracy, 100-103.
4 7. James also contemplated leaving the United States because he so hated the
"sight of my fellow beings at hotels and dining-cars having their boiled eggs bro't
to them, broken by a negro, two in a cup, and eaten with butter. How irrational
this dislike is, is proved both by the logic, and by the pleasure taken in the custom
by the elite of mankind over here" (letter to Henry James, 3 May 1903, in William
and Henry, 1897-1910, vol. 3 of The Correspondence of William James, ed. lgnas
K. Skrupskelis and Elizabeth M. Berkeley [Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1994], 233).
48. Talks to Teachers, 154-56; quotation is on 154.
49. In this way among others, James's critical political position is different from
that of Richard Rorty, who invokes pragmatism to justify, even celebrate, existing
American values and arrangements.
50. One illustration of what James rejected is John Locke's implied dictum that
cultures which do not productively use the land deserve to lose it. "God gave the
world ... to the use of the industrious and rational" (Locke, Second Treatise of
Government, chap. 5, par. 34 ).
51. Talks to Teachers, 141.
52. Ibid., 146-47.
53. Dewey endorsed this outlook and adopted James's proposal of the school
as the site for learning about other cultures and imparting the temperament for
civilly discussing differences. See Democracy and Education, vol. 9 of The Middle
Works of John Dewey, 1899-1924, ed. Jo Ann Boydston (Carbondale: Southern
Illinois University Press, 1985), 14-28.
54. Talks to Teachers, 154-56. On this passage, see George Cotkin, William
James, Public Philosopher (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990), 110.
On Tolstoy's influence on James, see Deborah J. Coon, "Courtship with Anarchy:
The Socio-Political Foundations of William James's Pragmatism" (Ph.D. diss.,
Harvard University, 1988), 235.
55. Talks to Teachers, 133. Here the problem is too much distance, but else-
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where James urges us to realize that from a large distance, our differences are insignificant.
56. "The spectator has a long history in philosophy of detachment, distance,
and therefore of impartiality and objectivity. James is attacking a position that is
virtually identical with the history of philosophy. Today, Foucault and others attack 'the ocular position'" (Wolin editorial comments).
57. Talks to Teachers, 151 (emphasis in original). James overlooks the possibility of blindness to the faults in what one loves. Applied to politics, this oversight
might take the form of so much devotion to a cause that one becomes unable to
perceive in it danger, mistakes, or futility.
58. Like James, Adam Smith believed that true sympathy for others is difficult,
but he claimed that it is easier to sympathize with the joyful person than with
the sorrowful, which would indicate that we would shun the indigent, ill, and
needy (Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments [Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1976], 103-11).
59. Connolly, Identity/Difference, x, 178.
60. Ibid., 178. Connolly sees a hostility in identity-creation that may not be
intrinsic to it, i.e., one could imagine perceiving differences without the response
of envy and fear.
61. Alfred J. Kolatch, The Jewish Book of Why (Middle Village, N.Y.: Jonathan
David Publishers, 1981), 7.
62. Ambiguity in establishing identity can be painful in a society that requires
clear definitions: children of parents who have different racial, religious, or national identities than those of their community lose the comfort of simple solidarity.
63. Connolly, Identity/Difference, x, 179.
64. Ibid., 178.
65. Although I do know a man who nostalgically remembers the late Richard
J. Daley, mayor of Chicago, because opposition to Daley gave the man a sense of
purpose he missed later when fighting more ambiguous targets.
66. Connolly, Identity/Difference, 193. See Connolly's critique of Richard
Rorty in "Review Symposium on Richard Rorty," History of the Human Sciences
3 (February 1990): 108.
67. John H. Schaar, "The Case for Patriotism," in Schaar, Legitimacy in the
Modem State (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Press, 1981), 291.
68. Ibid., 293. Longtime readers of Schaar's work might find his embrace of
the Declaration of Independence ironic because throughout his essays (collected in Legitimacy in the Modern State) he criticizes such principles as independence, the document's implied definition of equality, and the pursuit of hap-
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piness while he advocates non-Jeffersonian principles of community, tradition,
and memory.
69. This was one of the first conundrums I confronted in political theory
when I discovered Rousseau in Schaar's class in 1974. I told him that Rousseau's
model city in The Social Contract would exclude its eccentric creator. Schaar
said, "You should decide whether that question really matters, and if you say
yes, then you should confront it seriously, thinking about it day and night for at
least a year. At the end of that time you will have to ask yourself, 'Am I with
Rousseau or against him?' I have done that, and I have decided that I stand with
him."
70. Randolph Bourne, another important voice in this conversation, said that
Americans need to learn to respect other cultures rather than requiring those
cultures to abandon their particular identities in order to adopt an "American
identity." Bourne taught that American life would be richer if immigrants
preserved what was best in the culture they brought to the United States (see
"Transnational America," in Randolph Bourne, The Radical Will , ed. Olaf Hansen [New York: Urizen, 1977], 248-64). Like Lincoln, James emphasized obedience to the laws. In a passage cited earlier, lawbreakers would not benefit from
James's famous tolerance ("Robert Gould Shaw," 74). Yet, influenced by Darwin's
model of evolution, James wrote in Will to Believe that geniuses and their followers
must transgress the laws to create new systems of belief and institutions ( 216-54).
No less horrified by lynching than was Lincoln, James was more sanguine about
the possibility of radical change.
71. The Portable Abraham Lincoln, ed. Andrew Delbanco (New York: Penguin,
1993), 22 (emphasis in original).
72. Elaine Thomas notes that in Lincoln's formulation the people do a fair
measure of preaching, enforcing, and sacrificing on behalf of the national covenant.
73. Schaar, "The Case for Patriotism," 296.
74. I do not mean to imply that a common belief of the American citizenry
in equality, self-government, and mutual respect is something to belittle.
75. Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, ed. J. P. Mayer, trans.
George Lawrence (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1969), 236, 510; Mary Parker
Follett, The New State: Group Organization the Solution of Popular Government
(1918; reprint, Gloucester, Mass.: Peter Smith, 1965); Hannah Arendt, The
Human Condition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958), 58.
76. J. Anthony Lukas portrays this transformation particularly well in Common Ground (New York: Random, 1986), the story of three families involved in
a clash in Boston over school busing.
77. Follett, The New State, 25, 39. This goal is obviously more difficult on the
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international level, but various exchange programs for students, teachers, and government leaders in which the languages, history, and customs of other cultures are
taught may do some good.
78. Schaar, "The Case for Patriotism," 296.
79. For example, Christine Di Stefano criticizes Mill's theory of tolerance on
several grounds, including that of missing the tie between ideas and interests

(Configurations of Masculinity: A Feminist Perspective on Modern Political Theory
[Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991], 169).
80. Rousseau, The Social Contract, bk. 2, chap. 11, n.1.
81. Norman Jacobson, Pride and Solace : The Functions and Limits of Political
Theory (New York: Methuen, 1978).
82. Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and
Spread of Nationalism (New York: Verso, 1991).

4. Faith and Doubt
1. One might say that the Soviet Union stands as a counterexample of the
benign effects of humanism because atheism did not undermine the ferocity of
Soviet communism. But, obviously, communism was based not on pragmatic humanism but on fervent faith in Marx and Engels, Lenin and Stalin, and dialectical
materialism.
2. Pragmatism and the Meaning of Truth (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1975), 290.
3. Ibid., 125.
4. Talks to Teachers on Psychology (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1983), 165-66. Wolin comments: "In thinking about James here, I am reminded
of Charles Taylor's argument that you should always try deal with opponents by
showing their case at its strongest, not by winning debater's points against them.
This takes James's point one step further" (editorial comments).
5. Wolin editorial comments.
6. For Follett, see Chapter 3.
7. James to Dickson S. Miller, 30 August 1896, in Letters of William James,
ed. Henry James, 2 vols. (Boston: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1920), 2:49-50. Two
types of actors, one acting on a "monist" model, the other on a "pluralistic" one,
are described by James in "The Absolute and the Strenuous Life," in Pragmatism
and the Meaning of Truth, 289-91.
8. Henry Adams, The Education of Henry Adams, ed. Ernest Samuels (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1974).
9. For an elaboration of the concept of "pluralist universe," see James, ''A
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Pluralistic Universe," in The Writings of William James, ed. John J. McDermott
( Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977).

10. Pragmatism and the Meaning of Truth , 116.
11. "Pragmatism and Religion," in Pragmatism and the Meaning of Truth, 13144.
12. The Will to Believe (1897; reprint, New York: Dover, 1956), 3, 184.
13. James discussed his model of change most extensively in "The Dilemma
of Determinism," in Will to Believe, 145-83. For an exploration of the meaning
of "success" in politics, see Joshua Miller, "No Success Like Failure: Existential
Politics in Norman Mailer's The Armies of the Night," Polity 22 (Spring 1990):

379-96.
14. Ralph Barton Perry, The Thought and Character of William James, 2 vols.
(Boston: Little, Brown, 1935), 1:488.
15. Varieties of Religious Experience (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1985), 219-20.
16. Ibid., 272.
17. See Sacvan Bercovitch, The American Jeremiad (Madison: University of
Wisconsin Press, 1978).
18. Brian Wiener points out that Jefferson can be read in a Jamesian fashion
if "holding" the truths is interpreted as "choose to believe" rather than "we know
without having to prove it that our American view is that of God" ( editorial comment).
19. The Federalist (New York: Modem Library, n.d.), 3.
20. Perry, Thought and Character, 2:277.
21. Wolin editorial comments.
22. Henry S. Commager, The American Mina (New Haven: Yale University
Press), 83.
23. Gay Wilson Allen, WilliamJames: A Biography (New York: Viking, 1967),
161-70. See also George Catkin, William James, Public Philosopher (Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990), 55-56.
24. "The Will to Believe," in Pragmatism and the Meaning of Truth, 125.
25. See Jeffrey Lustig, Corporate Liberalism (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1982), 159-63.
26. "Rationality, Activity, and Faith," Princeton Re1liew 2 (July 1882): 71.
27. See "What Pragmatism Means," in Pragmatism and the Meaning of Truth,

27-44.
28. Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince, trans. and ed. Robert M. Adams (New
York: Norton, 1977), chap. 15, p. 44.
29. Flannery O'Connor, Letter to "A.," 27 June 1959, in The Habit of Being,
ed. Sally Fitzgerald (New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1979), 338.
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30. David W Blight, Frederick Douglass' War: Keeping Faith in Jubilee (Baton
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1989), 11.
31 . On Wells's career, see Paula Giddings, When and Where I Enter (New York:
William Morrow, 1984), 17-31.
32. Martin Luther King, Jr., "Letter from a Birmingham Jail," in King, I Have
a Dream: Twenty-Four Writings and Speeches That Changed the World, ed. James
Melvin Washington (New York: Harper San Francisco, 1992), 98.
33. The religious sources of the civil rights movement are explored in Taylor
Branch, Parting the Waters (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1989).
34. See Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic (Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press, 1969), 344-564.

5. Democratic Teaching
1. The problem of silence is not unique to universities in the 1990s. Describing Harvard in 1871 Henry Adams wrote: "The only privilege a student had that
was worth his claiming was that of talking to the professor, and the professor was
bound to encourage it. His only difficulty on that side was getting them to talk at
all. He had to devise schemes to find what they were thinking about, and induce
them to risk criticism from their fellows. Any large body of students stifles the
student. No man can instruct more than half-a-dozen students at once. The
whole problem of education is one of its cost in money" (Henry Adams, The Education of Henry Adams, ed. Ernest Samuels [1918; reprint, Boston: Houghton
Mifflin, 1974], 302).
2. David Mamet powerfully explores these issues in his play Oleanna (New
York: Vintage, 1993).
3. Karl Marx: Early Writings, trans. and ed. T. B. Bottomore (New York:
McGraw-Hill, 1963), 124-25.
4. "If that is supposed to sum up what has gone before, it is more than a
feeling of power. I would assume that James is proposing actual institutional arrangements that would give the students actual power" (Wolin editorial comments).
5. Richard Hofstadter, Anti-Intellectualism in American Life (New York: Vintage, 1963).
6. Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York:
Pantheon, 1977).
7. In addition to Talks to Teachers, James wrote several essays on education,
including "The True Harvard" (74-77), "Stanford's Ideal Destiny" (102-6), and
"The Social Value of the College-Bred" (106-12), all of which are contained in
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William James, Essays, Comments, and Reviews (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1987). Although John Dewey's writings on education are more familiar today, Dewey acknowledged James had an important influence upon his own thinking. See Jo-Anna Johnson Moore, "William James and Art: Perspectives for Art
Educators" (Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 1991), 3-4; Frederick E. Bolton,
"Great Contributions to Education: 1. William James," Progressive Education 7:3
(1930): 82-87; and Bird T. Baldwin, "William James's Contributions to Education," Journal of Educational Psychology 2 (1911): 369-82.
8. Paul E Boller, Jr., "William James as Educator: Individualism and Democracy," Teachers College Record 80:3 (1979): 587-601.
9. Gay Wilson Allen, William James (New York: Viking, 1967), 305. "This
story does not show James to be democratic. It suggests that he was arbitraryindulgent ( if understandably) toward Stein and unfair to students who did the
work. In fact, it indicates his elitism: he made the very able Stein above the law,
a favorite preferred to her peers. Neither he nor Stein submitted to the judgment
of the community" (McWilliams editorial comment).
10. Ralph Barton Perry, The Thought and Character of William James, 2 vols.
(Boston: Little, Brown, 1935), 2:695-96.
11. ·James believed in teaching subjects historically so that human effort
and will would be appreciated. Colleges should teach "biographical history,
not that of politics merely, but of anything and everything so far as human efforts and conquests are factors that have played their part" ("Social Value of the
College-Bred," 108). See also Gerald E. Myers, "Introduction" in Talks to Teachers, xix.
12. Talks to Teachers, 106. "The mind of him whose fields of consciousness are
complex, and who, with the reasons for the action, see the reasons against it, and
yet, instead of being palsied, acts in a way that takes the whole field into consideration-so, I say, is such a mind the ideal sort of mind that we should seek to
reproduce in our pupils" (ibid.).
13. Ibid. James saw the typical southerner as all action, the northerner as all
inhibition.
14. Ibid., 50.
15. Talks to Teachers, 30, 32. James asserted, "You should regard your professional task as if it consisted chiefly and essentially in training the pupil to behavior"
(26). He defined education as "the organization of acquired habits of conduct and
tendencies to behavior" (27). Habits lead to destiny, and education changes habits. "The teacher's prime concern should be to ingrain into the pupil that assortment of habits that shall be most useful to him through life. Education is for behavior, and the habits are the stuff of which behavior consists" (48).
16. Ibid., 68. "You must simply work your pupil into such a state of interest in
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what you are going to teach him that every other object of attention is banished
from his mind; then reveal it to him so impressively that he will remember the
occasion to his dying day; and finally fill him with a devouring curiosity to know
what the next steps in connection with the subject are" (16). See also 73, 83,
107, and Myers, "Introduction," xix-xxiii.
17. The tone of college work, James said, should be adult and professional
("The Proposed Shortening of the College Course," in Essays, Comments, and
Reviews, 40).
18. Ibid. and "Concerning Student Celebrations and Self-Government," in
Essays, Comments, and Reviews, 124. "I feel, as do my colleagues, that the sense
of responsibility comes with freedom, and that a Harvard student can feel no
greater challenge to his self control and control of others than when he realizes
that the repute and safety of the college yard are committed entirely to his hands"
(123 ).
19. William James, Some Problems of Philosophy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979), xxi, 11.
20. He wrote in Some Problems of Philosophy, "If the best use of our colleges is
to give young men a wider openness of mind and a more flexible way of thinking
than special technical training can generate, then we hold that philosophy ( taken
in the broad sense .. . ) is the most important of all college studies." The goal of
philosophy may not be to find universal truth, but "one can never deny that philosophic study means the habit of always seeing an alternative, of not taking the
usual for granted, of making conventionalities fluid again, of imagining foreign
states of mind. In a word, it means the possession of mental perspective." He said
that students should get from their teachers, not doctrines, but "the living, philosophic attitude of mind, the independent personal look at all the data of life, and
the eagerness to harmonize them" (4-5).
21. Ibid., 10-11; see also "The True Harvard," 76.
22. "Great Men and Their Environment," in The Will to Believe (1897; reprint, New York: Dover, 1956, 229.
23. "Social Value of the College-Bred," 109.
24. "Stanford's Ideal Destiny," 104.
25. "Social Value of the College-Bred," 109-10.
26. Wolin editorial comments.
27. "'Do people truly deprived of the knowledge of each thing that is, who
lack a distinct pattern of it in their souls, who are unable to look at absolute truth
like painters and constantly refer to it over there and contemplate it as accurately
as possible, and then either set up standards here, if they must, of beauty, justice,
and goodness, or guard and preserve the existing ones-do people like that seem
better than blind men? ... Then shall we make guardians them, or the ones who
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... have also recognized each thing that is?'" (Plato, The Republic , ed. and trans.
Raymond Larson [Arlington Heights, Ill.: Harlan Davidson, 1979], 484c--d, 147).
28. See "What Makes a Life Significant," in Talks to Teachers, 150-67.
29. Plato, Republic, bk. 4, 435e-442d, 102-9.
30. See Sheldon S. Wolin, "Political Philosophy and Philosophy," in Politics
and Vision: Continuity and Innovation in ~stem Political Thought (Boston: Little,
Brown, 1960), 1-27; Wolin, "Political Theory as a Vocation," in Machiavelli and
the Nature of Political Thought , ed. M. Fleisher (New York: Atheneum, 1972), 2375; and Wolin, Hobbes and the Epic Tradition of Political Theory (Los Angeles:
Clark Memorial Library, University of California, 1970).
31. Talks to Teachers, 13. The intellectual influence would even extend to
other nations, although James does not claim that Americans invented the intellectual temperament. Universities should "mediat[e] between America and Asia
. . . helping the more intellectual men of both continents to understand each
other better" ("Stanford's Ideal Destiny," 106).
32. "The Proposed Shortening of the College Course," 36. James wrote in his
essay on "The Ph.D. Octopus" that the sole aim of graduate school should be to
increase the number of learned people (Essays, Comments, and Reviews, 70). See
also "Stanford's Ideal Destiny," 104, and Will to Believe, 260-61.
33. "Proposed Shortening of the College Course," 37.
34. Ibid., 37, 38, 35.
35. Democratic colleges should have the widest possible influence, James believed. The more people who came into contact with the college-educated the
better it would be for the country.
36. Talks to Teachers, 13.
37. "Social Value of the College-Bred," 110.
38. "Stanford's Ideal Destiny," 104 (emphasis in original).
39. "Proposed Shortening of the College Course," 37.
40. "Social Value of the College-Bred," 111. "If we are to be the yeast-cake
for democracy's dough, if we are to make it rise with culture's preferences, we must
see to it that culture spreads broad sails. We must shake the old double reefs out
of the canvas into the wind and sunshine, and let in every modem subject, sure
that any subject will prove humanistic, if its setting be kept only wide enough"
(110).
41. "Social Value of the College-Bred," 108; "Proposed Shortening of the College Course," 34.
42. "Stanford's Ideal Destiny," 105. College should teach "the sense for human
superiority" ("Social Value of the College-Bred," 108).
43 . "Social Value of the College-Bred," 107. "In picking out from history our
heroes, and communing with their kindred spirits . .. each one of us may best
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fortify and inspire what creative energy may lie in his own soul" ("The Importance of Individuals," Will to Believe, 260-61).
44. Wolin editorial comments.
45. "Social Value of the College-Bred," 108.
46. Letter to H. G. Wells, 11 September 1906, in Letters of William James, ed.
Henry James, 2 vols. (Boston: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1920), 2:260.
47. "Social Value of the College-Bred," 110.
48. See Henry Adams, Degradation of the Democratic Dogma (New York: Harper and Row, 1919).
49. "Social Value of the College-Bred," 109.
50. Ibid., 106. "The great problem is to make our colleges tell in our national
life: the leaders of every generation should as far as possible be college-bred men.
Now college breeding doesn't by itself make leaders; leaders are made by natural
ability and force. But the colleges ought so to cast their net that few young fellows of ability and force escape their toils" ("Proposed Shortening of the College
Course," 38).

51. Talks to Teachers, 70.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Ibid., 68.
Ibid., 71-72.
Ibid., 30.
Adams, Education of Henry Adams, 300.

Conclusion
1. Hannah Arendt, Totalitarianism (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World,
1951), 3-38.
2. The Oxford English Dictionary, s.v., "temperament."
3. Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, ed. J. P. Mayer, trans.
George Lawrence (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1969), 189, 243.
4. "Isn't this solution a little too easy? Doesn't it cut across the whole
thrust of capitalist understandings of firms and organizations? One has to face
up to the antidemocratic character of many of the institutions in the society,
of which the school and the workplace are only two-most important perhaps, but only two. If you're going to advocate a democratic citizenry, you are
going to have to be much more critical and expect much more. You will have to
understand not only those who disagree with you but those who have a power
which they would feel is threatened by the sort of formulations you are making
here. This points to a problem in James. Does he come to terms or even recognize
the difficulty of action in a hierarchical, institutional setting of the kind that you
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describe? Does he not tend to presume most of the time a kind of debating society
conception of political disagreement?" (Wolin editorial comments). In Chapters
1 and 3, I showed that James, while not concentrating on institutional analysis,
was sensitive to the threat large, bureaucratic institutions posed to the type of
citizenship he was attempting to develop in Americans.
5. I provide the bibliographic information about this revival in the section
"Suggested Reading."
6. Dewey, Democracy and Education, vol. 9 of The Middle Works of John
Dewey, 1899-1924, ed. Jo Ann Boydston (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1985), 25-26, 104-5.
7. Ibid., 227-33, 292, 298, and Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy and Essays, vol. 12 of The Middle Works (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press,
1988), chaps. 1-3.
8. Richard Rorty, Contingency, Irony, Solidarity (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 198.
9. Richard Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth, vol. 1 of Philosophical Papers (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 198, 213, 110.
10. Come! West, The American Evasion of Philosophy: A Genealogy of Pragmatism (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1989), 54-68.
11. Come! West, Keeping Faith: Philosophy and Race in America (New York:
Routledge, 1993), 28, 140; 29,291; 113.
12. Ibid., xi, 27, 89, 103; 139; 95.
13. Ibid., 135, 139.
14. Pragmatism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975), 14.

SUGGESTED READING
Students of politics or political theory might well begin to encounter James
through his essays "On a Certain Blindness in Human Beings" and "What
Makes a Life Significant" in Talks to Teachers on Psychology and to Students
on Some of Life's Ideals (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983; New
York: Norton, 1958). Then peruse Pragmatism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975), The Will to Believe (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1975; New York: Dover, 1956), and Varieties of Religious Experience
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985; New York: Vintage Books,
Library of America, 1990). Finally, selectively study his wonderful twovolume masterpiece The Principles of Psychology (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1981; New York: Dover, 1890). Scholars will want to
use the Harvard University Press editions of The Works of William James ;
everyone else will appreciate less-expensive paperbacks. John J. McDermott's collection of The Writings of William James (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1977) is handy.
Crucial James essays include "Robert Gould Shaw," "Remarks at the
Peace Banquet," "The Energies of Men," and "The Moral Equivalent of
War," all in Essays in Religion and Morality (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982). Other important pieces, including "Vacations," "The
Proposed Shortening of the College Course," "The Ph.D. Octopus," "The
True Harvard," ''Address on the Philippine Question," "Thomas Davidson: Individualist," "Stanford's Ideal Destiny," and "The Social Value of
the College-Bred," appear in Essays, Comments, and Reviews (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1987). In that same volume, read the letters to
the editor on disorders in the college yard, the Philippines, and lynching.
The review of Women's Suffrage by Horace Bushnell and The Subjection of
Women by John Stuart Mill in Essays, Comments, and Reviews, 246-56, is
James's .most extended comment on feminism.
James expressed many of his ideas most clearly in his letters. A selection
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of these are found in Letters of William James, 2 vols., ed. Henry James
(Boston: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1920), and four volumes have so far appeared of The Correspondence of William James, ed. lgnas K. Skrupskelis
and Elizabeth M. Berkeley ( Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press,
1992-1994). The traditional, and still excellent, starting place for seeing
the broad sweep of James's life and ideas is Ralph Barton Perry's The
Thought and Character of William James, 2 vols. (Boston: Little, Brown,
193 5). Perry combines biography, selections from the correspondence,
excerpts from James's published writings, and intelligent commentary.
James's life and the history of his family are fascinating. Gay Wilson Allen's William James (New York: Viking, 1967) is a straightforward biography. R. W B. Lewis takes on the whole clan in The Jameses: A Family
Narrative (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1991 ).
The secondary literature on James is vast, and I cannot claim to have
read all of it. For the purposes of discerning James's political ideas I found
most useful George Cotkin, William James, Public Philosopher (Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990), and Deborah J. Coon, "Courtship
with Anarchy: The Socio-Political Foundations of William James's Pragmatism" (Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 1988). Casey Nelson Blake, a
radical democrat, treats James insightfully in Beloved Community: The

Cultural Criticism of Randolph Bourne, Van Wyck Brooks, Waldo Frank, and
Lewis Mumford (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1990).
Jeffrey Lustig, in Corporate Liberalism (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1982), and Cornel West, in The American Evasion of Philosophy: A
Genealogy of Pragmatism (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1989),
analyze pragmatism from a radical democratic perspective, with incisive
treatments of James. James plays an important role in Christopher Lasch,
The True and Only Heaven (New York: Norton, 1991), in which Lasch
applies the categories of Varieties of Religious Experience to political actors.
C. Wright Mills in Sociology and Pragmatism, ed. I. L. Horowitz (New
York: Paine-Whitman, 1964), uncovers the political implications of pragmatism and has a good chapter on James. Wilson Carey McWilliams insightfully discusses James in "Old Americans and New," in The Idea of
Fraternity in America (Berkeley: University California Press, 1973), 47379.
A classic critique of the political implications of pragmatism, McWilliams's favorite, is W Y. P. Elliott, The Pragmatic Revolt in Politics (New
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York: Macmillan, 1928). Elliott was Sheldon Wolin's professor at Harvard,
as was R. B. Perry. Although sympathetic to James personally, as are most
commentators, Elliott links pragmatism with Georges Sorel on the one
side and Mussolini on the other. Richard Hofstadter, in Social Darwinism
in American Thought (Boston: Beacon, 1955), helpfully elucidates James's
critique of social Darwinism. Gerald E. Myers's William James: His Life and
Thought (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986) is thorough and helpful
for understanding James's politics (see chap. 13, "Morality," 387-445).
One of the best pieces on James is in Josiah Royce, William James, and
Other Essays (New York: Macmillan, 1911). George Santayana, who invariably speaks of his former teacher with a mixture of respect and condescension, has an essay "William James" in Santayana, Character and Opinion in the United States (New York: Scribner's, 1920) and comments on
him in Persons and Places : Fragments of Autobiography, ed. William G.
Holzberger and Herman J. Saatkamp, Jr. (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press,
1987). John Dewey frequently wrote about James; one example being
"William James in 1926," New Republic 47 (30 June 1926): 163-65, and
Theodore Roosevelt took a Jamesian theme in a dangerous direction in
"The Strenuous Life," in The Strenuous Life (New York: Century, 1902),
1-21. Horace Kallen, another student of James and a founder of the New
School for Social Research, penned a generous obituary of James in
The Nation 91 (8 September 1910): 210-21. See also Henry D. Aiken,
"William James as Moral and Social Philosopher," Philosophic Exchange 3
(Summer 1980): 57-66. George R. Garrison and Edward H. Madden in
"William James-Warts and All," American Quarterly 29 (Summer
1977): 207-21, harshly judge James's inadequacies as a political actor.
For James's intellectual milieu, see Bruce Kuklick, The Rise of American
Philosophy: Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1860-1930 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), especially the chapter "Social and Political Philosophy," 306-14. W. E. B. Du Bois, The Souls of Black Folk (New York: Penguin, 1989), displays James's influence, especially in Du Bois's idea of the
talented tenth, corresponding to Jamesian geniuses, who would raise up
the masses through reason and vision. I found it instructive to read James
as a counterpoint to his friend Henry Adams, especially on the issues of
nihilism, action, and gender. See Adams, The Education of Henry Adams,
ed. Ernest Samuels (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1974 (1918)). T. J. Jackson
Lears depicts the despair of public intellectuals in No Place of Grace : An-
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timodernism and the Transformation of American Culture (New York: Pantheon Books, 1981).
For historical context, I found most useful Daniel Schirmer, "William
James and the New Age," Science and Society 33 (Fall-Winter 1969): 43445; Walter LaFeber, The New Empire: An Interpretation of American Expansion, 1860-1898 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1963); Richard E.
Welch, Jr., Response to Imperialism (Chapel Hill: University, of North
Carolina Press, 1979); Robert L. Beisner, Twelve Against Empire: The AntiImperialists, 1898-1900 (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968); Henry Steele
Commager, The American Mind (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1950); Frederick Merk, Manifest Destiny and Mission (New York: Vintage,
1963); Harold Faulkner, Politics, Reform, and Expansion: 1890-1900
(New York: Harper, 1959); Michael H. Hunt, Ideology and U.S. Foreign
Policy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987); and Paula Giddings,

When and Where I Enter: The Impact of Black Women on Race and Sex in
America (New York: William Morrow, 1984).
On the issue of masculinity and politics, read Wendy L. Brown, Manhood and Politics: A Feminist Reading in Political Theory (Totowa, N.J.:
Rowman and Littlefield, 1988); Christine Di Stefano, Configurations of
Masculinity: A Feminist Perspective on Modern Political Theory (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 1991); Nancy C. M. Hartsock, "Prologue to a
Feminist Critique of War and Politics," in Women's Views of the Political World of Men, ed. Judith H. Stiehm (Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Transnational
Publishers, 1984), 121-50; Hanna Fenichel Pitkin, "Justice: On Relating
Public and Private," Political Theory 9 (August 1981): 3 27-52; Sara Evans,

Personal Politics: The Roots of Women's Liberation in the Civil Rights Movement and New Left (New York: Vintage, 1980); and Ann Popkin, "The
Personal Is Political: The Women's Liberation Movement," in They Should
Have Served That Cup of Coffee, ed. Dick Cluster (Boston: South End
Press, 1979), 181-224.
For a range of feminist thinking today, see Linda J. Nicholson, ed.,
Feminism/Postmodernism (New York: Routledge, 1990), and Marianne
Hirsch and Evelyn Fox Keller, eds., Conflicts in Feminism (New York: Routledge, 1990). For a blunt attack on James, see Jane Roland Martin, "Martial Virtues or Capital Vices? William James's Moral Equivalent of War Revisited," Journal of Thought 22 (Fall 1987): 32-44. Jean Bethke Elshtain
is more subtle in Women and War (New York: Basic Books, 1987). Michael
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C. Adams, The Great Adventure: Male Desire and the Coming of World War
I (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990), describes how men perceived gender roles in the late nineteenth century. For additional insight
into the 1890s on several themes, including masculinity, see James C.
Malin, Confounded Rot About Napoleon: Reflections upon Science and Technology, Nationalism, World Depression of the Eighteen-nineties, and Afterwards (Lawrence, Kans.: James C. Malin, 1961).
When thinking about action, I begin with Machiavelli's Prince and
then Hannah Arendt's The Human Condition (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1958). French theorist Georges Sorel (1847-1922) was
influenced by James and wrote about him, and Sorel's writings are excerpted and preceded by a masterful introductory essay in From Georges
Sorel: Essays in Socialism and Philosophy, ed. John L. Stanley, trans. John
and Charlotte Stanley (New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1987). John
H. Schaar makes the case for politics and addresses the problem of truth
and politics in a contemporary restatement of Machiavelli in his chapter
"Power and Purity" in Legitimacy in the Modern State (New Brunswick,
N.J.: Transaction Books, 1981), 313-30.
Lisa J. Disch pointed me toward an essay by Arendt that articulated
precisely what I admire most in James's theory of mutual respect based on
plural truths: "On Humanity in Dark Times: Thoughts About Lessing,"
in Men in Dark Times (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, 1968),
3-31. I encountered this theme first in William E. Connolly, Identity/Dif
ference (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991).
On education, I drew from Jo-Anna Johnson Moore, "William James
and Art: Perspectives for Art Educators" (Ph.D. diss., Harvard University,
1991); Paul F. Boller, Jr., "William James as Educator: Individualism and
Democracy," Teachers College Record 80:3 (1979): 587-601; Frederick E.
Bolton, "Great Contributions to Education: 1. William James," Progressive
Education 7:3 (1930): 82-88; C. Wright Mills, "Social Role of the Intellectual" and "Mass Society and Liberal Education," in Power, Politics, and
People, ed. I. L. Horowitz (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963); and
James Mclachlan, '~merican Colleges and the Transmission of Culture:
The Case of the Mugwumps," in Stanley Elkins and Eric McKitrick, eds.,
The Hofstadter Aegis (New York: Knopf, 1974). Merle Curti offers a devastating critique of James and Dewey in The Social Ideas of American Education (Patterson, N.J.: Littlefield, Adams and Company, 1959). I caught
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the spirit of educational innovation from John Andrew Rice, I Came Out
of the Eighteenth Century (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1942), in
which Rice, who founded Black Mountain College, wrote: "Black Mountain was to be education for democracy.... If it was to be education for
democracy, if that was its end, that must also be its means: it must be
education in democracy" (327). His stories about John Dewey ("the only
man I have ever known who was completely fit and fitted to live in a democracy" [331]) could almost make you like Dewey.
The tension between progressive education and the movement to
make great books the center of the college curriculum deserves further
study. Start with the debate between Dewey and Robert Hutchins in Social
Frontier. Dewey presented "President Hutchins' Proposals to Remake
Higher Education," Social Frontier 3 (January 193 7): 103-4, and Hutchins
responded with "Grammar, Rhetoric, and Mr. Dewey," in Social Frontier
3 (February 193 7): 13 7-39. They then went at each other a few more
times.
The recent interest in pragmatism as democratic politics has centered
on Dewey, not James. From the standpoint of democratic thought, Dewey's
central works are The Public and Its Problems ( 192 7; reprint, Athens, Ohio:
Swallow, 1954); Democracy and Education, vol. 9 of The Middle Works of
John Dewey, 1899-1924, ed. Jo Ann Boydston (Carbondale: Southern
Illinois University Press, 1985); and Reconstruction in Philosophy and Essays, vol. 12 of The Middle Works, ( 1988). See also Experience and Education (New York: Macmillan Collier, 1962), and "The Bearings of Pragmatism upon Education," in The Middle Works, vol. 4 (1977), 178-91.
Democratic theorists will not soon surpass Robert B. Westbrook's lengthy
and thorough study, John Dewey and American Democracy (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1991). Wilson Carey McWilliams writes on Dewey in
The Idea of Fraternity in America (526-38); Richard Hofstadter, Anti-Intellectualism in American Life (New York: Vintage, 1963), is highly critical of James's and Dewey's conceptions of progressive education; and Benjamin Barber draws on Dewey in Strong Democracy: Participatory Politics
for a New Age (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984). See also
Alan Ryan, John Dewey and the High Tide of American Liberalism (New
York: W W Norton, 1995).
James said Charles S. Peirce invented pragmatism, and he certainly developed a more communitarian epistemology than did James. Peirce's key
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writings, including "The Fixation of Beliefs" and "How to Make Our Ideas
Clear," can be found in Essential Peirce, vol. 1, ed. Nathan Houser and
Christian Kloesel (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992) . See
also James Hoopes, "Objectivity and Relativism Affirmed: Historical
Knowledge and the Philosophy of Charles S. Peirce," American Historical
Review 98 (December 1993): 1545-55. Joseph Brent, in Charles Sanders
Peirce: A Life (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993 ), portrays a
tormented and truly interesting man.
Some books I recognize as being substantial and important, even if I
did not draw on them much in this book. Schaar told me as I embarked
on this project that I would have to decide if I could possibly add anything
to Jacques Barzun's A Stroll with William James (New York: Harper and
Row, 1983), but I found that Barzun's interests in James almost completely
differed from my own with the exception of the chapter "Freedom and
Risk," which is concerned with action. Serious scholars of pragmatism and
politics should consult James T. Kloppenberg, Uncertain Victory : Social
Democracy and Progressivism in European and American Thought, 18701920 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986); Richard Flathman,
Willful Liberalism: Voluntarism and Individuality in Political Theory and
Practice (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992); Ross Posnock, The Trial
of Curiosity: Henry James, William James, and the Challenge of Modernity
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1991); and John P. Diggins, The
Promise of Pragmatism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994).
Kloppenberg, Robert B. Westbrook, and James Hoopes review Diggins's
book, followed by a reply from Diggins, in the Intellectual History Newsletter 17 (1995): 3-30. See also Richard Bernstein, "Dewey, Democracy:
The Task Before Us," in Post-Analytic Philosophy, ed. John Rajchman and
Cornell West (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985).
Richard Rorty is perhaps the key figure in the pragmatist revival, but
he wants pragmatism to serve the cause of liberalism, not radical democracy. On the link between philosophy and politics, see pt. 3 of Rorty's Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth: Philosophical Papers, vol. 1 (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1991 ), and Contingency, Irony, Solidarity
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989). New works about Rorty
are published every week. See the critiques of Rorty by William E. Connolly, "Review Symposium on Richard Rorty," in History of the Human
Sciences 3 (February 1990): 101-22; Richard Bernstein, "One Step For-
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ward, Two Steps Back," Political Theory 15 (November 1987): 538-63;
Cornel West, "The Politics of American Nee-Pragmatism," in Post-Analytic Philosophy, ed. John Rachjman and Cornel West (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985), 259-75; and Sheldon S. Wolin, "Democracy
in the Discourse of Postmodernism," Social Research 57 (Spring 1990):
5-30. Rorty's exchange with Clifford Geertz is especially worth reading. Geertz's "Uses of Diversity" appeared in Michigan Quarterly Review 25
(1986): 525-34; Rorty's comment, "On Ethnocentrism: A Reply to Clifford Geertz," was published in Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth, 203-10.
To explore further the tradition of political theory to which I subscribe,
see Sheldon S. Wolin, Politics and Vision : Continuity and Innovation in
Western Political Thought (Boston: Little, Brown, 1960), Arendt, The Human Condition, and Schaar, Legitimacy in the Modern State. Although I
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